Gladys I. Pardu

The appellants sought to appeal a motion judge's decision dismissing their motion to stay an action in favour of arbitration.

The respondents raised a jurisdictional objection based on section 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, which provides that there is no appeal from the court's decision on a motion to stay.

The Court of Appeal held that section 7(6) precludes any appeal from a decision on a motion to stay, whether granting or refusing the stay, and therefore dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds without reviewing the motion judge's analysis.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered appeals from a partial summary judgment granted by the Superior Court of Justice.

The parties agreed that the motion judge's refusal to grant a stay of the partial summary judgment constituted an interlocutory order, such that any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The Court of Appeal determined that the matter should proceed by way of leave application to the Divisional Court rather than by direct appeal.

The appeals were quashed and the request for transfer was denied.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal in a family law matter involving custody of a child.

The respondent father sought costs on a full recovery basis totaling $105,350.14 for the motion to stay, motion to admit fresh evidence, and the appeal.

The appellant mother sought either no costs or a modest award due to her strained financial circumstances, having already been ordered to pay $200,000 in trial costs and earning approximately $40,000 annually.

The court awarded costs to the respondent father in the reduced sum of $40,000, considering the length and complexity of the proceedings, the importance of the issues, proportionality, and the appellant's financial circumstances.

The appellants appealed from an order for sale under the Partition Act.

The Court of Appeal found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals from orders under the Partition Act lie to the Divisional Court, not the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Company appealed a motion judge's decision that Pembridge Insurance Company of Canada had no duty to defend Dennis Chu and John Chu from claims arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The underlying claim involved allegations that Dennis Chu drove negligently and subsequently engaged in threatening and assaultive conduct toward another driver.

The motion judge found that Pembridge's homeowner policy exclusions for vehicle-related claims and intentional acts precluded coverage.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by making factual findings inappropriate at the duty to defend stage, by failing to apply the proper legal test comparing pleadings to policy language, and by conflating the duty to defend with the duty to indemnify.

The court declared that the Chus were entitled to a defence under Pembridge's homeowner policy.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's order dismissing their motion seeking a declaration that a default judgment against the respondent Chris Mace survived his bankruptcy under sections 178(1)(d) and 178(1)(h) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellants obtained a default judgment by having the Registrar sign it under Rule 19.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which is limited to claims for "a debt or liquidated demand in money." The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the generic pleadings in the statement of claim were insufficient to establish the type of misconduct required for exemption under section 178(1)(d), and that the motion judge was not required to go beyond the pleadings to make fresh findings of fact.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The motion judge had dismissed the claim as incomprehensible and non-compliant with Rule 25.06.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge erred in applying Rule 2.1 as a substitute for addressing pleading defects, the appeal was dismissed on the substantive ground that the appellant lacked standing to advance the claim.

The claim concerned errors by lawyers retained by her fiancé and insurance payments owed to him.

Upon the fiancé's death in 2015, any such rights devolved to his estate, not to the appellant personally.

The appellant's assertion that she was the executor of a will was unsupported by evidence.

A 14-year-old boy had been systematically alienated from his father by his mother through years of denigration, false allegations, and manipulation.

The trial judge found the mother had engaged in parental alienation and ordered a reversal of custody, placing the child with the father and suspending contact with the mother for six months to allow for reconciliation.

The mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the best interests test, imposing an extreme remedy without expert evidence or therapeutic support, improperly delegating decision-making to therapists, and ordering therapy without the child's consent in violation of the Health Care Consent Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error and upholding the trial judge's discretionary decision-making in this difficult family law matter.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition that continued a conditional discharge for an NCR accused.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board erred in finding he continued to pose a significant risk to public safety.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the Board's analysis was unreasonable because it improperly focused on the appellant's lack of insight into his medical condition rather than conducting a holistic assessment of whether he posed a foreseeable and substantial risk of serious harm to the public.

The Board also failed to adequately address conflicting evidence regarding the appellant's insight and did not provide sufficient evidentiary analysis of the relevant factors.

The matter was remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for various firearms offences.

He was arrested on an outstanding warrant during a search incident to arrest, in which a loaded handgun was found.

The appellant challenged the vehicle stop as violating his Charter rights to be secure from arbitrary detention, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for investigative detention.

The trial judge found the police had reasonable grounds to suspect a robbery suspect was in the vehicle based on the observation of red clothing matching the suspect's description.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no Charter violation.

The appellant's sentence of six years less 18 months pre-sentence custody (3 years 9 months remaining) was also upheld as fit.

The applicant sought leave to appeal his convictions for criminal harassment, uttering threats, and causing a disturbance.

