Fergus O'Donnell

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood, contrary to section 253 of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the police violated the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant claimed she was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to exercise her right to counsel and sought exclusion of the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

The court found that the defendant was properly informed of her right to counsel, understood this right, but failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to retain counsel.

The defendant repeatedly claimed to have a lawyer but could not identify one, refused to pursue duty counsel despite being informed of this option, and engaged in what appeared to be deliberate delay tactics.

The court dismissed the Charter motion and found the defendant guilty.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at an abortion clinic where she allegedly offered roses and pamphlets to patients to discourage them from having abortions.

Wagner brought an application seeking production of all medical records, counselling records, identities, and contact information for the fifteen clinic patients and staff.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the requested information failed both branches of the O'Connor test: the information was not likely relevant to any material issue at trial, and even if it were, the privacy and dignity interests of the patients and employees outweighed any benefit to the defence.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach occurred when the constable delayed approximately twenty minutes in reading the approved instrument demand to the accused.

The court applied the s. 24(2) Charter analysis from R. v. Grant and admitted the breath sample evidence, finding that the seriousness of the breach was minimal (simple human error), the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was slight to moderate, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits strongly favoured admission.

The accused was found guilty.

Mary Wagner was charged with breach of probation and mischief interfering with private property arising from her attendance at a Toronto abortion clinic, where she attempted to intercede with patients by offering roses and pamphlets.

The trial focused not on whether the Crown could prove the acts alleged, but on whether Wagner was justified in her conduct based on defences of self-defence of others and necessity.

Wagner argued that a foetus has the status of a human being and that she was duty-bound to intervene to protect unborn lives.

The court rejected all of Wagner's constitutional and legal defences, finding her guilty on all counts.

The judgment provides extensive analysis of the legal status of the foetus under Canadian law, the scope of self-defence provisions, the doctrine of necessity, and the rule of law.

The court granted two DNA warrant applications under s. 487 of the Criminal Code in relation to charges of aggravated assault.

While the warrants were issued, the judge provided an endorsement identifying significant deficiencies in the application materials and procedures, including poor formatting, redundancy, spelling errors, lack of paragraph numbering, missing conditions in draft warrants, and inadequate Crown review.

The judge used the decision as a teaching opportunity to address systemic issues in warrant applications.

The defendant, a bank employee, pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud involving the theft of over $11,000 from the bank and its clients.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a discharge.

The defendant claimed he committed the frauds to raise money to save his sister from kidnapping and rape threats by a Syrian militia group.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible and accepted that his motivation was to protect his sister from serious harm.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years' probation, finding that the exceptional circumstances of the case—involving duress-like conditions and a humanitarian motivation—warranted a departure from the typical sentencing range for breach of trust frauds.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud after stealing approximately $11,000 from his employer, a bank.

The accused committed the breach of trust to pay a ransom to a Syrian militia that was threatening to kidnap and rape his sister.

The Crown sought a six-month conditional sentence, while the defence sought a discharge.

The court found the accused's motivation to be exceptional and credible, concluding that a conditional discharge would not be contrary to the public interest despite the general need for deterrence in breach of trust cases.

The accused was granted a conditional discharge with two years' probation, 150 hours of community service, and full restitution.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought a fifteen-month jail sentence, while the defence sought an intermittent sentence of ninety days plus probation.

The court imposed an eleven-month jail sentence with a two-year driving prohibition.

The sentencing considered the serious injuries to the victim, including permanent disability and chronic pain, balanced against the defendant's own significant injuries from the collision, his guilty plea, community service, and remorse.

The court rejected the defence position that the defendant's medical condition warranted an intermittent sentence, finding that while medical factors could place the defendant lower in the sentencing range, they did not justify a fundamentally different outcome.

The offender pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm after striking a parked utility vehicle while driving with a blood alcohol concentration more than double the legal limit.

The collision caused severe, life-altering injuries to a worker and injured three of the offender's passengers.

The offender also suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in the crash.

The Crown sought 15 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence due to the offender's medical condition.

