Hartley Morris Schwartz

The Minister of Finance appealed a master's decision dismissing a motion to renew a writ of execution against an uninsured motorist who had filed a consumer proposal.

The motorist's driver's licence had been subject to suspension under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act for failing to pay a judgment debt arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding an operational conflict between the provincial legislation and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that the provincial scheme was effectively a debt collection mechanism that subverted the federal bankruptcy scheme and the 'fresh start' principle, rendering the provincial provision inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for break and enter and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the W.D. principle, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence on the point of entry window was sufficient to support the conviction.

The consecutive sentence for breach of probation was also upheld given the appellant's lengthy related record.

A self-represented applicant sought costs against a provincial court judge personally after successfully obtaining relief relating to the judge’s refusal to remove him as counsel during a criminal trial.

The Superior Court considered whether costs could be awarded against the judge and whether the Crown should receive costs against the applicant.

The court held that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity under s. 82 of the Courts of Justice Act, barring any costs award against the judge.

The court also declined to award costs to the Crown against the applicant despite concerns about the merit of the motion.

Both costs requests were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the claims even if they were not statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The Court noted that the section 15 Charter claim was too vague and lacked evidence to permit meaningful analysis.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent, though the Crown undertook not to enforce the order due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The complainants, family members of deceased involuntary psychiatric patients, alleged that s. 10 of the Coroners Act discriminated against them on the basis of mental disability by making inquests discretionary for involuntary patients but mandatory for inmates in penal institutions.

The Human Rights Tribunal found discrimination and ordered inquests and damages.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while a coroner's inquest is a 'service' under s. 1 of the Human Rights Code, the differential treatment under the Coroners Act does not amount to discrimination.

The distinction is based on the different vulnerable circumstances and levels of public oversight in penal institutions versus psychiatric facilities, not on disability.

The appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment when he attended the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge might have made further inquiries before refusing the adjournment, the fairness of the trial was not compromised.

The trial judge granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who was provided with transcripts and disclosure, and who subsequently recalled a Crown witness and presented the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment when he appeared on the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial's fairness was not compromised.

The trial judge had granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who then recalled a Crown witness, called defence evidence, and made submissions.

The overall conduct of the proceedings overcame any perceived unfairness from the initial denial of the adjournment.

The applicants sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario following successful applications for judicial review.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale against the Tribunal.

The court noted that while costs against a statutory tribunal are rare, the Tribunal's fully adversarial stance and unsuccessful arguments on all issues justified the award.

The applicants, an employer and its manager, settled a sexual harassment complaint with the complainant.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission then referred the complaint solely against another respondent to the Human Rights Tribunal.

Despite the applicants not being parties to the hearing, the Tribunal made adverse findings of fact and liability against them.

The Divisional Court granted judicial review, holding that the Tribunal breached natural justice and exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating matters not referred to it and making findings against non-parties who had settled.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to amend its decision.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against her former employer.

The Commission decided not to deal with the complaint.

The appellant sought judicial review and requested production of a legal opinion provided to the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solicitor-client privilege applies to legal advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel just as it does in private law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the legal opinion was protected from disclosure.

The appellants, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant, appealed a Divisional Court costs order that awarded $25,000 against them despite their substantial success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Divisional Court erred in principle by awarding costs against a successful party and by denying costs to the complainant because he was represented by pro bono counsel.

The Court varied the order to award partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the Divisional Court proceedings and the appeal.

The applicant, a college professor, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap.

He also filed 14 grievances covering the same allegations under his collective agreement.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission exercised its discretion under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code not to deal with the complaint, finding it could be more appropriately dealt with through the grievance and arbitration procedure.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the Commission's decision was patently unreasonable because it failed to investigate the efficacy of the grievance procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission is not required to conduct a full-scale investigation into the efficacy of the grievance procedure and its decision was not patently unreasonable given the overlap between the grievances and the complaint.

The appellant, a charity licensed to sell break open lottery tickets (BOTs), brought a class action seeking restitution of a provincial administration fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional indirect tax.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment to strike the restitution claim, adducing evidence that the fee was borne by consumers through a reduced prize board, not by the charities.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the appellant failed to adduce evidence showing a genuine issue for trial regarding who bore the burden of the fee or its entitlement to restitution.

The applicants, corporate retailers and their employees, were convicted of carrying on business on a proscribed holiday contrary to the Retail Business Holidays Act.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, challenging the constitutionality of the Act under ss. 2(a) and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the unique history of the legislation and the evolution of equality law left sufficient uncertainty regarding the Act's validity to warrant consideration by a full panel.

The Crown appealed a Divisional Court decision permitting the Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters to examine the Premier and the Minister of Natural Resources regarding the cancellation of the spring bear hunt.

The applicants alleged the Minister failed to exercise independent discretion and was improperly influenced by the Premier and political expediency.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the summonses, holding that the motives for passing a regulation are irrelevant to its validity, and there was no justiciable issue or reasonable evidentiary basis to permit the examinations.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The respondents were charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Crown refused to disclose a Prosecution Approval Form, claiming solicitor-client privilege.

A justice of the peace found a Charter breach, ordered disclosure, and awarded costs against the Crown.

The Crown successfully applied to quash the costs order, arguing the provincial offences court was not a 'court of competent jurisdiction' under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a provincial offences court has the power to order costs against the Crown for a Charter breach based on a functional and structural approach to its jurisdiction.

The applicants brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside interlocutory orders made by a single judge in a pending judicial review application challenging the cancellation of the spring bear hunt.

The panel allowed the motion in part, permitting the applicants to examine the Premier and the Minister of Natural Resources under Rule 39.03 on the narrow issue of whether the Minister exercised independent discretion or was dictated to by the Premier.

The panel upheld the single judge's orders restricting the applicants to four expert witnesses and directing that the respondents' motion to strike portions of affidavits be heard by a single judge prior to the main application.

Parents who, for religious reasons, sent their children to private Jewish and Christian schools challenged Ontario’s refusal to fund those schools and to extend school health support services to students attending them.

The appeal raised Charter claims under ss. 2(a) and 15(1), together with the constitutional significance of s. 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 and s. 29 of the Charter.

The majority held that the non-funding of dissentient religious schools did not violate the appellants’ Charter rights, emphasizing the constitutional structure governing denominational school rights and the absence of any positive entitlement to state support for religious education.

The majority also held that the School Health Support Services Program was properly characterized as an education service linked to the public system and therefore did not infringe the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed, with partial dissents on the equality and school health support issues.

The corporate appellants, retail businesses, and their employees sought declarations that the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act was unconstitutional, alleging it infringed freedom of religion and equality rights under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants lacked standing.

The Court found that while there was a serious issue as to the Act's validity and the appellants were directly affected, there were other reasonable and effective ways to bring the issue before the court, as evidenced by their reliance on the evidentiary record of another case.

The Court also held that the appellants could not claim their own religious rights were violated without specific factual evidence.