James F. Diamond

This costs endorsement followed a plaintiff's motion to amend her Statement of Claim at the outset of trial, which resulted in an adjournment.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs for costs thrown away and for the motion to amend.

The court considered the principles for compensatory cost awards on motions to amend, rejecting the plaintiff's arguments regarding prematurity, unsupported impecuniosity, and alleged inequitable conduct by the defendants.

While finding no substantive grounds to deny costs, the court adjusted the defendants' requested amounts due to identified duplication of effort and time not truly "thrown away," ultimately awarding the defendants $22,500.00 on a substantial indemnity basis for costs thrown away and $1,500.00 on a partial indemnity basis for the motion to amend.

The court determined costs for several motions following a previous endorsement.

Filomena Siggillino was ordered to pay costs for an abandoned motion.

Filomena, Teresa Scalamogna, and Lilianna Siggillino were ordered to pay costs for a successful Vesting Order motion brought by 2377544 Ontario Inc. and an unsuccessful Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) motion brought by Filomena.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the request for substantial indemnity, and adjusted the claimed amounts based on the complexity of the proceedings, the results achieved, and the clarity of the costs submissions.

The defendant, The Personal Insurance Company of Canada, sought to have the same judge who granted its initial summary judgment motion hear a subsequent 'further motion' to dismiss the balance of the plaintiff's action.

The plaintiff opposed this request, arguing the relief was inappropriate for summary judgment and citing concerns about the judge's prior favourable ruling.

The court, referencing Hryniak v. Mauldin, declined to seize itself of the further motion, clarifying that the obligation to craft a trial process arises when summary judgment motions are dismissed, not granted.

However, the court offered to case manage the interim issues related to the second motion.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendants were partially successful in striking out "campaign of defamation" allegations from the plaintiffs' Amended Statement of Claim, while the plaintiffs successfully opposed striking out pleas of malice.

The defendants sought $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01 and considering the "fair and reasonable" principle, found that despite divided success, the "campaign of defamation" allegations were a principal issue where the defendants' position was validated.

The court awarded the defendants $11,500 in all-inclusive costs, payable by the plaintiffs.

This endorsement addresses two motions within related legal proceedings concerning a "family feud" over a property.

Robert Di Toro, on behalf of 2377544 Ontario Inc., sought a vesting order to facilitate the sale of a property, with $1,500,000.00 to be paid into court as previously ordered by Master Short.

Filomena Siggillino, the mother of the other parties, brought a cross-motion for leave to register her own Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the property, alleging fraudulent misuse of a Power of Attorney by her daughters, Teresa Scalamogna and Lilianna Siggillino.

The court dismissed Filomena's cross-motion for a CPL, finding no tenable cause of action against Robert/2377544 Ontario Inc. and that damages would be an appropriate remedy.

The court also noted the disingenuous position of Teresa and Lilianna in supporting their mother's motion, which undermined their own prior claims, constituting an abuse of process.

Consequently, the court granted the vesting order sought by 2377544 Ontario Inc., allowing the property sale to proceed with the specified funds paid into court.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a declaration that the parties had a binding settlement agreement, including a mutual release covering all claims, even those not pleaded, specifically regarding a property in Bulgaria.

The plaintiffs argued the release was limited to claims within the litigation.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, holding that the phrase 'and otherwise' in the Minutes of Settlement did not extend to unpleaded claims, particularly those not previously raised, without more precise language.

The court emphasized that a general release requires specific wording to cover unknown claims and that it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite the settlement terms.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's subrogated action, arguing it was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, having been commenced more than two years after a fire and explosion.

The plaintiff, through its insurer Intact, contended that the claim was not discovered until the Ontario Fire Marshal's report identified the cause as arson.

The court found Intact's evidence regarding its due diligence in investigating the claim to be significantly lacking, relying on hearsay.

Despite the evidentiary deficiencies, the court, applying the enhanced powers under Rule 20, ordered a mini-trial to determine the issue of Intact's reasonable diligence in discovering the claim, emphasizing the need for a fair and just adjudication and the unique circumstances of pending official investigations.

The plaintiff's action for $3.13 million in damages for "humiliation" and "aggravation" arising from debt collection efforts was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court had previously stayed the proceeding pending a response from the plaintiff regarding the contemplated dismissal, but no response was received.

The alleged misconduct related to a debt already subject to a previously dismissed proceeding, reinforcing the court's finding of abuse of process.

The defendant, National Bank of Canada, brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's Amended Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim, specifically claims for intentional interference with economic relations and breach of the duty of good faith.

The court granted the motion to strike the claim for intentional interference with economic relations, but with leave to amend, finding the plaintiff failed to plead an unlawful act actionable by a third party.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the claim for breach of the duty of good faith, finding it was not plain and obvious that it could not succeed, but ordered the plaintiff to provide further particulars.

The plaintiff, Antonio Marques, was terminated without cause by the defendant, Delmar International Inc., after 7.5 months of employment.

The parties brought a motion for summary judgment to determine three issues: whether a monthly car allowance was part of the plaintiff's remuneration, whether the plaintiff was entitled to a guaranteed bonus payment as part of wrongful dismissal damages, and the amount of common law reasonable notice.

The court found the car allowance was part of remuneration.

The bonus was conditional on the notice period extending to the one-year anniversary of employment.

