Hugh R. Scher

The defendants brought a motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from a judgment in a construction lien case.

The defendants' Manitoba counsel missed the 15-day appeal period prescribed by the Construction Lien Act, mistakenly believing they had 30 days from the entry of the formal order.

The court granted the extension, finding that the defendants had formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period, the delay was reasonably explained by counsel's error, and the plaintiff would not suffer prejudice that could not be compensated by costs and interest.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario issued an interim decision granting ARCH Disability Law Centre leave to intervene in the proceeding.

The Tribunal also set a schedule for submissions regarding the applicant's request to appoint Sheila Barber as litigation guardian, noting the respondent's intention to argue a conflict of interest.

During a case management conference call in a human rights application, the respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the applicant's litigation guardian, who holds powers of attorney for personal care and property, should be removed due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Tribunal issued an interim decision directing the applicant to file the relevant Power of Attorney and scheduling a teleconference hearing to determine whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to remove a litigation guardian under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The applicant filed an Application for Contravention of Settlement alleging the respondents breached a Memorandum of Settlement by paying the second settlement instalment eight days late and providing an unsatisfactory apology letter.

The Tribunal found that while the late payment constituted a breach, the respondent had provided advance notice and fulfilled the payment shortly after.

The Tribunal concluded that the apology provided did not breach the settlement terms and that no harm arose from the brief payment delay to justify a remedial order under section 45.9(8) of the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants filed human rights applications alleging reprisal by the respondents, who were opposing counsel and parties in a previous application.

A preliminary hearing was scheduled to determine if the applications were an abuse of process and if the applicants should be declared vexatious litigants.

The applicants failed to attend the hearing or file submissions.

The Tribunal dismissed the applications and, finding a pattern of vexatious conduct and abuse of process, ordered that the applicants must obtain leave from the Tribunal before filing any future applications against the respondents or related parties.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging failure to accommodate his disability and workplace harassment following a workplace reorganization.

The respondents brought a request to dismiss the application under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing the matters had been appropriately dealt with in a prior grievance arbitration proceeding.

The Tribunal found that the accommodation issues were substantively resolved through settlements and an arbitration decision in the prior proceeding, and dismissed that portion of the application.

However, the Tribunal allowed the harassment allegations to proceed, as they had not been addressed in the grievance process.

The applicant alleged that her building manager sexually solicited her, made sexually demeaning comments, and issued eviction notices in retaliation for her objections.

The respondents denied the allegations and asserted that the eviction notices were privileged and based on tenant complaints.

The Tribunal refused a preliminary request to bar the applicant's representative, finding insufficient evidence of abuse of process.

The Tribunal also found that statements in the eviction notices were protected by absolute privilege.

On the merits, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence unreliable and concluded that the eviction notices were prompted by tenant complaints, not retaliation.

The application was dismissed.

The respondents requested the dismissal of a human rights application alleging sexual solicitation and harassment by a building manager, arguing the matter was already dealt with by the Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) during eviction proceedings.

The Tribunal found that while the LTB considered whether eviction notices constituted harassment, it did not assess the allegations of sexual solicitation or apply human rights principles.

The Tribunal concluded the LTB did not appropriately deal with the substance of the application under s. 45.1 of the Code.

The respondents' alternative arguments for dismissal based on issue estoppel and abuse of process were also rejected, and the motion to dismiss was denied.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the human rights application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, or on the basis of abuse of process or issue estoppel, relying on a prior decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The Tribunal held a Case Resolution Conference and orally denied the motion to dismiss, with written reasons to follow.

The Tribunal directed the parties to proceed with the next steps in the process, including the exchange of additional facts and relevant documents.

The respondent employee, who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, was terminated after refusing to meet with an occupational medicine specialist chosen by the appellant employer to assess his disability and accommodation needs.

The trial judge found the employee was wrongfully dismissed, awarded 15 months' notice, extended the notice period to 24 months for bad faith in the manner of dismissal (Wallace damages), and awarded $500,000 in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the wrongful dismissal and Wallace damages, but reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the employer's appeal in part, upholding the 15-month notice period but setting aside the Wallace and punitive damages.

The Court held that damages for the manner of dismissal should be assessed under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle rather than by arbitrarily extending the notice period, and found no bad faith or independently actionable wrong to justify aggravated or punitive damages.

The appellant employer sought a stay of execution of a Court of Appeal judgment awarding wrongful dismissal and punitive damages to the respondent employee, pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court granted the stay under s. 65(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Act based on the appellant's undertaking to pay.

However, applying the test for lifting a stay to s. 65(4) of the Act, the court partially lifted the stay to the extent of $60,000 to alleviate the respondent's severe financial hardship pending the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against his employer and union for conspiracy and collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement.

Applying the Weber principle and the Labour Relations Act, the court held it lacked jurisdiction over the claims.

The court noted the appellant's proper recourse was to file an unfair representation complaint with the labour board.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee, who suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome.

The trial judge awarded 15 months' notice, a 9-month Wallace extension, $500,000 in punitive damages, and a costs premium.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of wrongful dismissal, the notice period, and the Wallace extension, finding the employer's order to meet with its doctor unreasonable and its conduct in termination high-handed.

However, the Court reduced the punitive damages to $100,000, finding the trial judge made palpable errors of fact regarding the duration and scope of the employer's misconduct, and reduced the costs premium.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

The insurer required them to undergo a Designated Assessment Centre (DAC) assessment, which concluded the requested treatments were not reasonable or necessary.

The appellants sued the DAC and its assessors for negligence and bad faith.

The motion judge struck the claims, finding no duty of care and applying witness immunity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that while policy considerations preclude a claim for simple negligence against DAC assessors, it is not plain and obvious that claims based on bad faith or breach of a duty of neutrality should be struck, nor does witness immunity necessarily apply to their role as decision-makers.

The union referred a grievance to arbitration regarding the employer's violation of the union security provisions of the collective agreement by employing non-union members.

In a prior decision, the Board found the employer liable.

In this decision on damages, the Board held that the breach of the collective agreement gave rise to a claim for damages because the union had unemployed members who were ready, willing, and able to perform the work.

The Board rejected the employer's argument that its good faith in attempting to enter into a bona fide subcontract should relieve it from paying damages.

The employer was ordered to pay $18,751.44 to the union.

In an application for certification in the construction industry, the Board determined the voter eligibility of several individuals.

The Board declined to dismiss the application under section 11.2 of the Labour Relations Act, finding no prejudice to the responding parties from the delivery of the application.

The Board held that individuals working in a compulsory certified trade within the three-month grace period under section 9 of the Trades Qualification and Apprenticeship Act are lawfully employed and eligible to vote, even if they have not yet registered as apprentices.

However, one individual whose grace period had expired prior to the application date was found ineligible to vote.