Court File Numbers

CV-20-00651475-0000
CV-20-00645977-0000

Date

July 17, 2025

Court

Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Parties

Re: Bruno Rosso, Applicant
And: Domenic Rosso also known as Tony Rosso, Carmelina Rosso also known as Carmela Rosso, Salvatore Rosso, and Computershare Trust Company of Canada Societe de Fiducie Computershare du Canada, Respondents

And Re: Domenic A. Rosso, Applicant
And: Bruno Rosso, Nancy Rosso also known as Ignazia Rosso, and Salvatore Rosso, Respondents

Before

Rohit Parghi

Counsel

• Jeffrey Radnoff, for the Applicant Bruno Rosso / Respondents Bruno Rosso and Nancy Rosso
• Kevin Richard and Leanne Gruppuso, for the Respondent/Applicant Domenic Rosso
• Philip V. Hiebert, for the Respondent Carmelina Rosso also known as Carmela Rosso
• Edmard Marrocco and Olivia Eng, for the Respondent Salvatore Rosso

Date Heard

June 4 & 5, 2025

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] Domenic, Bruno, and Salvatore Rosso are brothers and the joint owners of a triplex property at 519-521 Royal York Road in Toronto (the “Property”). They bring two competing applications which were argued together before me.

[2] Domenic brings an application to enforce an oral agreement that he says he, Bruno, and Salvatore reached in February 2019, whereby Bruno would sell his one-third interest in the Property to Domenic and Salvatore (the “Agreement”). The brothers are the sole owners of the Property, as tenants in common. Domenic commenced his application in August 2020. The brothers entered into minutes of settlement, from which Domenic resiled, leading to additional litigation (Rosso v. Rosso, 2024 ONSC 1109). In those proceedings, Domenic claimed that he was coerced into the settlement by Bruno and Salvatore through harassment, intimidation, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Centa J. rejected those claims outright. The minutes of settlement were ultimately set aside on other grounds. In the result, Domenic’s application was revived.

[3] Bruno brings an application seeking the partition and sale of the Property under the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, with a subsequent accounting and proceeds from the sale to be distributed as determined at a later time. Bruno commenced his application in November 2020. Domenic’s position is that Bruno is no longer a co-owner of the Property because, in the Agreement, he agreed to sell his interest in the Property. As such, states Domenic, Bruno cannot seek its partition and sale.

[4] Domenic submits that Salvatore originally supported his application, but the record does not bear out this claim. I accept Salvatore’s evidence, uncontradicted on this point, that he was initially named as a co-applicant to Domenic’s application without his knowledge and consent. The record makes clear that in August 2024, Salvatore moved, on consent, to be named as a respondent to Domenic’s application instead. Salvatore is also a respondent to Bruno’s application. As discussed below, on most issues Salvatore adopts Bruno’s position.

[5] For the reasons below, I dismiss Domenic’s application. I find that there was no oral contract for Domenic and Salvatore to purchase Bruno’s one-third interest in the Property. In the alternative, had I found that there was such an oral contract, I would have found that the contract was unenforceable pursuant to the Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19; that, even if the contract was enforceable, Domenic and Salvatore repudiated the contract and Bruno is therefore not in breach and not required to transfer his interest in the Property; and that, even if Bruno had breached the contract, Domenic would be entitled only to damages and not specific performance.

[6] Additionally, I grant Bruno’s application for partition and sale of the Property and a subsequent accounting. Bruno is presumptively entitled to partition and sale, and Domenic provides no evidence to persuade me that I should exercise my narrow discretion to refuse this remedy. I am also of the view that a sale will be more advantageous to the parties than a partition, in all the circumstances.

Domenic’s Application to Enforce the Oral Agreement

Whether There Was an Oral Contract to Buy Bruno’s Interest in the Property

[7] The primary issue before me is whether the Agreement was in fact an oral contract that may be enforced, as Domenic requests. To demonstrate that there was such an oral contract, Domenic must persuade me that the brothers formed a mutual intention to enter into an agreement with one another for the sale of Bruno’s interest in the Property, and that they agreed to the essential terms of that bargain (John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2020), at p. 31). The Court of Appeal for Ontario, in UBS Securities Canada, Inc. v. Sands Brothers Canada, Ltd., 2009 ONCA 328, 95 O.R. (3d) 93, at para. 47, described the test as follows:

For a contract to exist, there must be a meeting of minds…. The test as to whether there has been a meeting of the minds is an objective one -- would an objective, reasonable bystander conclude that, in all the circumstances, the parties intended to contract? As intention alone is insufficient to create an enforceable agreement, it is necessary that the essential terms of the agreement are also sufficiently certain.

