Ira G. Parghi

The court considered a wrongful dismissal and unpaid commissions claim by Kashif Salam against his former employer, Ontario Research and Innovation Optical Network (ORION).

The court found that while a draft commission plan was never finalized or binding, the parties’ conduct and employment agreement entitled Mr. Salam to commissions of up to 15% of his base salary.

The court awarded him damages for six months’ reasonable notice, loss of benefits, and commissions, totaling $58,419.52 less statutory deductions.

The plaintiffs, Albert Carbone and Cathy Horvath, sought default and summary judgment against several defendants for misappropriating their life savings through a fraudulent investment scheme involving a non-existent cannabis business.

The court granted default judgment against Salvatore Boccia, David Shpilt, and 215 Holding Corp. for fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and summary judgment against Rosanna Boccia for fraud, conversion, and oppression.

Punitive damages were awarded against Salvatore Boccia, David Shpilt, and 215 Holding Corp. The court found the conduct to be brazen, intentional, and a marked departure from ordinary standards of behaviour, and held the defendants jointly and severally liable for the losses.

This endorsement addresses the awarding of full indemnity costs to the Defendants following the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that several indicia of anti-SLAPP litigation were present, including a history of litigation against critics, a punitive purpose, and minimal damages.

The Plaintiffs did not provide costs submissions or arguments against the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs.

The court found the quantum of costs sought to be reasonable and noted that the Plaintiffs’ conduct increased litigation costs.

The Defendants were awarded $64,359.30 in costs, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiffs alleged that Maria Surovova and her company, Maria Mortgage Services Inc., engaged in a mortgage churning scheme, inducing the plaintiffs to take out a series of mortgages and transfer the proceeds to Surovova under the pretense that the funds would be applied to their mortgages.

Instead, Surovova misappropriated the funds for personal use.

The court found Surovova liable for civil fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, awarding the plaintiffs $1,666,059.13 in damages and $215,603.52 in costs.

The court considered a motion by several defendants to strike out claims in a civil action involving allegations of mortgage fraud, conspiracy, and related causes of action.

The moving defendants sought to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and as being frivolous and vexatious.

The court granted the motion in part, striking claims of negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence against the moving defendants without leave to amend, but allowed the claim against Mr. Geraci personally to be amended.

The court also addressed the admissibility of late-served motion materials and the requirements for amending pleadings in the face of a motion to strike.

The court considered a request by Canadian Tire Bank to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to dismiss, finding that the pleadings, read generously, disclosed a core complaint that was not clearly frivolous or abusive.

The court emphasized that rule 2.1 is a blunt instrument reserved for the clearest of cases and is not a substitute for other procedural motions.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Coco Developments Ltd., against the defendant, Sukhwant Singh Bal, for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring trial regarding liability or damages.

The defendant failed to close the transaction, and the plaintiff was entitled to damages reflecting the difference between the original and resale prices, as well as carrying costs.

The court also awarded the plaintiff $19,000 in costs, relying on the agreement’s full indemnity provision and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s legal costs.

The court dismissed a defamation action brought by UM Financial Inc., Omar Kalair, and Yusuf Panchbhaya against Ronald Butler and Butler Mortgage Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that a social media post by Mr. Butler defamed them by referencing a halal mortgage organization that "ripped off its clients years ago & embezzled people’s money." The court found that UM Financial lacked standing as an undischarged bankrupt, and that the impugned words did not refer to the plaintiffs specifically.

The court also found that the plaintiffs failed to show substantial merit to their claim, failed to show the defendants had no valid defences, and failed to demonstrate that the public interest in allowing the action to proceed outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The action was dismissed under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

This decision concerns cross-applications to set aside or enforce two arbitral decisions relating to a commercial property dispute between the Moscone Parties and Edenrock Holdings Inc. and Anthony Marrese.

The Moscone Parties sought to set aside or appeal the arbitral decisions on grounds of procedural unfairness, natural justice, and bias, or in the alternative, to remit the matter to a new arbitrator.

The court dismissed the Moscone Parties’ application, finding no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the arbitration agreement precluded any right of appeal.

The application by Edenrock and Marrese to enforce the arbitral decisions was granted.

The Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group appealed an arbitrator's decision regarding a loss transfer dispute, arguing the arbitrator erred by applying Rule 10(4) instead of Rule 6 of the Fault Determination Rules and improperly considered the circumstances of the accident contrary to Rule 3.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator correctly applied Rule 10(4) because the accident occurred during a lane change, not as a rear-end collision.

The court also held that the arbitrator's consideration of the accident's specific facts was necessary to determine the applicable rule and did not violate Rule 3, which prohibits considering external circumstances.

The defendant, Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPR), brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action by 863880 Ontario Limited (863) as statute-barred.

The action sought damages for TCE contamination on a property purchased by 863 from CPR's predecessors.

CPR argued 863 had sufficient knowledge of the contamination by April 1991, triggering the six-year limitation period. 863 contended it only gained full knowledge in 1998.

