Gregory M. Sidlofsky

The defendant brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s lawyer of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

The defendant had previously consulted another lawyer who worked in association with the plaintiff’s lawyer at the same office group regarding the same employment dispute.

The court applied the principles from MacDonald Estate v. Martin concerning removal of counsel and protection of confidential information.

It held that the presumption that lawyers share confidential information applies within law firms but does not automatically apply to lawyers who merely work in association with separate practices.

Because the lawyers had separate practices and there was no evidence that confidential information had been shared with the lawyer of record, the motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

Costs decision following litigation between the applicant and multiple respondents in a commercial dispute.

The court considered the discretionary factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, complexity, and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party.

Although the matter was not factually or legally complex, it was important to the litigants.

The court found that one respondent had been more successful than the applicant.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements, payable partly immediately and partly upon the sale of property.

The applicant sought an oppression remedy under s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act arising from a dispute between brothers who each owned 50% of a family produce business.

The applicant alleged the responding shareholder operated the company for the benefit of himself and his family, including alleged undisclosed cash transactions, misuse of company assets, and failure to provide financial disclosure.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish reasonable expectations necessary to ground an oppression claim.

The evidence did not demonstrate oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarding conduct within the meaning of the statute.

While the oppression remedy was dismissed, the court ordered the sale of the jointly owned property where the business operated under specified terms pursuant to the Partition Act.

The court determined costs following the dismissal of a motion seeking to add additional defendants under Rules 5.04 and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Proposed defendants sought recovery of their legal costs incurred responding to the unsuccessful motion.

The court assessed the reasonable costs expected for a half‑day motion involving complex issues of privity of contract but reduced the amounts claimed due to unnecessary costs arising from arguments raised or abandoned during earlier proceedings.

The court also considered the absence of responding evidence and the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates.

Costs were awarded to the proposed defendants in reduced amounts.

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to add several limited partners of a limited partnership as defendants in an action concerning repayment obligations connected to a promissory note and related agreements.

The proposed amendment alleged that the limited partners were liable through assumption agreements tied to the limited partnership’s debt obligations.

The court considered whether the plaintiff had a tenable cause of action based on privity of contract or under Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permitting claims against limited partners.

The court held that the plaintiff lacked privity of contract with the limited partners and that Rule 8 is procedural and does not create substantive liability for limited partners.

As the proposed claims were clearly impossible of success, the motion to amend was dismissed.

The moving parties sought an order requiring the plaintiffs by counterclaim to post security for costs under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding parties included an individual residing outside Ontario and a corporation alleged to lack sufficient Ontario assets, and the moving parties also argued the counterclaim was frivolous and vexatious.

The court held it was unnecessary to determine those grounds because the counterclaim was closely connected to the issues in the main action, particularly the claim for rescission of a share purchase agreement.

The success of the main action and the counterclaim depended on the same factual and credibility issues.

In these circumstances, security for costs should not be ordered.

The applicant sought to resign as trustee of a family trust.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a cross-application to appoint a new independent trustee, arguing that the settlor's children, who intended to appoint themselves as trustees pursuant to the trust agreement, had abused their discretion as directors of the trust's holding company.

The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion that would justify interfering under s. 5(1) of the Trustee Act, and held that the executors could appoint the next trustees pursuant to the trust agreement.

In an estates dispute between co-executors, the court determined the issue of costs following prior litigation concerning the administration of the estate.

The court applied the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that one executor had been principally successful, though the result was somewhat mixed.

The court emphasized that estate litigation should not automatically result in costs being paid from the estate and that parties should ordinarily bear their own litigation costs unless the dispute was necessary to properly administer the estate.

Finding that this was not such a case, the court ordered costs payable personally by the losing parties.

A non-party sought leave to appeal an order requiring production of decades of corporate financial statements in connection with a summary judgment motion.

The order, originally made by a master and upheld on appeal, required production of financial statements of a pharmaceutical company alleged to be carrying on the business of a predecessor company whose sale generated royalty and option agreements benefiting the plaintiffs.

The moving party argued that conflicting decisions existed and that the order was incorrect because the documents were irrelevant, disproportionate, and improperly required disclosure from a non-party.

The court held that the alleged conflicting decisions involved different procedural stages and discretionary contexts, and therefore did not conflict in principle.