[8] It is settled law that purchase price is an essential term of an agreement for purchase and sale of property (Simcoe Vacant Land Condominium Corporation No. 272 v. Blue Shores Developments Ltd., 2015 ONCA 378). Domenic does not dispute this point. He submits that the purchase price was in fact agreed to among the brothers.

[9] I find that the brothers did not have a meeting of the minds as to the price at which Bruno was to sell his one-third interest in the Property.

[10] First, the brothers disagree over what property valuation they decided would form the basis of the buyout of Bruno’s interest. Domenic states that the brothers agreed that the Property would be valued at $1.7 million, which would value Bruno’s one-third interest at $566,666.67. Bruno states that they agreed to use a Property valuation of $1.8 million, which would value his interest at $600,000. Salvatore initially provided affidavit evidence that the agreed-to valuation was $1.7 million. He now states that both the $1.8 million and $1.7 million figures were discussed during the meeting, and that he cannot specifically recall with certainty which valuation was ultimately agreed to. He was agreeable to both numbers and left the particulars of the negotiation to his brothers.

[11] Second, the brothers dispute what, if any, deductions they agreed were to be made from Bruno’s one-third share of the Property valuation before he was paid out.

[12] Domenic states that the brothers agreed that two deductions would be made. They agreed that Bruno’s one-third share of the mortgage on the Property would be deducted. That mortgage was registered for $505,000 in September 2010. Domenic offered no evidence on the amount owed on the mortgage at the time of the Agreement. His counsel suggested in oral argument that Bruno’s share of the mortgage in February 2019, when the Agreement was made, was $110,000, based on a total mortgage balance of $330,000, which counsel “extrapolated” from information about the mortgage balance in subsequent time periods.

[13] In addition, says Domenic, the brothers agreed that a previous loan of $50,000 that Domenic had made to Bruno would be deducted. There is no objective evidence before me to substantiate that Domenic ever made such a loan to Bruno. Indeed, Domenic acknowledges that he has no documentation about the loan. It is not clear when the loan was given; Domenic merely claims that the loan was made sometime between 2004 and 2010.

[14] Bruno and Salvatore’s evidence is unequivocal that these deductions were neither discussed nor agreed to. They say that they did not agree to deduct any amounts from Bruno’s one-third share of the Property valuation. Salvatore’s evidence is that the brothers understood that one-third of the full purchase price would be paid to Bruno.

[15] Nor is there documentary evidence to suggest that there was ever a meeting of the minds on purchase price. The Agreement was never reduced to writing. There are no notes, memoranda, or communications, contemporaneous or otherwise, about the Agreement generally, or the purchase price specifically. While Domenic attested that he took notes at the meetings, Bruno and Salvatore deny that he did so, and in any event, Domenic has not produced any such notes.

[16] Domenic suggests that I should prefer Salvatore’s initial evidence that the agreed-to Property valuation was $1.7 million over his later evidence that he cannot recall what purchase price was agreed to. I do not agree. Salvatore’s most current evidence is, in my view, the most reliable. In reviewing Salvatore’s affidavit evidence, and his evidence on cross-examination, I am struck by his efforts to be thoughtful and forthright, and to avoid overstatement or overgeneralization. For example, he gave evidence that he recalls that some topics relevant to the Agreement were not discussed. He recalls that some topics were discussed but no agreement was reached in respect of them. He recalls that other topics gave rise to an agreement but he does not recall the specifics of what was agreed to. He also gave evidence that he cannot recall whether some topics were discussed at all. I found Salvatore’s evidence, on the issue of purchase price and more generally, to be credible. I accept his evidence that he does not recall what the brothers agreed to in respect of the Property valuation. I reject the suggestion that he has changed his evidence in an effort to “take sides” with Bruno over Domenic.

[17] I therefore conclude that the brothers did not have an agreement as to purchase price.

