Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-22-686650-0000
Date: July 15, 2025
Court: Superior Court of Justice – Ontario

Plaintiff: Ammar Ahmad
Defendants: Qura Tul Ain and Re/Max Premier Amatul Waheed Real Estate, Brokerage

Before: Rohit Parghi

Counsel:
Gathya Manoharan, for the Plaintiff
Muhammad Zafar, for the Defendant Qura Tul Ain
Aaron Postelnik, for the Defendant Re/Max Premier Amatul Waheed Real Estate, Brokerage

Heard: May 20-22, 2025

Endorsement

Introduction

[1] This was a summary trial for breach of contract involving an agreement for purchase and sale of a residential property. For the reasons below, I find in favour of the vendor, the Plaintiff Ammar Ahmed (incorrectly styled “Ahmad”), and award him damages of $386,460.60 to be paid by the purchaser, the Defendant Qura Tul Ain. I dismiss Ms. Ain’s crossclaim against Re-Max Premier Amatul Waheed Real Estate Brokerage (the “Brokerage”).

Liability of Ms. Ain, the Purchaser

[2] It is uncontested that there was a binding agreement between Mr. Ahmed and Ms. Ain, whereby Ms. Ain would purchase Mr. Ahmed’s home in Bradford West Gwillimbury, Ontario for $1.45 million (the “Agreement”). The Agreement was entered into on February 15, 2022. It was a firm offer with no conditions. It contained a “time is of the essence” clause.

[3] The closing date for the transaction under the Agreement was April 28, 2022. The closing date was extended twice, first to May 5, 2022 and then to May 27, 2022, both times at Ms. Ain’s request. On May 26, 2022, Ms. Ain’s real estate agent advised Mr. Ahmed that Ms. Ain would not be completing her purchase of the property.

[4] It is uncontested that Mr. Ahmed was at all material times ready, willing, and able to complete the transaction. Ms. Ain’s own evidence at trial was that she was not ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase on the original closing date, the first extended closing date, or the second extended closing date, which was a full month after the original closing date.

[5] As I discuss further below, after Ms. Ain failed to close the transaction, Mr. Ahmed re-listed the property. By this time, he had already moved to Austin, Texas with his family.

[6] I am satisfied that Ms. Ain breached the Agreement. There were no financing conditions or other conditions precedent that had to be satisfied before she was obligated to complete the purchase. She was obligated by the terms of the Agreement to complete the purchase, and she did not. The Agreement was legally binding with clear and definite terms.

[7] Ms. Ain’s evidence was that the sale of her own home did not go through because the purchaser of her home did not have the funds to close, and that, as a consequence, she was unable to go through with her own purchase of Mr. Ahmed’s home. She suggested that Mr. Ahmed was aware that she was selling her existing home and should have accommodated her when her own house sale did not go through by offering a further extension of the closing date or reducing the purchase price.

[8] I do not agree. As a preliminary matter, there is no evidence that Ms. Ain requested a third extension of the closing date. Nor am I persuaded that Mr. Ahmed was aware that Ms. Ain’s own house sale did not go through. More importantly, even if he was, that would have no relevance. The Agreement was not conditional on Ms. Ain successfully selling her home. It was not conditional on her obtaining financing to purchase the property. It was not conditional on anything. Mr. Ahmed could have extended the closing date if he wished to, and indeed he did so twice. But he was under no obligation to have done so, or to do so a third time. Nothing in the Agreement provides for such an obligation. The case law makes clear that there is no such obligation (see e.g., 2100 Bridletowne Inc. v. Ding, 2021 ONSC 2119, para. 66). The cases are also clear that a vendor may, in the absence of bad faith, insist on compliance with the agreed-to terms of an agreement (Zoleta v. Singh and RE/MAX Twin City Realty, 2023 ONSC 5898, para. 69, citing Deangelis v. Weldan Properties Inc., 2017 ONSC 4155).

