Gregory M. Sidlofsky

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Myers J. dated November 2, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $7,500.

The applicant sought to challenge his deceased father's 2019 Will, which left the entire estate to the applicant's mother.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for lack of standing, relying on a 1996 Will that also left the entire estate to the mother.

The court found that the applicant failed to present sufficient evidence to challenge the validity of the 1996 Will.

Consequently, even if the 2019 Will were invalid, the applicant would have no financial interest in the estate under the 1996 Will.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that his separate civil claim for proprietary estoppel gave him independent standing under s. 23 of the Estates Act.

The motion was granted and the application dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the respondent's action regarding the allocation of shareholdings in a holding company.

The parties, former spouses, disputed whether the respondent owned 30% or 50% of the shares, with the respondent claiming a constructive trust over 20% of the shares due to family law and unjust enrichment principles.

The court found that the corporate records were deficient and that the intertwined family law complexities, including the respondent's decision not to seek an equalization payment, created critical factual disputes.

The court concluded there was a genuine issue for trial and denied summary judgment.

Melissa Hrvoic brought a motion seeking to compel Aaron Franks to answer 53 questions refused on grounds of solicitor-client and litigation privilege during a Rule 39.03 examination.

The motion also faced dismissal due to Melissa Hrvoic's non-compliance with a prior interlocutory order to return $500,000.

The court found the questions relevant and the privileges properly asserted.

It determined that Mr. Hrvoic had not waived privilege by including an explanatory letter from his lawyer in the record, as this did not constitute using legal advice as a material fact in his claim or defence, nor was it equivalent to filing an affidavit.

The court also dismissed the motion due to Melissa Hrvoic's non-compliance with Justice Dow's order.

The moving party sought leave to appeal the order of Dow J. dated March 10, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 for the stay motion and $5,000 for the motion for leave to appeal to the responding party.

The applicant sought relief from forfeiture arising from an agreement of purchase and sale after breaching a term requiring the vendor's prior written consent to list or sell the townhouse.

The applicant had listed and sold the property without consent, leading the respondent vendor to terminate the agreement and forfeit deposits and occupancy fees.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's conduct, the gravity of the breach, and the disparity between the forfeited property value and damages did not warrant relief from forfeiture.

Furthermore, the retention of the deposit and occupancy fees was not found to be unconscionable, considering the commercial context and the applicant's sophistication.

This endorsement addresses a procedural case conference concerning ongoing litigation between separated spouses.

The applicant, Mr. Hrvoic, initiated an application for Ms. Hrvoic to sell her shares in a family business.

Following Mr. Hrvoic's termination of Ms. Hrvoic's employment, Ms. Hrvoic "borrowed" $600,000 from a line of credit.

Dow J. subsequently ordered Ms. Hrvoic to repay $500,000 of this amount.

Ms. Hrvoic now seeks leave to appeal this term and an urgent stay pending appeal.

The court noted the parties' contentious approach and set a schedule for the motion for a stay pending appeal, declining to grant an interim stay.

The plaintiffs and defendants, former business partners in the security surveillance equipment industry, brought competing motions for interlocutory injunctive relief following a bitter separation.

The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from using a disputed trademark, accessing the plaintiffs' computer systems, and making defamatory statements.

The defendants cross-moved to enjoin the plaintiffs from competing and soliciting customers.

The court dismissed the trademark injunction, finding damages were an adequate remedy, but granted the injunctions regarding computer access, website redirection, and defamation.

The defendants' cross-motion was dismissed as premature and lacking evidence of irreparable harm.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing his application against his daughters regarding the transfer of a mortgage from a family company to a family trust.

The Court of Appeal determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the order arose from an oppression application under the Business Corporations Act, for which the proper appellate route is to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments that section 6(2) of the Courts of Justice Act or Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permitted the Court of Appeal to hear the appeal, and declined to reconstitute itself as the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's order striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action against his daughters and their company.

The appellant sought to challenge the validity of a family trust established in connection with an estate freeze in 2007.

The motion judge had struck the claim on the basis of res judicata, collateral attack, and abuse of process, finding that the appellant could have raised the validity issue in the daughters' prior oppression application but failed to do so.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the doctrine of abuse of process alone warranted striking the claim, as allowing the action to proceed would constitute an attempt to relitigate a matter already decided.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for a declaration of ownership and exclusive use of a disputed strip of land based on adverse possession.

The strip had been enclosed by a fence between two properties from December 1992 to December 2002.