The court found that 863 had actual knowledge of the contamination in April 1991, sufficient to trigger the limitation period, as perfect or complete knowledge of the extent or source of damage is not required.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and 863's action against CPR was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses costs following a successful motion for default judgment brought by the defendant Joseph Gavin Briggs against the plaintiffs Joe Alessandro and Law Help Ltd. Briggs was awarded $45,285.00 in damages on his counterclaim.

The court, applying factors under Rule 57.01 and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, found the plaintiffs' obstructive conduct increased litigation costs and that Alessandro had abused Briggs' trust.

The court also affirmed that costs may be awarded even when counsel acts pro bono.

Briggs was awarded $15,000.00 in costs.

The Plaintiffs (Arkland Homes Inc. et al. and Zhen Kang) brought an action seeking declarations regarding mortgage standing and to set aside property sales.

This decision addresses three interlocutory motions: the Plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to restrain the sale of the Bannatyne Property, Defendant Qiong Huang's motion for possession of 177 Rumsey Road, and the Plaintiffs' cross-motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on 171 Rumsey Road.

The court granted the Plaintiffs' injunction and CPL motions, finding serious issues to be tried regarding the mortgage defaults, the application of a significant payment, and allegations of bad faith and improper conduct by the Defendants Ming Wei Liu and Yizi Feng, including the hasty sale of properties below market value and an alarming "self-help" attempt to evict occupants.

The court denied Ms. Huang's motion for possession, concluding that whether she was a bona fide purchaser for value was a genuine issue requiring trial.

The court also ordered consolidation and case management for all related litigation.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendants for passing off their sports hydration products (Cwench) as the plaintiffs' (BioSteel).

The plaintiffs alleged that Cwench's products, flavors, and packaging ("get-ups") were confusingly similar to BioSteel's.

The court dismissed the injunction request, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious issue to be tried regarding goodwill in their product's get-ups, misrepresentation causing confusion, or actual/potential damages.

The court determined the injunction was mandatory, requiring a higher "strong prima facie case" standard, and found that similarities were common industry features or functional choices, and evidence of consumer confusion was insufficient.

The Kahu Defendants moved to dismiss Park Lawn Corporation's action for knowing assistance as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), arguing it was an improper attempt to re-litigate issues from a previously settled action against a former CEO.

The court denied the motion, finding that Park Lawn was not aware of the Kahu Defendants' alleged misconduct at the time of the previous settlement, the facts and causes of action were not identical, and the case law allows for several liability in knowing assistance claims, which was consistent with the terms of the prior release.

The court also clarified that a consent dismissal does not automatically lead to an abuse of process finding unless the issues could have been raised in the prior action.

The Applicants sought to set aside an arbitrator's decision denying their challenge for bias and to remove the arbitrator, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias due to the arbitrator's undisclosed involvement in another arbitration with the Respondents' counsel, and actual bias from a costs decision.

The court dismissed the application, finding the bias challenge was not brought in a timely manner and that neither reasonable apprehension of bias nor actual bias was established.

The court found no meaningful overlap between the arbitrations and that the arbitrator's finding of 'false statements' did not indicate actual bias.

The Plaintiff sought default judgment against the Defendant for wrongful dismissal, discrimination under the Human Rights Code of Ontario, aggravated damages, and damages for inconvenience.

The court granted default judgment, finding the Plaintiff was wrongfully dismissed when her request to work from home to protect her husband's health (due to his disability) was refused, leading to her termination.

This was deemed discrimination based on association with a disabled person under s. 12 of the Human Rights Code.

The court awarded damages for wrongful dismissal, human rights breach, aggravated damages for the high-handed manner of dismissal, and damages for inconvenience caused by an incorrect Record of Employment.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis.

The Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment due to a mortgage default by the Defendants.

The motion was previously adjourned on consent with terms for the Defendants to refinance, but they failed to comply.

The court applied the Hryniak v. Mauldin test for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to the mortgage principal, interest, and various fees, including liquidated damages, which were found not to violate s. 8(1) of the Interest Act.

An order for possession of the property and leave to issue a writ of possession were granted.

The court declined to award additional costs to the Plaintiffs, noting that the liquidated damages clause already compensated them for the costs of bringing the motion.

The defendant, Joseph Gavin Briggs, brought a motion for default judgment on his counterclaim against the plaintiffs, Joe Alessandro and Law Help Ltd. Briggs alleged misrepresentation, breach of duty, and unjust enrichment, stemming from Alessandro, an unlicensed individual, holding himself out as a paralegal and providing inadequate legal services, including entering unauthorized guilty pleas on Briggs' behalf.

Alessandro and Law Help Ltd. were noted in default on the counterclaim due to their failure to participate in the litigation process.

The court found Alessandro and Law Help Ltd. liable for intentional misrepresentation and unjust enrichment, and pierced the corporate veil to hold Alessandro personally liable.

The court awarded compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages, and ordered the production of legal files.