Hartley Morris Schwartz

The applicant requested to amend the application to name Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario as the respondent instead of the Minister of Health and Long-Term Care.

The Tribunal granted the amendment.

The Tribunal also considered two intervention requests.

The Canadian Association for Community Living, Community Living Ontario and People First of Canada were granted limited intervenor status to call evidence on the context of community living and deinstitutionalization.

The Bazelon Centre for Mental Health Law's request to intervene to provide a comparative perspective on U.S. anti-discrimination laws was denied, as the parties could provide this assistance themselves.

The appellant, a deaf individual with limited communication skills, was involuntarily committed under the Mental Health Act and detained in a maximum security psychiatric facility for 19 years.

He challenged the constitutionality of the involuntary committal provisions under s. 7 of the Charter and alleged a violation of his s. 15(1) equality rights due to inadequate sign language interpretation.

The Court of Appeal held that the Mental Health Act violates s. 7 when applied to long-term detainees because the Consent and Capacity Board lacks the authority to ensure that liberty is restricted no more than necessary.

The Court also found a violation of s. 15(1) due to the systemic failure to provide adequate interpretation services.

The Court severed the words 'or subsequent' from s. 20(4)(b)(iii) of the Act, suspending the declaration of invalidity for 12 months, and granted a declaration of the appellant's equality rights.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Mental Health Legal Committee brought motions for leave to intervene as friends of the court in an upcoming appeal concerning the constitutionality of the involuntary detention provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The appellant supported the motions, while the respondent Crown and mental health facility opposed them, arguing the proposed interventions would be duplicative or raise new issues.

The Court of Appeal granted both motions, finding that the proposed interveners had special expertise, would make useful contributions without duplicating the appellant's arguments, and that the new legal arguments raised did not require fresh evidence or cause prejudice to the respondents.

The plaintiff, having been found not criminally responsible, was ordered detained at a mental health facility but was instead held in a provincial jail for 50 days due to a lack of hospital beds.

The plaintiff sued the Crown for false imprisonment and Charter breaches.

The Crown moved to strike portions of the Statement of Claim.

The court struck the false imprisonment and Charter damages claims with leave to amend, finding the Crown statutorily immune based on the current pleadings and noting the failure to plead bad faith for Charter damages.

The court allowed the underlying Charter breach claims to proceed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to indefinitely suspend his driver's licence following his third impaired driving conviction.

The applicant argued that his first conviction, which occurred when he was a youth, could not be used to calculate the suspension under the Highway Traffic Act due to the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He also argued that the Registrar was estopped from imposing the indefinite suspension because he had previously received an erroneous notice of a three-year suspension and a notice of eligibility for reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflict between the provincial and federal legislation, and holding that the doctrines of public estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot override the Registrar's mandatory statutory duty to suspend the licence.

The applicants, male-to-female transsexuals, alleged discrimination because of sex and gender identity due to the government's failure to fund laser hair removal, voice therapy, and breast augmentation.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the applications had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that the expert report provided by the applicants did not establish that the requested services were medically necessary or fell within the purpose of OHIP funding.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the applications for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Minister of Finance appealed a master's decision dismissing a motion to renew a writ of execution against an uninsured motorist who had filed a consumer proposal.

The motorist's driver's licence had been subject to suspension under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act for failing to pay a judgment debt arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding an operational conflict between the provincial legislation and the federal Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court held that the provincial scheme was effectively a debt collection mechanism that subverted the federal bankruptcy scheme and the 'fresh start' principle, rendering the provincial provision inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for break and enter and breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, misapplied the W.D. principle, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the fingerprint evidence on the point of entry window was sufficient to support the conviction.

The consecutive sentence for breach of probation was also upheld given the appellant's lengthy related record.

A self-represented applicant sought costs against a provincial court judge personally after successfully obtaining relief relating to the judge’s refusal to remove him as counsel during a criminal trial.

The Superior Court considered whether costs could be awarded against the judge and whether the Crown should receive costs against the applicant.

The court held that judges enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for acts performed in their judicial capacity under s. 82 of the Courts of Justice Act, barring any costs award against the judge.

