35 total
Court rejects single publication rule for internet defamation but dismisses negligence claim for lack of proximity.
The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation and negligence arising from an article published in Toronto Life magazine and on its website.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were statute-barred and the negligence claim lacked a duty of care.
The Court of Appeal held that the application of the Libel and Slander Act to the internet publication and the issue of discoverability were genuine issues for trial.
The Court explicitly rejected the American 'single publication rule' for internet defamation in Ontario.
However, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' attempt to recapture a claim for the print version of the article as statute-barred under s. 6 of the Act, and dismissed the negligence claim because the brief interactions between the journalists and the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficiently close relationship of proximity to create a duty of care.
Damages of $4.9 million awarded following resolution of property expense deductions and pre-judgment interest calculations.
Following a trial decision awarding equitable compensation to the plaintiff, the parties disputed the calculation of damages.
The court resolved issues regarding the proportionality of property taxes, mortgage payments, and rent receipts to be deducted from the plaintiff's award.
The court also determined the appropriate method for calculating pre-judgment interest under the Courts of Justice Act, rejecting both parties' overly complicated approaches.
Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for $4,976,925.32.
Counterclaim against financial regulators struck due to statutory immunity, lack of capacity to be sued, and inapplicable contribution claims.
The appellants were sued by a credit union for monies owed under a credit facility after an employee stole $30 million.
The appellants counterclaimed against the regulators, FSCO and DICO, seeking contribution and indemnity on the basis that they negligently failed to oversee the credit union.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the counterclaim, finding that FSCO is not an entity capable of being sued, DICO is protected by statutory immunity, and the appellants had no tenable claim for contribution and indemnity under the Negligence Act because they were not tortfeasors.
Summary judgment dismissing libel action set aside as excerpts were capable of being defamatory.
The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his libel action against a magazine publisher.
The motion judge had concluded that certain excerpts were not defamatory or not capable of referring to the appellant.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in his application of the test for summary judgment.
The Court held that, reading the article as a whole, the excerpts were capable of being defamatory of the appellant and raised a genuine issue for trial.
Reconsideration denied; Labour Relations Board must first determine its own jurisdiction over the dispute.
Following an appeal decision, the appellant requested a reconsideration, advising the court that the record regarding the Labour Relations Board proceedings was incomplete.
The appellant sought to proceed with a claim based on the alleged misuse of an Industry Fund.
The Court of Appeal declined to reconsider the matter, finding that the issue of the Board's jurisdiction under section 143 of the Labour Relations Act had not been previously decided by the Board.
The court held that the specialized tribunal should have the first opportunity to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.
Action against employers' association dismissed as the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Relations Board.
The appellant, a low-rise forming contractor, commenced an action against the respondent employers' association for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional interference with economic relations, alleging misuse of an Industry Fund.
The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the association's statutory duty of fair representation and the reasonableness of levied fees, both of which are matters exclusively within the Board's jurisdiction under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge's finding of prescriptive easement over shared driveway upheld.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment declaring that the respondents were entitled to a prescriptive easement for a right-of-way over a driveway on the appellants' property.
The appellants argued the trial judge erred in finding the use was 'as of right' rather than by permission.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the trial judge to find on the record that the arrangement between the original owners did not amount to permission, and deference was owed to that factual finding.
Motion for leave to appeal to Divisional Court must be heard in the region where the appeal will be heard.
The defendants brought a motion in Toronto for leave to appeal an interlocutory order made in Milton (Central West Region).
The court raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the motion was properly returnable in Toronto.
After reviewing the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court must be filed and heard in the region where the appeal is to be heard, which in this case was the Central West Region.
The court ordered the motion transferred to the Central West Region.
Defamation action restored; novel questions of law regarding 'broadcast' definition inappropriate for summary judgment.
The appellant, a law student, sued the respondent for defamation after the respondent made disparaging remarks about him into a microphone at an Italian social club meeting.
The motion judge dismissed the claims for libel and slander on a motion for summary judgment, finding that the use of a microphone was not a 'broadcast' under the Libel and Slander Act, that the appellant could not claim slander per se because he was not yet a lawyer, and that there was no evidence of special damage.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by deciding novel and significant questions of law on a summary judgment motion without a full factual record, and finding that there was some evidence of special damage.
Canada Post's exclusive privilege over collecting, transmitting, and delivering letters applies to outbound international mail.
The appellants, private couriers providing outbound international mail services, appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting s. 14 of the Canada Post Corporation Act.
The motion judge held that Canada Post's exclusive privilege of 'collecting, transmitting and delivering letters' applies to any one or more of those activities within Canada, including for letters destined abroad.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the French version of the statute clearly granted an exclusive privilege for each activity independently.
The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the activities constituted a single indivisible process, noting that such an interpretation would conflict with other provisions of the Act.
Motion to intervene granted; competitors added as parties to appeal concerning postal service monopoly.
Two competitors in the outbound international mail industry brought a motion to intervene in an appeal concerning the interpretation of the Canada Post Corporation Act's exclusive privilege provisions.
The moving parties sought to be added as parties or friends of the court, arguing they had a direct interest as they were facing similar injunction proceedings by the respondent.
The Court of Appeal granted the motion, adding the moving parties as intervenors with the right to augment the record, finding they had a sufficient interest and common questions of law with the main proceeding.
Appeal dismissed; whether the discoverability rule applies to a contractual limitation period requires a trial.
The defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment.
The plaintiff sued for breach of a commercial lease after the defendants sold the property without honouring the plaintiff's right of first refusal.
The defendants argued the action was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that whether the discoverability rule applies to a contractual limitation period is a genuine issue for trial, as is the factual question of when the plaintiff ought reasonably to have discovered the breach.
Libel appeal dismissed; alternative defamatory meaning could be pleaded and justified.
The appellant in a libel action challenged the refusal to strike a statement of defence that denied the pleaded defamatory meaning and asserted a different defamatory meaning said to be true.
The Court of Appeal adopted the Divisional Court's reasoning that, under the modern rule, a defendant in a libel action may plead any defamatory meaning the words are capable of bearing and may justify that meaning or plead fair comment on a matter of public interest.
Finding no basis for appellate intervention, the court dismissed the appeal and fixed costs in favour of the respondents.
Non-party investigator ordered to produce interview notes and submit to discovery in libel action.
The defendants in a libel action appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to compel production of documents and examination for discovery of a non-party investigator.
The investigator had been hired by the plaintiff employer to interview employees regarding the same allegations that formed the basis of the libel action.
The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the interview notes were relevant to the defendants' plea of justification and were not protected by privilege under the Wigmore criteria.
The court concluded it would be unfair to require the defendants to proceed to trial without discovery of the non-party.
Board of Inquiry has jurisdiction to decide Charter challenges; individual condominium directors may be named as respondents.
The respondents in several human rights complaints regarding 'adults only' condominium policies brought preliminary motions challenging the Board of Inquiry's jurisdiction and the naming of individual directors as parties.
The Board held that it has jurisdiction under section 52(1) of the Charter to determine whether the Code's definition of age violates equality rights.
The Board also declined to remove the individual directors as respondents, noting they could be found personally liable for causing the corporations to discriminate, but removed the 'Board of Directors' as it is not a legal entity.