[18] Further, the closing date was an essential contractual term of the Agreement, and there was no agreement among the brothers regarding the closing date for the purchase of Bruno’s interest in the Property.

[19] Domenic submits that the closing date should not be viewed as an essential term of the Agreement. He observes that in Mountain v. TD Canada Trust Company, 2012 ONCA 806, 112 O.R. (3d) 721, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that the essential terms of such an agreement are the parties, the property, and the price. The Court did not list the closing date as an essential term.

[20] I do not accept this argument. The Court in Mountain held, at para. 66, that when the parties, property, and price are agreed to, a contract “may” be found without evidence of a written agreement. The Court was not saying that these three elements, when present, require a finding of an oral agreement. Indeed, the jurisprudence is clear that whether a closing date is an essential element of an oral agreement will depend on the context in which a particular agreement is entered into, including, for example, the relationships among the parties and the circumstances in which their agreement was formed (see e.g., Xynos v. Xynos, 2023 ONSC 830, paras 100-103).

[21] In my view, an individual who wishes to sell their interest in land would typically require clarity as to when payments are due and when the interest in the property is set to change hands. It is unlikely that they would be prepared to sell on the understanding that they would get their money whenever the purchaser decides they should. The purchaser would likewise not want to proceed on the understanding that they would have to pay for the land and would receive the interest in the land only when the seller decides the time is right. The commercial realities of this type of transaction dictate that a closing date can generally be viewed as an essential term of the agreement.

[22] The context of this case requires that the closing date be treated as an essential term. Domenic’s own evidence was that Bruno approached his brothers about selling his interest in the Property because he required the funds from the sale to pay off debts he owed to the Canada Revenue Agency. It is difficult to imagine that Bruno would have been prepared to proceed with the transaction while having no idea when he would actually receive the funds needed to pay down his debts. Presumably, he wished to pay the CRA sooner rather than later, hence his desire to sell to begin with. Domenic’s suggestion that the brothers were prepared to have an unspecified, “off in the future” closing date ignores this reality.

[23] I therefore find that, in the circumstances of this case, the closing date was an essential term of any agreement to purchase Bruno’s interest in the Property.

[24] The brothers did not have an agreement as to the closing date of the transaction. The record before me contains no discussion of a closing date, even by Domenic, who seeks to enforce the Agreement. This appears to be undisputed.

[25] Nor did they have an agreement as to the payment schedule. It appears that the brothers agreed to the payment date for the first installment of $100,000, and Bruno was accordingly paid that amount in March 2019. However, they had no agreement as to the date by which the second installment, containing the balance of the purchase price, was to be paid. Bruno was paid an additional $200,050 in October 2019. That payment did not reflect the full balance of the purchase price, whether that price was calculated based on Domenic’s stated understanding of the deal (one-third of $1.7 million less both deductions) or Bruno’s (one-third of $1.8 million with no deductions). Bruno’s evidence was that he understood that the second (and final) installment was initially due in August 2019 and was later extended to October 2019. Salvatore’s evidence was that he could not recall with certainty, but believed the final installment was due in August 2019 or sooner and was later extended to October 2019.

[26] Only Domenic takes a different view. He seems to have thought at first that the final installment could be paid in “fall of 2019” or “shortly after” fall 2019, with no fixed deadline. He suggests that the agreement was that if he needed more time beyond fall 2019, he could simply let Bruno know. It appears that Domenic eventually took the view that he could pay the balance whenever he chose. There is no other explanation as to why he followed up with Bruno about paying what he termed the “final” $100,000 months later, in April 2020, as discussed below. Perplexingly, Domenic seems to have taken this view even though he has asserted that “time was of the essence” in the Agreement.

[27] In April 2020, Domenic and his then-counsel sent a series of text and email communications to Bruno and Bruno’s then-counsel. By this time, 14 months had passed since the Agreement was entered into. Six months had passed since Bruno’s understanding of the extended deadline for payment of the second (and final) installment. Bruno had still not been paid the full purchase price, by any measure of the purchase price. Bruno and Salvatore take the position that the Agreement had collapsed by this date, because Bruno had not been paid the remaining balance, which they say was due several months prior in October 2019.