The court also declined to award costs to the Crown against the applicant despite concerns about the merit of the motion.

Both costs requests were dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against the Crown.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the claims even if they were not statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

The Court noted that the section 15 Charter claim was too vague and lacked evidence to permit meaningful analysis.

Costs of $8,000 were awarded to the respondent, though the Crown undertook not to enforce the order due to the appellant's financial circumstances.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission requested an adjournment of a case management conference scheduled for 77 consolidated complaints regarding the special diet allowance under the Ontario Disability Support Program.

The Commission's lead counsel requested the adjournment because he would be on a long-planned vacation.

The Tribunal denied the request, noting that it does not reschedule initial conference calls without the written consent of all parties, and that a party's desire to have particular counsel attend cannot justify an adjournment.

The complainants, family members of deceased involuntary psychiatric patients, alleged that s. 10 of the Coroners Act discriminated against them on the basis of mental disability by making inquests discretionary for involuntary patients but mandatory for inmates in penal institutions.

The Human Rights Tribunal found discrimination and ordered inquests and damages.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while a coroner's inquest is a 'service' under s. 1 of the Human Rights Code, the differential treatment under the Coroners Act does not amount to discrimination.

The distinction is based on the different vulnerable circumstances and levels of public oversight in penal institutions versus psychiatric facilities, not on disability.

The appeal was allowed and the complaints were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment when he attended the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that although the trial judge might have made further inquiries before refusing the adjournment, the fairness of the trial was not compromised.

The trial judge granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who was provided with transcripts and disclosure, and who subsequently recalled a Crown witness and presented the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing an adjournment when he appeared on the trial date with newly retained counsel, forcing him to proceed unrepresented during the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial's fairness was not compromised.

The trial judge had granted a lengthy adjournment after the Crown's case, allowing the appellant to retain counsel who then recalled a Crown witness, called defence evidence, and made submissions.

The overall conduct of the proceedings overcame any perceived unfairness from the initial denial of the adjournment.

The applicants sought costs against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario following successful applications for judicial review.

The Divisional Court awarded costs of $20,000 on a partial indemnity scale against the Tribunal.

The court noted that while costs against a statutory tribunal are rare, the Tribunal's fully adversarial stance and unsuccessful arguments on all issues justified the award.

The applicants, an employer and its manager, settled a sexual harassment complaint with the complainant.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission then referred the complaint solely against another respondent to the Human Rights Tribunal.

Despite the applicants not being parties to the hearing, the Tribunal made adverse findings of fact and liability against them.

The Divisional Court granted judicial review, holding that the Tribunal breached natural justice and exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating matters not referred to it and making findings against non-parties who had settled.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to amend its decision.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against her former employer.

The Commission decided not to deal with the complaint.

The appellant sought judicial review and requested production of a legal opinion provided to the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solicitor-client privilege applies to legal advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel just as it does in private law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the legal opinion was protected from disclosure.

The appellants, the Ontario Human Rights Commission and the complainant, appealed a Divisional Court costs order that awarded $25,000 against them despite their substantial success on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Divisional Court erred in principle by awarding costs against a successful party and by denying costs to the complainant because he was represented by pro bono counsel.

The Court varied the order to award partial indemnity costs to the appellants for both the Divisional Court proceedings and the appeal.

The applicant, a college professor, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of handicap.

He also filed 14 grievances covering the same allegations under his collective agreement.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission exercised its discretion under s. 34(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code not to deal with the complaint, finding it could be more appropriately dealt with through the grievance and arbitration procedure.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the Commission's decision was patently unreasonable because it failed to investigate the efficacy of the grievance procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission is not required to conduct a full-scale investigation into the efficacy of the grievance procedure and its decision was not patently unreasonable given the overlap between the grievances and the complaint.

The appellant, a charity licensed to sell break open lottery tickets (BOTs), brought a class action seeking restitution of a provincial administration fee, arguing it was an unconstitutional indirect tax.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment to strike the restitution claim, adducing evidence that the fee was borne by consumers through a reduced prize board, not by the charities.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding the appellant failed to adduce evidence showing a genuine issue for trial regarding who bore the burden of the fee or its entitlement to restitution.