Gloria Epstein

The appellant appealed his sentence for breaching a court order by making collect calls to the complainant from custody.

The Crown conceded that the sentencing judge erred in principle by proceeding without hearing submissions from the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted a conditional discharge with six months' probation, noting the breach was at the less serious end of the spectrum, the appellant had served four months in jail, and he faced deportation if convicted.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference involving a minor complainant who alleged he touched her while she slept during an overnight visit.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof in a credibility contest between the complainant and the accused.

The Court of Appeal held that although the trial judge correctly recited the W.(D.) principles, his analysis treated the case as a choice between competing versions rather than determining whether the accused’s evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Because the reasons showed that the possibility of reasonable doubt was not properly considered, the burden of proof was misapplied.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual offences involving the minor daughter of his former partner.

The trial judge rejected the appellant’s denial largely based on an assumed failure to respond appropriately when the complainant allegedly asked to touch his penis and on a third party’s out-of-court statement implying knowledge of an improper relationship.

The Court of Appeal held that the first finding lacked evidentiary support because the appellant had never been asked about any response, making the inference unfair.

The court also found the statement was inadmissible hearsay and did not meet the requirements of the principled hearsay exception or the state of mind exception.

Because these errors tainted the credibility analysis, the convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence of two years less a day imposed on the respondent for historical sexual offences against his foster daughter.

The offences occurred over 35 years prior, resulting in the complainant's pregnancy at age 15.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made several errors in principle, including improperly relying on an unproven finding about when the respondent learned of the pregnancy, misapplying the framework for conditional sentences, and inappropriately treating health issues and social stigma as mitigating factors.

The Court held the sentence was manifestly unfit given the profound breach of trust and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appeal was allowed and a three-year custodial sentence was imposed, with one year of credit given for time served under the conditional sentence.

The parties separated and the central issue was the equalization of their jointly-owned physiotherapy clinic.

The application judge valued the business by averaging two competing expert figures and ordered the appellant to buy out the respondent's share.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Family Law Act, a judge cannot order a buyout of jointly-owned property without consent; the property must be sold.

The court also found the valuation method flawed and ordered the business listed for sale at the respondent's expert's valuation figure, with an accounting to follow.

The applicant commenced an action against York University, which was struck by a Superior Court judge.

The applicant then brought an ex parte motion before another Superior Court judge to set aside the dismissal, which was denied.

The applicant appealed this denial, but the appeal was dismissed for delay by the Registrar.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal refused to set aside the Registrar's order.

On a motion to review the single judge's decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no merit to the underlying appeal because the second Superior Court judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the first judge's order.

The applicant brought a motion to review an order of a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had dismissed his motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay.

The underlying action was a claim for damages against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario regarding its investigation of a complaint against his former physician, which had been struck for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no reason to interfere with the single judge's decision, agreeing that the appeal had no merit.

The motion for review was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for unpaid construction work.

The principal issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to re-open the trial to admit articles of revival for a dissolved corporate defendant, which the individual appellant sought to introduce after judgment was rendered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the evidence could have been discovered sooner with reasonable diligence and that the refusal to re-open the trial was a proper exercise of discretion.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing his claim to set aside property transactions made by his late father.

The father had originally placed a residential property in joint tenancy with the appellant, but later severed the joint tenancy and transferred his half-interest to the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the initial joint tenancy did not constitute an irrevocable inter vivos gift, and that the subsequent severance and transfer were not the result of undue influence by the respondent.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, sexual assault, and uttering death threats, as well as his four-year sentence.

He argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to oppose the admission of the deceased complainant's preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant had declined the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant at the preliminary inquiry and had agreed with his counsel's advice at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge properly considered all principles, and rehabilitation played no significant role given the appellant's lack of remorse and prior record.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in failing to exercise discretion against the designation and in finding he did not qualify as a long-term offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly assessed the appellant's high risk of violent recidivism, his extensive criminal history, and the lack of a reasonable possibility that his risk could eventually be controlled in the community.

The appellants challenged the motion judge's conclusion that no binding agreement had been formed following negotiations, an offer, and a time-limited counter-offer.

The court held that the counter-offer expired by its own terms and was not accepted within the specified time.

Because there was no communication of acceptance before expiry, there was no meeting of the minds.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application for a declaration that a section of a forced road had been assumed by the municipality as a public highway.

The application judge found that historical, sporadic maintenance by the municipality did not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intention to assume the road.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's assessment of the evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $231,963 for loans advanced.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by relying on evidence of settlement discussions held before a mediator in India, claiming settlement privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had waived any potential settlement privilege by failing to pursue their objection, leading their own evidence about the discussions, and relying on that evidence in closing submissions.

The trial judge's finding of personal liability was upheld.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to properly consider reducing his risk through chemical castration.

He sought a long-term offender designation combined with a section 810.2 recognizance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's condition intractable and that he could not be controlled within the duration of a long-term sentence.

The Court reaffirmed that a section 810.2 order cannot be used as a stop-gap for highly dangerous offenders who fail to meet the long-term offender criteria.

The appellants, vendors of a property, appealed a decision granting partial summary judgment and specific performance to the respondent purchasers.

The transaction failed to close on the extended closing date because the appellants had not provided required documents.

The motion judge found that the 'time is of the essence' clause had been waived and that the appellants were not ready to close.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's factual findings or her conclusion that there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Hryniak supported the expeditious resolution.

The appellant challenged an order striking pleaded claims against an individual corporate principal and dismissing an unjust enrichment claim on a pleadings motion.

The Court of Appeal held that it was not plain and obvious that the statutory claims under s. 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, the claim under s. 10 of the Partnerships Act, and the pleaded breach of contract and misrepresentation claims against the individual respondent could not succeed.

Applying the unjust enrichment benefit analysis from Peel, the court held the claim was properly struck against the individual respondent personally for lack of material facts showing a tangible benefit, but could proceed against the remaining respondents based on unpaid services and business expenses.

The appeal was allowed in part and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed a second-degree murder conviction arising from a fatal shooting during a gang-related confrontation at a public festival.

The appeal challenged the jury charge on former s. 34(2) self-defence, the refusal to leave provocation under s. 232 to the jury, and the trial judge’s review of the evidence.

The court held that the charge, read as a whole, fairly presented self-defence and correctly focused the jury on the critical moment of the shooting.

It further held that there was no air of reality to provocation because the defence position was deliberate self-preservation, not loss of self-control, and found no material misstatement or omission in the evidentiary review.

Following a jury verdict apportioning fault for a motor vehicle accident between two motorcyclists, the appellant challenged the trial judge’s jury instructions on causation, joint tortfeasor liability, and concurrent liability.

The court held that any alleged error concerning joint tortfeasor instructions was immaterial because the jury’s answers clearly established liability as a concurrent tortfeasor, and the evidence supported that route to liability.

The court also rejected the argument that the charge was unbalanced or unfair when read as a whole.

It further upheld the dismissal of a post-verdict Rule 21.01 motion concerning insurance coverage, holding that the issue could properly proceed in a separate action.