The applicant was convicted at trial and his summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

On this motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, the applicant raised three grounds of appeal characterized as questions of law: alleged undue deference to the trial judge's curtailment of questioning regarding an abuse of process application; alleged error in concluding the applicant abandoned a Charter s. 11(b) application; and alleged error in the trial judge's misstatement of the legal test for threatening.

The Court of Appeal found that the first two grounds did not involve pure questions of law, and the third ground involved mixed fact and law with little significance beyond the specific case.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempting to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction arose from allegations that while in custody, the appellant wrote letters to another inmate requesting false evidence concerning prior convictions.

The trial judge convicted the appellant despite the loss of the original letters prior to the re-trial.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge shifted the burden of proof when assessing the evidence of the key witness; (2) the trial judge failed to properly apply Vetrovec principles regarding the credibility of an unsavoury witness; and (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing the stay application based on the prejudice caused by the loss of the original letters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for intimidation of a justice system participant contrary to s. 423.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code and sought leave to appeal his sentence of a suspended sentence with one-year probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons and did not properly apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were detailed and adequately addressed the evidence, including the appellant's testimony.

The court also dismissed a motion to set aside victim fine surcharges imposed in a separate matter, finding that the matter was not properly before the court.

The appellant was convicted of attempting to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code and breaching a long-term supervision order by failing to obey the law and keep the peace contrary to s. 753.3(1).

He received 18 months' imprisonment, less credit for 68 days of pre-sentence custody.

The sole issue at trial was the reliability of voice identification evidence from the complainant, who testified that the appellant called her and attempted to persuade her not to attend court or to lie if she did.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding phone access at the detention centre.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, the fresh evidence application, and refused leave to appeal sentence.

The appellant appealed from the refusal of a Superior Court judge to grant mandamus with certiorari in aid in relation to a decision of a justice of the peace refusing to issue process on a private prosecution.

The appellant sought an adjournment at the hearing on grounds of efficiency and personal circumstances, which was refused.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the justice of the peace had not committed any jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or other error permitting Superior Court review.

The appellant appealed from his conviction on two counts of failure to comply with a recognizance and three counts of break and enter a dwelling house and commit theft, as well as from his sentence of time served (585 days pre-sentence custody credited at 878 days).

The appellant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel on multiple grounds, including claims that he did not understand the proceedings, was not provided with disclosure, and that his counsel negotiated a resolution without his instructions.

The Court of Appeal found all allegations lacked credibility based on the record of the plea inquiry, written instructions from the appellant to counsel, and the appellant's express waiver of a translator.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals.

The appellant purchased a painting purportedly by renowned Anishinaabe artist Norval Morrisseau for $20,000, accompanied by a provenance statement.

After the Art Gallery of Ontario indicated the painting was likely a fake, the appellant sued for return of the purchase price, lost investment returns, and punitive damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the authenticity of the painting remained uncertain.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by rejecting expert evidence based on his own personal research not in evidence, and by misapprehending the contract's terms regarding the provenance statement.

The court awarded damages for breach of contract and the Sale of Goods Act, plus punitive damages.

The applicant, a construction company, sought leave to appeal from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice dismissing its appeal from sentences imposed for environmental offences.

The company was convicted of two counts of discharging material into a watercourse contrary to the Ontario Water Resources Act and two counts of failing to notify the Ministry of the Environment of those discharges.

The total sentence imposed was $220,000 in fines.

The applicant argued the fines were excessive and that aggravating and mitigating circumstances should have been weighed differently.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of principle and noting that the sentencing judge's weighing of relevant factors was owed deference.

The father appealed a trial judgment permitting the mother to relocate with two children (ages five and seven) from Orleans, Ontario to Montreal, Quebec.

The father moved for a stay of the trial judgment pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the grounds of appeal were not particularly strong, that the father would not suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the relocation to proceed.

The trial judgment had granted the father increased access, including overnight access on alternating weekends commencing February 2020, and the mother had made arrangements to facilitate the father's continued relationship with the children.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching but acquitted of sexual assault, all charges arising from the same facts and evidence.

The appellant appealed on the ground that the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Crown cross-appealed the acquittal, arguing that confusing jury instructions explained the inconsistency.

A five-judge panel was convened to resolve conflicting authorities regarding the role of jury instructions in inconsistent verdict analysis.

The majority held that the Supreme Court's guidance in R. v. F. (J.) provides authoritative direction: if the Crown wishes to respond to an inconsistent verdict argument by asserting that an acquittal resulted from legal error in instructions, it must appeal the acquittal.

The majority found the instructions legally correct and declined to order a retrial, instead entering acquittals on the conviction counts.

The dissent would have allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on all counts, finding the charge confusing when viewed as a whole.