[28] The text and email messages that Domenic and his then-counsel sent set forth Domenic’s position on what the brothers had agreed to: that the Property would be valued at $1.7 million and that they would deduct Bruno’s share of the mortgage, plus the $50,000 loan to Bruno, from Bruno’s one-third share of the $1.7 million. The email from Domenic’s then-counsel indicated that his firm was prepared to advance $100,000 to Bruno’s counsel’s trust account to “complete this transaction”.

[29] Bruno and Salvatore say that in sending the messages, Domenic was attempting to unilaterally alter the terms of the Agreement. They state that the final payment of $100,000 referred to by Domenic’s then-counsel would have resulted in a total payment to Bruno of only $400,000, which was never what the brothers agreed to.

[30] Bruno did not respond to or acknowledge the messages. Salvatore’s evidence, which I accept, is that once he learned that Domenic was trying to pay Bruno only $100,000 to complete the transaction, he told Domenic that he should honour the Agreement and pay Bruno the rest of his money, and Domenic told Salvatore that the fight was between Domenic and Bruno.

[31] Domenic states that Bruno wrongfully refused to accept the final payment of $100,000 and denies that he was trying to rewrite the deal. He says he was simply reiterating its agreed-to terms and informing Bruno of the amount that he needed to pay to Bruno to close the transaction. He suggests that Bruno’s failure to respond to the messages reflects the brothers’ shared understanding of those terms.

[32] I am unable to agree. The evidence of Bruno and Salvatore makes it abundantly clear that they did not share Domenic’s understanding of the terms of the Agreement. At best, Domenic’s messages merely reiterated his understanding, which his brothers did not share. At worst, his messages were an after-the-fact effort to rewrite the terms of the deal to work to his benefit, and to the detriment of Bruno. Either way, the messages are not a reliable expression of contractual terms on which the brothers were ad idem. They have no evidentiary value.

[33] As such, no oral agreement for the sale of Bruno’s interest in the Property has been proven. I am not persuaded that Domenic, Bruno, and Salvatore had a meeting of the minds as to the purchase price or closing date, both of which were essential terms of any such agreement. Nor did they have an agreement as to the payment schedule, which might have served as a proxy for the closing date despite the absence of an agreement on a closing date. They had a discussion, and perhaps more than one discussion, but these did not amount to a contract.

Whether Any Oral Contract Would Have Been Enforceable Based on the Statute of Frauds and the Equitable Doctrine of Part Performance

[34] Even if I had found that Domenic had proven the existence of an oral agreement for the sale of Bruno’s interest in the Property, that agreement would still, in my view, have been unenforceable.

[35] Oral agreements for the purchase and sale of land are presumptively unenforceable under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19. That provision, rooted in the need to protect against fraudulent oral claims in respect of land, states that no action for an interest in land is enforceable “unless the agreement upon which the action is brought, or some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or some person thereunto lawfully authorized by the party.”

[36] As discussed above, the Agreement is not written. Nor is there any memorandum or note in respect of it. In the result, the Agreement is an oral agreement and is presumptively unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

[37] An oral agreement may fall outside the operation of the Statute of Frauds, and hence be enforceable, where the equitable doctrine of part performance applies (Xynos v. Xynos, 2023 ONSC 830; Hill v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General)). The doctrine of part performance “allows the court to enforce an oral agreement in cases where it is unconscionable to apply the Statute of Frauds to render a contract unenforceable” (Xynos, at para. 107).

[38] There are two requirements for the doctrine of part performance to apply (Xynos, at para. 108; 2730453 Ont. Inc. v. 2380673 Ont. Inc., 2022 ONSC 6660, para 119; Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada and Constantineau). There must be some acts of part performance that are “unequivocally referable in their own nature to some dealing with the land,” such that the acts indicate the existence of the alleged contract. There must also be detrimental reliance.

[39] Even if I had found there to be an oral agreement, I would not have found the doctrine of part performance to apply.

[40] Domenic states that his payment of $300,050 towards the Agreement was unequivocally referable to the Property and was made to his detriment. I accept that argument. In my view, however, Domenic has engaged in misconduct in relation to the payment, with the result that he does not have clean hands and cannot rely on the fact of the payment in support of his claim of part performance.