[9] Even if a further extension had been offered, there is no evidence that Ms. Ain could have completed the transaction on that date. She testified that she needed the funds from the sale of her own home in order to close on her purchase of Mr. Ahmed’s home. Her own home did not sell until some time in 2024, at least a year and a half after the second extended closing date and over a year after Mr. Ahmed sold his property to another buyer.

Liability of the Brokerage

[10] Ms. Ain’s crossclaim against the Brokerage makes a number of allegations. It pleads that in mid-February 2022, the real estate market declined, but Mr. Ahmed and Ms. Ain’s agent through the Brokerage, Amatul Waheed, conspired to hide from Ms. Ain the true (reduced) market price of Mr. Ahmed’s home and did so in bad faith. The crossclaim further asserts that Ms. Waheed “deliberately did not insert the mandatory” financing condition into the Agreement, did not provide Ms. Ain with an opportunity to review the Agreement with an interpreter in the face of Ms. Ain’s limited English skills, “rushed” Ms. Ain into signing the Agreement, breached her fiduciary duty to Ms. Ain, and had a conflict of interest because she improperly acted for both Mr. Ahmed and Ms. Ain.

[11] I reject each of these claims.

[12] There is no evidence that the market price for the home was anything other than what Ms. Ain offered and agreed to pay for it. There is no evidence that any information about the value of the home was concealed from Ms. Ain. I pause to observe that Ms. Ain had been interested in potentially buying a home and had been following the real estate market since fall 2021. She had looked at at least seven properties by the time she made the offer to purchase Mr. Ahmed’s home.

[13] There is no evidence of bad faith. Certainly I see no evidence of anyone hiding information from Ms. Ain, deceiving her, or trying to do wrong by her. She is the one who did not carry out her legal obligations and now seeks to resile from them.

[14] There is no evidence that a financing condition is a “mandatory” provision in any agreement to purchase a home. Indeed, Ms. Ain’s agreement to sell her own home contained no such provision. I accept Ms. Waheed’s evidence that she prepared each offer in accordance with Ms. Ain’s instructions to her and that Ms. Ain did not want her to put such a condition in the Agreement. Ms. Ain offers no evidence to counter Ms. Waheed’s evidence on this point.

[15] If Ms. Ain wished to advance the argument that the Brokerage fell below the standard of care by not including a financing condition in the Agreement, then she needed to tender expert evidence in support of that allegation. It is settled law that a finding of professional negligence requires expert evidence (Krawchuk v. Scherbak, 2011 ONCA 352). There are exceptions to this general rule where the standard of care can be determined without the help of expert evidence, or the defendant’s impugned actions are so egregious that they obviously fell outside of the standard of care. Neither exception applies here.

[16] Nor am I persuaded that the Brokerage failed to provide interpretive services to Ms. Ain. The uncontroverted evidence before me was that Ms. Waheed and Ms. Ain both speak Urdu and understood one another well, that Ms. Ain had been following the real estate market (in English) for some time, and that Ms. Ain understood and communicated in English (the record is replete with text messages she sent in English or a combination of English and Urdu). There is no suggestion in the record that Ms. Ain ever told Ms. Waheed that she had difficulty understanding the Agreement or any of the discussions about the Agreement.

[17] Nor do I accept that the Brokerage improperly “rushed” her into signing the Agreement. I find that when Mr. Ahmed rejected Ms. Ain’s first offer, Ms. Waheed told her that she had the option of buying another house or going with Mr. Ahmed’s proposed price if she was comfortable with it, and that there were other houses in the neighbourhood. Ms. Ain considered matters and told Ms. Waheed that Mr. Ahmed’s was the only house with a basement apartment and she wanted Ms. Waheed to provide her with Mr. Ahmed’s counter-offer. In addition, the presentation of Ms. Ain’s offer that evening, and the ensuing negotiations, took place over the course of roughly two hours. Ms. Ain waited outside in her car with her sister while Ms. Waheed presented Ms. Ain’s offer to Mr. Ahmed in his home. Ms. Waheed advised Ms. Ain during negotiations to discuss matters with her family and provide her responses. I see no evidence that Ms. Waheed ever hurried Ms. Ain along or that Ms. Ain ever told Ms. Waheed that she felt rushed or wanted to slow the process down.