The court awarded 4 months' reasonable notice, which did not extend to the one-year anniversary, thus disentitling the plaintiff to the bonus.

This action was referred to the court under Rule 2.1.01(7) following a request by the Children's Aid Society of London and Middlesex under Rule 2.1.01(6) to dismiss the proceeding as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court had previously stayed the proceeding pending a response from the plaintiffs regarding the contemplated dismissal.

Upon reviewing the plaintiffs' written response, the court found the action to be without merit.

The claims appeared identical to those previously dismissed and some defendants were legally protected from civil lawsuits.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's original and amended statements of claim, arguing that the human rights damages claim was defective and that amendments constituted a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act.

The court found that the human rights claim was sufficiently pleaded and that it was not plain and obvious that the limitation period had expired for the human rights damages claim.

The court also declined to strike allegations of bad faith damages.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs appealed a Master's order compelling them to answer questions during an examination in aid of execution.

The questions related to the plaintiffs' financial affairs, including the Marhaban Trust and proceeds from a quota sale, and the business affairs of non-parties.

The appeal argued that there was insufficient evidence to link the plaintiffs to the non-parties' property and that the Master's reasons were inadequate.

The court upheld the Master's decision, finding sufficient evidence of a connection between the plaintiffs and the Marhaban Trust and other associated companies, and that the Master's reasons were adequate.

A minor amendment was made to the scope of one question.

Lixo Investments Limited applied for relief concerning demolition work by FCHT Holdings on an adjacent property, particularly regarding a shared party wall damaged by a prior fire.

The application sought damages for loss of use and reconstruction costs, alleging FCHT was responsible for pre-acquisition fire effects and negligent demolition.

The court dismissed claims related to pre-acquisition events, finding FCHT did not inherit prior tortious conduct.

For claims regarding FCHT's demolition work and its impact on the party wall, the court found material facts in dispute requiring viva voce evidence and expert testimony.

Consequently, the balance of the application was converted into an expedited action for trial.

The plaintiff, Mancini Associates LLP, obtained a judgment against the defendant Anthony Guido for $29,413.15 plus prejudgment interest.

This decision concerns the subsequent costs award.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, as the defendant failed to accept an offer to settle for the judgment amount.

Applying Rule 57.01 factors, the court awarded the plaintiff $40,000 in all-inclusive costs, deeming the plaintiff's requested amount of $64,537.28 to be partially excessive, particularly regarding hours claimed and non-recoverable expenses related to other defendants.

The defendant brought a motion to preclude the plaintiff's expert witness, W. Steve Prince, from testifying regarding the commercial viability of an insurance policy.

The defendant argued Prince's opinion evidence was unnecessary and irrelevant, particularly concerning policy interpretation and profitability assumptions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Prince's evidence potentially relevant to counter the defendant's assertion that such a policy was "absurd" in 1982, and also relevant if the legal remedy of rectification were required to assess the potential unconscionability of allowing the policy to remain in place.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 to consider dismissing an action for damages, totaling over $970 million, against multiple defendants including a Children's Aid Society, a judge, and legal services.

The action was deemed potentially frivolous, vexatious, and an an abuse of process, given its similarity to previously dismissed claims and the immunity of some defendants.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice of intent to dismiss and stayed the action pending a written hearing.

The plaintiff brought a motion requesting an order to transfer the proceeding into case management, which the defendants opposed.

The court considered the factors under Rule 77.05(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity of issues, public importance, number of parties, anticipated court intervention, discovery time, and any substantial delay.

Despite the proceeding being over two years old and ongoing disagreements between the parties regarding discovery and amendments, the court found no substantial delay or demonstrated need for court intervention to warrant case management at that time.

The plaintiff's request for case management was dismissed, but the court ordered all parties to deliver sworn affidavits of documents and Schedule "A" productions by a specific date to facilitate the progression of discovery.

The plaintiff law firm, Mancini Associates LLP, sued its former clients, Perpetual Income Producing Enterprises Inc. (PIPE), Armando Orefice, and Anthony Guido, for unpaid legal invoices totaling $29,413.15.

Default judgment was obtained against PIPE and Orefice.

The trial proceeded against Guido, who had signed a retainer agreement and verbally agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the fees.

Guido defended by alleging breach of solicitor-client relationship, "sharp practices," and that he signed the retainer under duress.

The court found Guido's retainer agreement valid and enforceable, rejecting the duress claim and his assertion that his obligations ceased when the plaintiff threatened to terminate its retainer with PIPE/Orefice.

The court also found no failure to mitigate by the plaintiff in not pursuing a charging order for a $10,000 costs award against a third party (TD Bank).

Judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff against Guido for the full amount plus pre-judgment interest.

Following a prior summary judgment finding liability for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiff requested that the court address punitive damages that had been omitted from the earlier endorsement.

Relying on Rule 59.06(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court amended the order to address the outstanding issue.

The court held that the defendant’s fraudulent misappropriation of funds from a charitable organization constituted malicious and high‑handed conduct warranting punitive damages.

Punitive damages of $50,000 were awarded, and costs of the action and motion were fixed at $150,000 pursuant to the parties’ agreement.

The court deferred its decision on whether to further extend an existing Mareva injunction pending submissions from the defendant.