Gregory M. Sidlofsky

The appellant obtained a default judgment in South Carolina in August 2014 against the respondent, a resident of Ontario.

The appellant commenced an enforcement action in Ontario in December 2017, more than three years later, claiming it did not know the respondent had assets in Ontario until October 2017.

The motion judge set aside the Mareva injunction granted ex parte, finding the enforcement action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the two-year limitation period began to run 30 days after the foreign judgment was entered, when the time to appeal expired.

The court rejected arguments that appeals by co-defendants postponed the limitation period and that the appellant lacked knowledge of the respondent's Ontario assets.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a mixed commercial/residential property in Port Perry.

The agreement contained a mortgage assumption condition requiring approval from the mortgagee, Alterna Savings, on terms acceptable to the buyer.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the condition precedent had not been satisfied because the buyer failed to formally accept Alterna's approval by signing and returning the approval letter before the deadline.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the condition precedent was satisfied when Alterna sent its approval letter, and that formal execution was not required.

The court ordered specific performance subject to Alterna renewing its approval on substantially similar terms.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs for a further and better affidavit of documents and a timetable for trial.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants' unexplained delay, particularly given the plaintiffs' advanced age and frail health, constituted bad faith.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity, importance, and conduct of the parties.

While adjusting the plaintiffs' claimed fees for waiting time and excessive photocopy charges, the court largely upheld the claim, noting the defendants' failure to provide their own dockets for comparison.

The defendant 2623559 Ontario Inc. ("262") moved for an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and a notice registered against a property it purchased.

The plaintiff, Goyal, opposed the motion, alleging the sale was fraudulent and sought rescission.

The court upheld the CPL, finding a triable issue regarding an interest in land and sufficient "badges of fraud" to justify its maintenance.

The decision applied the Dhunna factors and the holistic equitable test, concluding that the equities favored maintaining the CPL.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Luciano Sammut's application for adverse possession.

The respondent, Heather McGhee Peggs, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the application was commenced to interfere with her property sale.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the applicant to warrant substantial indemnity costs and determined that Rule 49.10 did not apply to the respondent's offer to settle as the applicant's claim failed.

Considering the importance of the boundary issue, the complexity, and comparable counsel time, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $32,267.53, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by the applicant.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership and exclusive use over a strip of land via adverse possession.

The properties were converted to Land Titles in 2002, requiring the applicant to prove adverse possession for the continuous ten-year period from December 1992 to December 2002.

While the court found actual possession of the disputed land by the applicant's predecessors in title, it determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite intention to exclude the true owner or establish mutual or unilateral mistake, primarily due to a lack of direct evidence from predecessors in title during the relevant period.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The appellants, estate trustees of the testator's estate, appealed the trial judge's finding that the testator lacked testamentary capacity when executing two wills dated August 16, 2010 and September 8, 2010.

The trial judge found the testator was unaware of the nature and extent of his assets, did not remember persons he might be expected to benefit, and did not understand claims that could be made by excluded persons.

The appellants also sought leave to appeal the costs award, which required the estate trustees personally to pay costs rather than having them borne by the estate.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable errors of fact and upheld the trial judge's findings on capacity and costs.

The respondent, Krates Keswick Inc., purchased and took assignments of three loans made to the appellants and related companies.

The motion judge granted judgment against the appellants on all three loans, granted possession of the Marko Lands to the respondent, dismissed the appellants' counterclaim, and refused to stay enforcement of the judgment.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the motion judge's decision.

The Court of Appeal upheld the judgment on all three loans and the dismissal of the counterclaim.

However, the court partially allowed the appeal by staying enforcement of the judgment relating to the two secured loans pending determination of what credit, if any, the appellants might be entitled to based on the value of the Marko Lands, which had been subject to a resulting trust determination in subsequent proceedings.

Enforcement of the unsecured loan was not stayed.

The appellant appealed a decision finding his conduct in connection with a family business was oppressive and removing him as a director, officer, and trustee.

The appellant had emptied the company's bank account, attempted to exclude his daughters from the account, and used corporate funds for personal purposes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant breached his fiduciary duties.