[41] The record indicates that after the February 2019 discussion among the brothers, the plan was for Domenic to take care of his and Salvatore’s shared payment obligations toward Bruno, using joint funds from their shared business ventures to pay Bruno, and that Salvatore relied on Domenic to do so. The longstanding practice between Salvatore and Domenic was for Domenic to manage financial matters for Salvatore, including in relation to rents on the Property, the mortgages on the Property, and the financials for their joint business.

[42] In October 2019, Domenic remitted the second payment of $200,050. Of this payment, $100,050 were in fact taken out of the bank account of the business that Salvatore and Domenic jointly own, as Domenic states. However, the record strongly suggests that Domenic drew the remaining $100,000 he paid to Bruno from the line of credit secured against the Property, for which all three brothers were jointly and severally liable. In effect, he used some of Bruno’s own money, borrowed from a line of credit for which Bruno was partly responsible, to pay Bruno. He concealed that he was doing so.

[43] In my view, Domenic cannot now rely on this payment as part performance in support of his claim for equitable relief. He does not have clean hands in respect of the payment and is therefore not entitled to a remedy in equity. As such, even if I had found that there was an oral agreement, I would have held that it was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds and not saved by equitable principles.

[44] For the reasons below, Domenic does not come to this court with clean hands. He is therefore not entitled to a remedy in equity.

Whether Any Enforceable Contract Was Breached by Bruno

[45] Even if I had concluded that there was an oral contract for Domenic and Salvatore to purchase Bruno’s interest in the Property, and that it was enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds based on the doctrine of part performance, I would have found that Bruno did not breach that agreement.

[46] The contract was repudiated by Domenic and Salvatore failing to remit the full monies owed to Bruno under the Agreement, whether the amount owed to Bruno is calculated based on Domenic’s understanding of the purchase price or Bruno’s. I infer from Bruno’s conduct, including his position in these proceedings, that he accepted Domenic’s and Salvatore’s repudiatory breach. As such, the contract was terminated and Bruno had no obligation to transfer his interest in the Property to his brothers (Ching v. Pier 27 Toronto Inc., 2021 ONCA 551, paras 31-33).

Whether Specific Performance Would Have Been Appropriately Granted for Any Breach of the Oral Contract

[47] Even if I had concluded that Bruno had breached the contract, I would see no basis on which to award specific performance, as Domenic requests. This is the type of case in which damages are the appropriate remedy.

[48] I deal first with Domenic’s rather surprising suggestion that Salvatore might be liable for damages for breach of the Agreement. Domenic has never alleged that Salvatore breached the Agreement. He has only ever alleged that it was Bruno who breached the Agreement. Domenic’s Notice of Application seeks no relief against Salvatore. Even after Salvatore was renamed as a respondent, Domenic did not seek to amend his pleading to seek any relief against Salvatore. I therefore reject outright any claim for damages against Salvatore.

[49] I would not have granted specific performance as against Bruno, even if I had found that there was a contract and that Bruno breached it. Specific performance is to be granted in respect of an agreement for purchase and sale of property where the property is “unique” and has a peculiar or special value to the purchaser (Matthew Brady Self Storage Corporation v. InStorage Limited Partnership, 2014 ONCA 858, para 38, leave to appeal refused, [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 36224). Where the property is not unique in this manner, the general presumption in favour of damages applies, on the view that damages will appropriately put the plaintiff in the position they would have been in but for the breach (UBS Securities Canada, Inc. v. Sands Brothers Canada, Ltd., 2009 ONCA 328, para 100).

[50] I am not satisfied that the Property is unique such that specific performance is warranted. Domenic has offered no evidence in respect of the Property’s alleged uniqueness. For instance, there is no evidence that Domenic, already a one-third owner of the Property, would derive some special value from increasing his ownership stake, such that damages would not be adequate. The evidence is that it serves primarily as an investment property and that Domenic owns a single family home elsewhere in Toronto where, presumably, he and Carmelina could reside if they no longer lived at the Property. Carmelina was asked about the other property in cross-examination and these questions were refused. In the result, I am left with no evidence to suggest that they could not live at the other property if the Property were sold.

[51] As such, even if I had found that there was an oral agreement, that it was enforceable despite the Statute of Frauds, and that Bruno had breached it, I would have held that specific performance was not the appropriate remedy and that Domenic was only entitled to damages.

