Gregory Ryan Skerkowski

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for the sexual assault of an 11-year-old child.

He argued the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended DNA and medical evidence, and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and free of legal error.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence reduced to two years, because the trial judge had sentenced the appellant based on a more invasive assault than the one for which he was convicted.

The young person appealed their robbery conviction, arguing it was unreasonable due to flawed eyewitness identification from a photographic line up and that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the complainant recognized the appellant from prior commercial dealings and another witness corroborated the appellant's involvement in planning the robbery.

The court also found the allegedly exculpatory evidence was not exculpatory and the trial judge was not required to mention every piece of evidence in the reasons.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be grossly excessive, noting it was double what the Crown had sought at trial and out of proportion to the offence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant's new counsel requested an adjournment at the opening of the appeal hearing to obtain fresh expert evidence, following the recent death of the appellant's previous counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment to a peremptory date without expressing a view on the admissibility of the proposed fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in resolving inconsistencies in the child complainant's evidence and that the Crown improperly split its case by using his police statements only during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility assessment was supported by confirming evidence and entitled to deference.

Furthermore, the Crown's use of the voluntary statements during cross-examination was solely for assessing credibility and did not constitute improper case splitting.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson endangering life and causing damage by fire to a dwelling house with intent to defraud, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the arson endangering life conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the reasonable doubt standard or treatment of after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the intent to defraud count, as the trial judge failed to find the appellant had the requisite intent when causing the fire, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the custodial sentence based on general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment by transferring findings from an admitted assault charge to the disputed sexual assault charges without explanation, ignoring key evidence such as a letter written by the complainant, and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) test.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the sexual assault charges, and the sentence for the remaining assault and criminal harassment convictions was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and failed to address weaknesses in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant's version of events incredible and the complainant's testimony credible and compelling.

The complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical bruising and another employee.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm during an indictable offence, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an accomplice's testimony, which the trial judge instructed the jury required confirmation.

The trial judge allowed the jury to use a witness's late, in-dock identification of the appellant as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to caution the jury about the frailties of in-dock identification and in leaving it as capable of confirming the accomplice's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge placed undue emphasis on his position of trust, claiming he was a fraudster rather than a genuine healer, and that the sentence was disproportionate due to immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant used his purported position as a religious consultant and healer to fraudulently obtain consent for sexual acts, and that the sentence was fit regardless of immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal judge misstated the fourth branch of the Palmer test for admitting fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge misstated the test by using 'would' instead of 'could', the fresh evidence was ultimately inadmissible.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge on the issue and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences involving his niece and sought leave to appeal a three-year penitentiary sentence.

The court held that contextual evidence concerning an unrelated child protection matter was admissible as necessary narrative surrounding the appellant's admissions, and any prejudicial effect was outweighed by the probative value of the confessions.

The court also held that the complainant's disclosures to family and friends were admissible as narrative evidence under the prior consistent statement jurisprudence, and that the jury charge did not require further limiting instructions in the circumstances of the defence theory.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the sentence was not manifestly unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing despite being advised by amicus curiae that the appeal could be dismissed if he did not appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious, unprovoked attack on an innocent victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was fit and that the trial judge correctly emphasized denunciation and general deterrence without treating the appellant as if he had been convicted of attempted murder.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and assault causing bodily harm following a violent attack in a convenience store parking lot.

The sole issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held the verdict was not unreasonable, but allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself and analyze the inherent frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The 74-year-old appellant appealed an order suspending his conditional sentence and directing him to serve 21 days in custody for breaching an alcohol prohibition.

The appellant filed fresh evidence showing his health had significantly deteriorated, including a bladder cancer diagnosis.

Given his age, time already served, and worsening medical condition, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the order to time served.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition detaining her in a minimum secure facility.

She argued the Board erred by failing to inquire whether she would consent to a conditional discharge subject to continued medication treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that such an inquiry was unnecessary because the appellant had been found incapable of consenting to treatment and lacked insight into her illness, making a conditional discharge an unrealistic option on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of recognizance.

On the scheduled trial date, the trial judge ruled that the appellant's counsel was no longer on the record due to a prior endorsement, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the prior endorsement and that counsel remained on the record.

The Court held that the appellant's right to be represented by counsel was violated, requiring a new trial without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.