Gregory Ryan Skerkowski

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of sexual assault and assault with a weapon.

The respondent had argued that the complainants consented to the activities, except for one assault with a hammer which he claimed was accidental.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to address whether the apparent consent was vitiated by the respondent's exercise of authority or the complainants' fear of violence, as required by s. 265(3) of the Criminal Code.

A new trial was ordered for the charges where consent was in issue.

The acquittal for the hammer assault was upheld as the trial judge's assessment of the injury was open to him.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that while incarceration is typically warranted for this type of offence absent special circumstances, the respondent's exemplary conduct during the eight months on her conditional sentence, including making restitution and securing employment, meant that incarcerating her now would not serve the interests of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding that the evidence of an unsavoury witness was corroborated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly scrutinized the evidence with great caution and correctly identified evidence capable of confirming the witness's testimony.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder with a firearm and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment after shooting a victim at a bar.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing issues of identity, intent, and intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions on identity and intent were amply supported by the evidence, and there was insufficient evidence of intoxication.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence was within the appropriate range given the serious, life-altering injuries sustained by the victim in a public place.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference involving a 13-year-old complainant.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility, misapplied the law regarding inconsistencies in a child witness's testimony, and engaged in conduct that rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, gave cogent reasons for rejecting defence evidence, and, despite some ill-chosen comments, did not deprive the appellant of a fair trial.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the issue because a new trial was ordered in a companion appeal.

The court noted the appellant could seek a new Rowbotham order at his new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breach of recognizance.

The parties agreed that the charges giving rise to the recognizance had been withdrawn prior to the alleged breach.

As a result, the appellant was not bound by a recognizance when he consumed alcohol, and the appeal was allowed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after his trial counsel was removed from the record by an application judge due to unpaid legal fees.

The appellant was forced to represent himself for the remainder of the trial.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in removing counsel absent a fundamental disagreement, serious breakdown in communications, or ethical dilemma.

The removal violated the appellant's right to counsel, and actual prejudice was not required to order a new trial, though prejudice likely existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving his nieces.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to consider evidence of collusion and by applying a higher standard of scrutiny to his evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the collusion issue but held that the trial judge erred in relying on the appellant's evasive answers to ambiguous and irrelevant questions about whether he found his nieces attractive to reject his testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault against his spouse.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's assessment of credibility, as the case turned almost entirely on the conflicting testimony of the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny, holding the appellant accountable for every inconsistency while glossing over significant contradictions in the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding her statements to police.

The trial judge also misapprehended material parts of the appellant's evidence.

Concluding that the appellant did not receive a fair trial, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing errors in the trial judge's jury charge and the admission of an officer's opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the failure to give a limiting instruction on animosity evidence, and held the jury question regarding aggravated assault and attempted murder was answered appropriately.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for the sexual assault of an 11-year-old child.

He argued the trial judge's findings were unreasonable, misapprehended DNA and medical evidence, and failed to properly apply the W. (D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and free of legal error.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence reduced to two years, because the trial judge had sentenced the appellant based on a more invasive assault than the one for which he was convicted.

The young person appealed their robbery conviction, arguing it was unreasonable due to flawed eyewitness identification from a photographic line up and that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the complainant recognized the appellant from prior commercial dealings and another witness corroborated the appellant's involvement in planning the robbery.

The court also found the allegedly exculpatory evidence was not exculpatory and the trial judge was not required to mention every piece of evidence in the reasons.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence to be grossly excessive, noting it was double what the Crown had sought at trial and out of proportion to the offence.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant's new counsel requested an adjournment at the opening of the appeal hearing to obtain fresh expert evidence, following the recent death of the appellant's previous counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment to a peremptory date without expressing a view on the admissibility of the proposed fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in resolving inconsistencies in the child complainant's evidence and that the Crown improperly split its case by using his police statements only during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court held that the trial judge's credibility assessment was supported by confirming evidence and entitled to deference.

Furthermore, the Crown's use of the voluntary statements during cross-examination was solely for assessing credibility and did not constitute improper case splitting.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson endangering life and causing damage by fire to a dwelling house with intent to defraud, as well as his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the arson endangering life conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the reasonable doubt standard or treatment of after-the-fact conduct.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the intent to defraud count, as the trial judge failed to find the appellant had the requisite intent when causing the fire, and ordered a new trial on that count.

The sentence appeal was dismissed, with the court upholding the custodial sentence based on general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for three counts of sexual assault and his sentence of three years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment by transferring findings from an admitted assault charge to the disputed sexual assault charges without explanation, ignoring key evidence such as a letter written by the complainant, and failing to properly apply the W.(D.) test.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the sexual assault charges, and the sentence for the remaining assault and criminal harassment convictions was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for failure to provide a breath sample and impaired driving.

He argued the trial judge erred in treating videotaped evidence and in dismissing his section 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to consult counsel of choice.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding no unreasonable errors in the trial judge's findings.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and failed to address weaknesses in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to find the appellant's version of events incredible and the complainant's testimony credible and compelling.

The complainant's evidence was corroborated by physical bruising and another employee.