The application judge found that while actual possession was established, the appellant failed to prove the requisite intention to exclude the true owner or effective exclusion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no errors of law or principle in the application judge's reasoning and confirming that the presumption of intention to exclude arising from a fence is not mandatory and may be rebutted by the absence of corroborating evidence.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the respondent's summary judgment motion in an estate litigation matter.

The applicants sought substantial indemnity costs against the respondent personally.

The court found the respondent personally liable for costs, rather than the estate, as the litigation stemmed from his personal conduct as power of attorney and estate trustee.

Crucially, the court found the respondent's counsel breached his duty of candour to the court by failing to disclose a directly on-point, adverse binding authority (Wall v. Shaw) during submissions.

This breach of professional conduct was a significant factor in the decision to award substantial indemnity costs to the applicants.

The respondent, in his personal capacity and as estate trustee, moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims by his siblings (the applicants) regarding nine Arizona properties.

The respondent argued the claims were statute-barred, subject to res judicata, or did not raise a genuine issue for trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that res judicata did not apply as the issues were not determined in a prior passing of accounts, and the limitation periods under the Trustee Act or Limitations Act, 2002 did not apply to notices of objection in a passing of accounts application.

The court also found that the respondent failed to account for inter vivos gifts of property, raising factual and legal questions requiring a trial.

The defendant 2623559 Ontario Inc. appealed a Master's decision dismissing its motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation on a property.

The plaintiff, a 50% owner of the vendor corporation (2425779 Ontario Inc.), alleged the sale to 2623559 Ontario Inc. was fraudulent and below market value.

The court upheld the Master's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law.

The Master correctly applied the test for discharging a CPL, considering the plaintiff's reasonable claim to an interest in land, the alleged "badges of fraud" in the transaction, and the "Dhunna factors" regarding the uniqueness of the land and the inadequacy of damages as an alternative remedy.

The court also determined that the alternative security paid into court was insufficient to protect the plaintiff's potential interest, which was significantly higher than the amount secured.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant obtained a default judgment in South Carolina in August 2014 against the respondent, a resident of Ontario.

The appellant commenced an enforcement action in Ontario in December 2017, more than three years later, claiming it did not know the respondent had assets in Ontario until October 2017.

The motion judge set aside the Mareva injunction granted ex parte, finding the enforcement action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, holding that the two-year limitation period began to run 30 days after the foreign judgment was entered, when the time to appeal expired.

The court rejected arguments that appeals by co-defendants postponed the limitation period and that the appellant lacked knowledge of the respondent's Ontario assets.

The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a mixed commercial/residential property in Port Perry.

The agreement contained a mortgage assumption condition requiring approval from the mortgagee, Alterna Savings, on terms acceptable to the buyer.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the condition precedent had not been satisfied because the buyer failed to formally accept Alterna's approval by signing and returning the approval letter before the deadline.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the condition precedent was satisfied when Alterna sent its approval letter, and that formal execution was not required.

The court ordered specific performance subject to Alterna renewing its approval on substantially similar terms.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion brought by the plaintiffs for a further and better affidavit of documents and a timetable for trial.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, finding that the defendants' unexplained delay, particularly given the plaintiffs' advanced age and frail health, constituted bad faith.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the complexity, importance, and conduct of the parties.

While adjusting the plaintiffs' claimed fees for waiting time and excessive photocopy charges, the court largely upheld the claim, noting the defendants' failure to provide their own dockets for comparison.

The defendant 2623559 Ontario Inc. ("262") moved for an order discharging a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and a notice registered against a property it purchased.

The plaintiff, Goyal, opposed the motion, alleging the sale was fraudulent and sought rescission.

The court upheld the CPL, finding a triable issue regarding an interest in land and sufficient "badges of fraud" to justify its maintenance.

The decision applied the Dhunna factors and the holistic equitable test, concluding that the equities favored maintaining the CPL.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Luciano Sammut's application for adverse possession.

The respondent, Heather McGhee Peggs, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the application was commenced to interfere with her property sale.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the applicant to warrant substantial indemnity costs and determined that Rule 49.10 did not apply to the respondent's offer to settle as the applicant's claim failed.

Considering the importance of the boundary issue, the complexity, and comparable counsel time, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $32,267.53, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by the applicant.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership and exclusive use over a strip of land via adverse possession.

The properties were converted to Land Titles in 2002, requiring the applicant to prove adverse possession for the continuous ten-year period from December 1992 to December 2002.

While the court found actual possession of the disputed land by the applicant's predecessors in title, it determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite intention to exclude the true owner or establish mutual or unilateral mistake, primarily due to a lack of direct evidence from predecessors in title during the relevant period.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.