Gregory Ryan Skerkowski

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm during an indictable offence, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an accomplice's testimony, which the trial judge instructed the jury required confirmation.

The trial judge allowed the jury to use a witness's late, in-dock identification of the appellant as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to caution the jury about the frailties of in-dock identification and in leaving it as capable of confirming the accomplice's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment for sexual assault.

The appellant argued the trial judge placed undue emphasis on his position of trust, claiming he was a fraudster rather than a genuine healer, and that the sentence was disproportionate due to immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant used his purported position as a religious consultant and healer to fraudulently obtain consent for sexual acts, and that the sentence was fit regardless of immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge on the issue and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that dismissed his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the summary conviction appeal judge misstated the fourth branch of the Palmer test for admitting fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the judge misstated the test by using 'would' instead of 'could', the fresh evidence was ultimately inadmissible.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences involving his niece and sought leave to appeal a three-year penitentiary sentence.

The court held that contextual evidence concerning an unrelated child protection matter was admissible as necessary narrative surrounding the appellant's admissions, and any prejudicial effect was outweighed by the probative value of the confessions.

The court also held that the complainant's disclosures to family and friends were admissible as narrative evidence under the prior consistent statement jurisprudence, and that the jury charge did not require further limiting instructions in the circumstances of the defence theory.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed because the sentence was not manifestly unfit and disclosed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The appellant failed to appear at the hearing despite being advised by amicus curiae that the appeal could be dismissed if he did not appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a vicious, unprovoked attack on an innocent victim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was fit and that the trial judge correctly emphasized denunciation and general deterrence without treating the appellant as if he had been convicted of attempted murder.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and assault causing bodily harm following a violent attack in a convenience store parking lot.

The sole issue at trial was eyewitness identification.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal held the verdict was not unreasonable, but allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge failed to properly instruct himself and analyze the inherent frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The 74-year-old appellant appealed an order suspending his conditional sentence and directing him to serve 21 days in custody for breaching an alcohol prohibition.

The appellant filed fresh evidence showing his health had significantly deteriorated, including a bladder cancer diagnosis.

Given his age, time already served, and worsening medical condition, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and varied the order to time served.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition detaining her in a minimum secure facility.

She argued the Board erred by failing to inquire whether she would consent to a conditional discharge subject to continued medication treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that such an inquiry was unnecessary because the appellant had been found incapable of consenting to treatment and lacked insight into her illness, making a conditional discharge an unrealistic option on the evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for criminal harassment, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of recognizance.

On the scheduled trial date, the trial judge ruled that the appellant's counsel was no longer on the record due to a prior endorsement, forcing the appellant to proceed unrepresented.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in interpreting the prior endorsement and that counsel remained on the record.

The Court held that the appellant's right to be represented by counsel was violated, requiring a new trial without the need to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, sexual assault, criminal harassment, threatening, and assaulting a police officer, arising from incidents involving his ex-girlfriend.

He argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on credibility and reasonable doubt, failed to give a limiting instruction on disposition evidence, and that the guilty verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittal for administering a noxious substance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, the disposition evidence was admissible without objection, and the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown should not have been permitted to cross-examine the appellant on statements that had not been proven voluntary, as there was no clear waiver of a voir dire.

The trial judge had relied on these statements to impugn the appellant's credibility.

Furthermore, the court found the verdict unreasonable regarding 24 bills found in another person's home, as there was insufficient evidence of control.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were set aside.

Given that the appellant had already served over a year of his sentence, a stay of proceedings was entered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that the combination of identification and confirmatory evidence made the verdict reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a career criminal with a lengthy record, appealed his concurrent 21-month sentences for two counts of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge had treated the appellant as being at the 'worst end of the continuum' simply because he was subject to a section 810.2 recognizance.

The Court of Appeal held this was an error in principle, as it would inevitably result in maximum sentences regardless of the gravity of the breach or rehabilitative steps.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences for the breach of recognizance counts were reduced to 12 months concurrent.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 43 months imprisonment for two sets of offences, including impaired driving and driving while disqualified.

The appellant had a lengthy record with eight prior convictions for drinking and driving.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global sentence as fit but found the sentencing judge erred in denying two-for-one credit for pre-sentence custody due to an adjournment requested by the appellant's counsel.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the sentence on the second impaired driving charge by 1.5 months to reflect the proper pre-sentence custody credit.