[18] I also reject the claim of breach of fiduciary duty. My factual findings, outlined above, make clear that I find no wrongdoing on the part of the Brokerage or Ms. Waheed that could support such a claim. Nor is there expert evidence before me of such a breach.

[19] Finally, the claim of conflict of interest was not advanced at trial.

[20] I accordingly dismiss Ms. Ain’s crossclaim against the Brokerage.

Damages

[21] The overarching principle in determining damages from a failed real estate transaction is that the plaintiff should be put back in the position they would have been in had the contract been performed (100 Main Street Ltd. v. W.B. Sullivan Construction Ltd., pp. 414-415).

[22] As such, Mr. Ahmed is entitled to the difference between the price Ms. Ain agreed to pay for the property in the Agreement and the price at which the property was resold after her breach. He is also entitled to recoup costs incurred due to the breach, such as the carrying costs for the property during the period between Ms. Ain’s breach and the closing date for the resale. Such damages must have been reasonably foreseeable to be recoverable. Mr. Ahmed must also have taken reasonable steps to mitigate his damages (Paradise Homes North West Inc. v. Sidhu, 2019 ONSC 1600, para. 26, citing Victor DiCastri, The Law of Vendor and Purchaser, 3rd ed. (Carswell, 1989), at para. 889; The Rosseau Group Inc. v. 2528061 Ontario Inc., 2023 ONCA 814).

[23] I find that Mr. Ahmed appropriately mitigated his damages. By the time he found out that Ms. Ain was not purchasing the home, he had already moved to Austin, Texas with his family, where he began new employment. From Texas, he retained a new real estate agent with whom he re-listed the property, initially in early July 2022 for $1.25 million. He received two offers but no agreement was reached. After the house had been on the market for 41 days, he re-listed it at the lower price of $1.195 million. He entered into an agreement to sell the home on August 25, 2022 for $1.1 million. This was $350,000 less than the purchase price Ms. Ain was to pay. The transaction was completed on October 27, 2022, after the property had been on the market for 53 days. That closing date was 182 days after the original closing date and 153 days after the second extended closing date agreed upon by Mr. Ahmed and Ms. Ain.

[24] Ms. Ain criticizes Mr. Ahmed’s mitigation efforts by claiming he took too long (just over a month) to re-list the property. I do not agree. Mr. Ahmed had just moved to Texas with his family. It is not unreasonable for him to have needed a few weeks to find a new agent and re-list the home. I am also of the view that he took reasonable steps to sell the home once it was re-listed, including by showing it to potential buyers and engaging in negotiations with them as appropriate.

[25] Mr. Ahmed seeks damages of $453,006.13. These damages reflect the difference between the original and resale purchase prices, and carrying costs during the 182 days between the original closing date of April 28, 2022 and the home’s eventual sale to a new buyer on October 27, 2022. The damages sought also include other costs that Mr. Ahmed says he incurred as a consequence of Ms. Ain’s breach, including the costs of moving to Texas, renting an apartment in Texas, and repairing his home when the new buyer found deficiencies during their housing inspection.

[26] The damages sought by Mr. Ahmed are broken down as follows:

• Difference between original and resale purchase price of home: $350,000.00
• Mortgage Payments (for 182 days): $10,512.32
• Home insurance (for 182 days): $358.67
• Electricity (for 182 days): $364.13
• Reliance Home Comfort (for 182 days): $45.14
• Property taxes (for 182 days): $2,545.65
• Repairs to home required by second purchaser pursuant to home inspection clause in agreement of purchase and sale: $8,136.00
• Real estate commission on resale of home (2.5% plus HST): $31,075.00
• Legal fees on resale of home: $1,362.95
• Costs for move to Texas (with a USD to CAD conversion rate of $1.27): $30,050.96
• Rent for apartment in Texas (with a USD to CAD conversion rate of $1.27): $18,555.31

[27] I consider each claim below.