Bruno’s Application for Partition and Sale of the Property

[52] Bruno applies for partition and sale of the Property. Salvatore supports Bruno’s application. Domenic opposes it, on the basis that Bruno in fact agreed to sell his interest in the Property and as such no longer is entitled to seek its partition and sale. For the reasons above, I reject Domenic’s claim and find that Bruno remains a one-third owner of the Property and is therefore entitled to apply for its partition and sale.

[53] The brothers previously were joint tenants of the Property and in September 2022 their ownership was converted to a tenancy in common. They are its sole owners.

[54] Under section 2 of the Partition Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.4, all co-owners of property are subject to the risk of suffering partition and sale. Under section 3, anyone with an interest in land may apply for partition and sale. The jurisprudence is clear that such an order is prima facie available to co-owners (Banfield v. Ristevska, 2025 ONSC 3172, para 84).

[55] A court will exercise its narrow discretion to refuse partition and sale only where the party resisting the application shows malice; oppression, including hardship that is of such a nature as to constitute oppression; or vexatious intent (Garfella Apartments Inc. v. Chouduri, 2010 ONSC 3413, paras 12-13; Brienza v. Brienza, 2014 ONSC 6942, paras 22-27). Presumptively, a partition will be ordered rather than a sale, unless the court finds that it is more advantageous to the parties to order a sale (Garfella Apartments, at paras. 10-11).

[56] Domenic and Carmelina offer no evidence in support of their claim that partition and sale should not be granted. There is no evidence of malice. There is no evidence of hardship, let alone hardship that would rise to the level of oppression, to any of the parties if partition and sale is granted. There is no evidence of vexatious intent.

[57] I find that partition and sale is the only practical remedy in all the circumstances. The record before me makes it abundantly clear that the relationship among the co-owners – Domenic, Salvatore, and Bruno – has irretrievably broken down. There are longstanding clashes over how Domenic is managing the Property. There are ongoing disputes over whether he is properly accounting to his co-owners for rents collected from tenants. Domenic accuses Bruno of backing out on an agreement to sell his interest in the Property. Salvatore and Bruno accuse Domenic of breaching that agreement and then trying to rewrite its terms to his own benefit and to Bruno’s detriment. The brothers previously entered into an apparent agreement to buy out Bruno’s interest in the Property, which wound up in litigation after Domenic resiled from it. The brothers cannot agree on anything. They cannot settle their differences. A sale will be more advantageous to the parties than a partition: a partition will resolve few if any of the disputes between the brothers and will likely only give rise to more, and different, conflicts.

[58] I therefore grant an order for partition and sale, in the form described below.

[59] Having regard to the request for an accounting, I note that Domenic manages the Property, and lives with his wife, Carmelina, in three of the Property’s six units. Bruno and Salvatore state that they had agreed that Domenic and Carmelina could live at the Property for a couple of years after their marriage. However, Domenic and Carmelina have now lived at the Property rent-free since 1992, and while they originally occupied one unit they now occupy three. Bruno and Salvatore say that they never anticipated or agreed to this arrangement. Bruno’s evidence, uncontested on this point, is that Domenic and Carmelina have never accounted to Bruno and Salvatore for rents collected from tenants at the Property.

[60] I therefore grant Bruno’s request for an accounting, as set forth below.

Order Granted

[61] I accordingly dismiss Domenic’s application to enforce the Agreement.

[62] In respect of Bruno’s application, I grant the following:

(a) An order under the Partition Act requiring the listing for sale and sale of the Property;

(b) The order described in paragraphs (b), and (d) through (k), of the order contained in the Notice of Motion on Case Centre at Master pages A1618 to A1620;

(c) An order that the net proceeds of the sale of the Property be paid into court subject to further order of this court; and

(d) An order that an associate judge provide ongoing supervision as required to effect the sale of the Property and resolve any issues that may arise, including in respect of the distribution of net proceeds from the sale and any set-offs as among the parties including in respect of the $300,050 paid to Bruno previously.

[63] Bruno, Salvatore, and Nancy Rosso were entirely successful in these proceedings and are accordingly entitled to their costs. The parties are to work together to resolve costs within 30 days, failing which they are to advise my judicial assistant. I will then provide a timetable for the exchange of brief costs submissions.

Rohit Parghi
Date: July 17, 2025