The court held that the remedy of removing him from his roles was appropriate and consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations, given his conduct and the divisive family relationship.

The applicant, standing in the shoes of a bankrupt corporation, sought a declaration that four properties registered in the names of the respondents (former shareholders) were held on resulting trust for the corporation.

The respondents claimed they purchased the properties personally.

The court found the respondents' evidence regarding their intentions and the corporate accounting to be unreliable and self-serving.

The court held that the corporation paid for the properties, maintained them, and acted as the owner throughout, thereby establishing a resulting trust in favour of the applicant.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissal of their action against a construction management company for alleged overpayments and damages under a penalty clause for construction delays.

The motion judge had rejected the overpayment claim and found the penalty clause did not apply to a feature wall.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's credibility assessment of the appellant was impaired by serious misapprehensions of evidence, including confusing testimony between witnesses and erroneously finding a non-existent invoice.

The court also found the motion judge erred by dismissing the action entirely despite the respondent's concession of a modest overpayment.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for the production of corporate documents, including financial statements, at the respondents' expense.

On appeal, the appellant narrowed his request to the financial statements of three corporations, claiming to be a 15% shareholder.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's finding that the relief sought was premature given a pending appeal of an earlier decision between the parties, and that there was no demonstrated prejudice to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order made following three motions.

The court determined that the costs order regarding the dismissed action was final, requiring leave under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, while the costs order for the remaining motions was interlocutory, requiring leave under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no matter of general importance for the interlocutory order and no strong grounds to find an error in discretion for the final order.

The appellant brought a motion to expedite his appeal of an order dismissing his application for the production of corporate records.

The respondents brought a cross-motion to stay the appeal pending the outcome of a related trial appeal.

The court found that the appellant's grounds for expediting the appeal, including seeking documents to potentially argue for a different valuation date, were unpersuasive and amounted to a fishing expedition.

The court also found the respondents' grounds for a stay insufficient.

Both the motion and cross-motion were dismissed.

This is a supplementary costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The appellants challenged the costs awarded by the application judge.

The Court of Appeal vacated the costs awarded by the application judge and left the determination of costs of the application to the trial judge.

The appellants successfully appealed a decision from the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellants in the amount of $10,000.00 all inclusive, payable by the respondents.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order regarding control of a religious organization's premises.

The motion judge had declared a November 16, 2013 meeting of Torah V'Avodah Congregation invalid and set aside resolutions to remove trustees and close membership, finding that proper notice had not been given.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by not ordering the entire application to proceed to trial.

The court determined that fundamental questions regarding membership and trustee status should be resolved at trial before determining the validity of the meeting and resolutions.

The court set aside the motion judge's declarations but preserved the interim arrangement maintaining the status quo with the original trustees in office pending trial.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs following a successful application for declaratory relief regarding a commercial lease renewal.

The applicant argued that the respondents' unconscionable conduct, which grounded a finding of proprietary estoppel, and a settlement offer justified an elevated costs scale.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted, as there was no litigation misconduct and the settlement offer was delivered too late for meaningful consideration.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale and fixed at $22,500.

The applicant commercial tenant sought a declaration that her lease was renewed for a further five-year term, despite failing to provide written notice as required by the lease.

The tenant argued that the landlord's principals had orally assured her that the lease would be renewed without further action on her part, leading her to rely on these assurances to her detriment.

The court found that the elements of proprietary estoppel were met, as the landlord had encouraged the tenant's mistaken belief to take unconscionable advantage and regain possession of the premises.

The application was granted, and the lease was declared renewed.

In the midst of an oppression remedy trial, the applicant brought a motion seeking production of the respondent companies' fiscal 2014 financial statements under various sections of the Business Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the statutory provisions relied upon did not entitle the applicant to the financial statements and that the applicant had not established a strong prima facie case of oppression.

Furthermore, the court declined to grant leave for a mid-trial motion, noting that the requested documents would have no probative value without reopening the evidence to allow for supplementary expert reports.