[28] Mr. Ahmed is entitled to recover the $350,000 difference in sale price between what Ms. Ain would have paid for the property, had she not breached the Agreement, and what the new purchaser paid.

[29] He is also entitled to recover the costs associated with carrying the home for the 153 days between the second extended closing date of May 27, 2022 and the closing date of the resale on October 27, 2022.

[30] I do not accept Mr. Ahmed’s position that he is entitled to damages for the 182 day period between the original closing date and the closing date of the resale. Whether the damages period begins as of the original closing date or the extended closing date would normally be governed by the terms of the extension agreed upon by the parties. However, the record does not contain the terms of either extension. As such, the default rule for determining the damages period applies. The default rule, set forth in the case law, is that damages are to be assessed as of the date of the breach – that is, the date the contract was to be performed (642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer, para. 41). Mr. Ahmed granted two extensions to Ms. Ain, first to May 5, 2022 and then May 27, 2022. Thus, by mutual agreement, May 27, 2022 was the date on which the contract was to be performed, and is the date on which Ms. Ain breached the contract by failing to complete the purchase. Damages are therefore to be calculated as of that date, and not the original closing date as Mr. Ahmed submits (Lazy Dolphin Development Inc. v. Pathmanathan, 2025 ONSC 3677, para. 31; Kandlproperties v. Big Bang, 2022 ONSC 2419, para. 53).

[31] Once calculated in respect of the correct damages date (May 27, 2022, and not April 28, 2022), the carrying costs claimed by Mr. Ahmed are reasonably foreseeable and flow directly from the breach. Some of the numbers provided by Mr. Ahmed are incorrect based on the underlying documentation in the record. I accordingly award carrying costs as follows, based on the evidence before me and the adjusted damages date:

• Mortgage payments: $57.76 in interest per day, plus $1.98 in insurance per day, for a total of $59.74 per day for 153 days, totalling $9,140.22
• Home insurance: $722.48 per year for 153 days, totalling $302.84
• Electricity: $233.81
• Property taxes: $5,105.29 per year for 153 days, totalling $2,140.03

[32] There is no bill for Reliance Home Comfort pertaining to the time period in question and as such I do not grant any amount for those expenses.

[33] I grant Mr. Ahmed the $8,136.00 in repairs he had to undertake on the home before the resale. The repairs proved necessary because the new buyers found deficiencies during their housing inspection. That inspection was conducted pursuant to the housing inspection condition in the second agreement for purchase and sale. There was no such housing inspection condition in the Agreement, and, as such, Mr. Ahmed would not have incurred these expenses had the sale to Ms. Ain gone through.

[34] I do not award him the real estate commission on the second purchase. He would have had to pay a commission had the sale to Ms. Ain gone through. If anything, because the resale of the home was for a lower purchase price to the second purchaser, he paid a smaller commission on the resale than he would have paid on the original sale to Ms. Ain.

[35] I award the $1,362.95 in legal fees associated with having to go through a second real estate transaction to sell his home. Had Ms. Ain not breached the Agreement, he would not have incurred these costs.

[36] I do not award Mr. Ahmed the costs for his move to Texas. These consist of the costs of travel for his family of four to Texas, together with the costs of hiring a professional moving company. By my calculation, these costs total $27,028.15. In his affidavit, Mr. Ahmed deposed that he would not have moved to Texas had he not entered into an agreement for an unconditional sale of his home. When cross-examined at trial, he testified that because of the tight closing date on his sale of the home to Ms. Ain (the Agreement was entered into on February 15, 2022 and was originally to close on April 28, 2022), he had to move out in a hurry, which required him to hire professional movers. With a less compressed closing date, he would have moved to Texas on his own without professional help.