It further found the financial statements had a semblance of relevance to issues of liability, including whether the successor company continued the predecessor’s business.

Leave to appeal was refused.

Following a successful damages claim arising from a mortgage dispute, the plaintiff sought recovery of legal costs on a substantial indemnity basis pursuant to the mortgage contract.

Although the defendants obtained a temporary stay of execution related to the conduct of the plaintiff’s former lawyer, the court found the plaintiff remained substantially successful overall.

The contractual provision supporting substantial indemnity costs was applied.

The court awarded costs slightly below the amount sought.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment relating to a mortgage debt that had been in default since 2001.

The defendants conceded judgment but sought a temporary stay of enforcement pending the determination of a separate action against their former lawyer for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and contribution or indemnity.

The court considered Rule 20.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the broad discretionary authority under s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act to stay proceedings where the interests of justice require.

Given the circumstances surrounding the initiation of the action and the alleged involvement of the former lawyer, the court concluded that the equities favoured granting a temporary stay of execution.

Judgment was granted to the plaintiff but enforcement was stayed on terms pending progress of the related litigation.

The applicant law firm sought leave to appeal a motion judge's costs order.

The motion judge had approved a settlement for a vulnerable person but reduced the requested legal fees from $45,656.74 to $16,000.00.

The applicant argued the motion judge erred in principle by failing to give sufficient weight to the client's approval of the fees and by not providing a proper process to justify the amounts claimed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion.

The appellant employee was terminated for cause after misappropriating company resources to renovate his home.

The employer sued for breach of fiduciary duty, and the employee counterclaimed for unpaid bonuses.

An arbitrator awarded damages to the employer for the misappropriation but also awarded the employee his unpaid bonuses, finding they were an integral part of his employment contract.

The Superior Court overturned the bonus award, holding that a fiduciary is not entitled to compensation during a period of wrongdoing.

The Court of Appeal allowed the employee's appeal and restored the arbitrator's award, finding no absolute rule disentitling an errant fiduciary to bonus compensation, and holding that the arbitrator's decision reasonably achieved the goals of restitution and deterrence.

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence.

The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues.

Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the respondents were privies to a prior foreclosure proceeding against the elder Marinos.

The appellant argued the respondents were independent debtors without a community of interest.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the respondents were privies and that issue estoppel applied against the appellant, dismissing the appeal.

The plaintiff, having been successful on an appeal from a Master's decision, sought costs of the appeal on a substantial or full indemnity scale, arguing the appeal was spurious.

The court found no basis for an elevated scale of costs, noting the defendants had a right to appeal and the single legal issue was not complex.

Costs were fixed at $4,500 on a partial indemnity scale, having regard to the principle of proportionality.

The defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Master had found that the defendants failed to provide a plausible explanation for the default and did not have an arguable defence on the merits.

The defendants argued the Master erred in interpreting an option agreement as not being a demand obligation, which affected when the limitation period commenced.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, agreeing that the cause of action did not arise until 45 days after the option was exercised, meaning the action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent filed a property claim in bankruptcy for funds it loaned to the bankrupt, alleging the loan was induced by fraud.

The trustee disallowed the claim, but the appeal judge found fraud and imposed a constructive trust over the remaining funds.

The trustee appealed, arguing the appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to determine the fraud allegations and erred in imposing a constructive trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the process was agreed upon and the constructive trust was a just remedy to prevent the bankrupt and its tainted creditors from being unjustly enriched by the fraud.

The appellant appealed an order of the Master refusing to re-open a final judgment of foreclosure granted three years earlier.

The foreclosure judgment had been granted on consent, and the mortgagee had elected not to request a reference.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the Master's consideration of the consent nature of the judgment, the delay, and the prejudice to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a decision finding they acted oppressively towards the respondent, a minority shareholder and president of the company.

The parties had a unanimous shareholder agreement guaranteeing the respondent's position and salary.

While the respondent was hospitalized, the appellants terminated his salary, removed him as president, and allowed receivables from their own company to build up, harming the shared business.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the business judgment rule does not override express terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement.

The court upheld the findings of oppression, the inclusion of the wrongful dismissal claim within the oppression application, and the order making the appellants jointly and severally liable.