[37] In my view, neither the costs of travel for his family nor the professional moving costs are recoverable. The ordinary measure of damages for breach of contract, including in the context of failed real estate transactions, is expectation damages (100 Main Street Ltd., at pp. 414-415). This means that Mr. Ahmed is entitled to be put in the position he would have been in if the contract had been performed. Had Ms. Ain completed the purchase, Mr. Ahmed would have moved to Texas and would have incurred the travel expenses and professional moving costs. On the basis of expectation damages, therefore, Mr. Ahmed is not entitled to recover these costs.

[38] In essence, Mr. Ahmed’s claim is based on reliance interests: he seeks to recover the wasted expenditures that he incurred in reliance on Ms. Ain holding up her end of the agreement (PreMD Inc. v. Ogilvy Renault LLP, 2013 ONCA 412, para. 66). However, reliance damages are not recoverable if the expense would have been incurred regardless of the breach (PreMD Inc., para. 68). Again, Mr. Ahmed would have incurred these moving expenses even if Ms. Ain had performed the contract.

[39] In any event, Mr. Ahmed would have known about Ms. Ain’s requested closing date at the time he was negotiating the Agreement with her, and presumably would have factored in the tight closing date when negotiating on price. As such, his reliance costs would have been reflected in the negotiated purchase price, and he will recover them because he is recovering the difference between the original and resale purchase prices. Granting reliance damages would amount to double recovery and would put Mr. Ahmed in a better position than he would have been in had the contract been performed (PreMD Inc., para. 70).

[40] Finally, I accept the claim for the costs of renting an apartment in Texas. Mr. Ahmed’s uncontradicted evidence was that he rented a small apartment in Texas because he did not have sufficient funds to purchase a home as a consequence of Ms. Ain’s breach. In Bonner v. Gill, 2024 ONSC 3270, paras. 27-28, the court noted that a defendant may be liable for expenses such as bridge financing, short-term accommodation, and storage costs where secondary transactions are affected by the defendant’s failure to close. The courts have granted costs associated with obtaining temporary accommodations due to failed real estate transactions (Falcone v. Primont Homes (Maple) Inc.; Hawryluk v. Korsakoff).

[41] Had Ms. Ain completed the transaction, Mr. Ahmed would have purchased a home in Texas and would not have incurred rental costs. It was reasonably foreseeable to Ms. Ain that Mr. Ahmed would rely on the funds from the sale to purchase a new home. Indeed, Ms. Ain herself was relying on the funds from the sale of her own home to complete her purchase of Mr. Ahmed’s home. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmed is entitled to recover $15,144.75, which represents the rental costs he incurred during the 153 days between Ms. Ain’s breach and the resale of the home.

[42] Based on the above, I award damages to Mr. Ahmed as follows:

• Difference between original and resale purchase price of home: $350,000.00
• Mortgage Payments (for 153 days): $9,140.22
• Home insurance (for 153 days): $302.84
• Electricity (for 153 days): $233.81
• Property taxes (for 153 days): $2,140.03
• Repairs to home required by second purchaser pursuant to home inspection clause in agreement of purchase and sale: $8,136.00
• Legal fees on resale of home: $1,362.95
• Rent for apartment in Texas (with a USD to CAD conversion rate of $1.27): $15,144.75

Total: $386,460.60

Order Granted

[43] For the reasons above, I find Ms. Ain liable for breach of contract and order her to pay $386,460.60 in damages to Mr. Ahmed. I dismiss her crossclaim against Re-Max Premier Amatul Waheed Real Estate Brokerage.

[44] Mr. Ahmed and the Brokerage are both entitled to their costs from Ms. Ain, given their success on the action and the crossclaim respectively. The parties are to work together to resolve costs. If they are unable to do so by August 5, 2025, they are to advise my judicial assistant and I will set a timetable for the exchange of brief cost submissions.

Rohit Parghi
Date: July 15, 2025