The court balanced the need for denunciation and general deterrence with the mitigating factor of the offender's own severe injuries, sentencing him to 11 months' imprisonment and a two-year driving prohibition.

The accused, a recently turned eighteen-year-old student, pleaded guilty to threatening to shoot up his school and threatening damage to property.

The Crown sought detention pending a psychiatric assessment and sentencing, citing concerns about potential access to firearms and possible mental illness.

The court granted bail with conditions, finding that detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds of the Criminal Code.

The decision addresses systemic issues in the bail system, including risk-aversion among decision-makers and the divergence between statutory bail provisions and actual bail court practices.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample at the roadside.

The Crown alleged that Constable Uppal made lawful demands for a breath sample, which the accused refused.

The central issue was whether the demands were lawful under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code, considering the "forthwith" requirement and the accused's right to counsel.

The court found that both an informal demand and a formal demand were lawful and timely, and that the accused's refusal constituted the offence.

The court rejected arguments that the absence of specific language rendered the demands invalid and found that the realistic availability of duty counsel did not support a finding that the demands were premature.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample at the roadside.

The accused argued that the demand was not made 'forthwith' and that he was denied his right to counsel.

The court found that the officer's informal and formal demands were lawful and timely, considering the context of the accused's obstreperous behaviour and the realistic unavailability of duty counsel within the forthwith window.

The accused was found guilty.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought approximately nine months with credit for time spent under house arrest.

The court considered the offender's youthful age, lack of prior record, history of childhood sexual abuse, and the significant mitigating effect of his strict bail conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 42 days intermittent custody, which accounted for the mandatory minimum and pre-sentence custody, followed by three years of probation.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day plus three years probation.

The defence sought approximately nine months with credit for nearly two years of house arrest.

The court imposed a sentence of 42 days intermittent imprisonment plus three years probation with conditions including counselling, community service, and compliance with sex offender registration requirements.

The court emphasized the defendant's youth, lack of prior record, genuine remorse, significant mitigating factors including childhood sexual abuse and mental health issues, and low risk of reoffending, while balancing denunciation and general deterrence principles applicable to child pornography offences.

The accused was charged with two counts of assaulting his domestic partner during a period of relationship breakdown.

The first count alleged an assault in the garage, which the court dismissed due to reasonable doubt arising from credibility issues and the defence's failure to cross-examine the complainant on key details.

The second count involved the accused swatting a mobile phone out of the complainant's hand while she was filming him.

The court found that while this technically constituted an assault, the force used was trifling and applied the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex to acquit the accused.

The accused was charged with two counts of criminal harassment against two complainants arising from a dispute over computer repair services.

The complainants alleged the accused made repeated calls with heavy breathing, sent threatening text messages, and made verbal threats regarding the return of a computer.

The accused denied the allegations and claimed his phone number always appeared on caller ID.

The court found the complainants' evidence credible and consistent, but determined that while the accused's conduct was rude and disregarded basic civility, the complainants did not experience a reasonable fear for their safety as required by the criminal harassment statute.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

A police constable pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after punching a photographer in the face during a noise complaint investigation at a restaurant in Niagara Falls.

The defendant sought an absolute discharge while the Crown sought a suspended sentence.

The court rejected the discharge, finding that while the defendant had significant mitigating factors including a clean record, community involvement, and remorse, the offence constituted a serious breach of trust.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with one year probation, including 40 hours of community service, a no-contact order, and a DNA order.

The court emphasized that police officers must be held to a higher standard and that the use of excessive force, particularly in conjunction with an unlawful direction to stop photographing, undermines public confidence in law enforcement.

The accused, a police officer, pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm after punching a bystander who was photographing police activity.

The accused sought an absolute discharge, while the Crown sought a suspended sentence.

The court found that the accused's direction to stop photographing was unlawful and that the assault constituted a breach of trust.

Concluding that a discharge would be contrary to the public interest and fail to adequately denounce the conduct, the court imposed a suspended sentence with one year of probation, including 40 hours of community service.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The Crown proceeded only on the impaired driving charge.

The trial involved a preliminary voir-dire regarding the qualifications of an unaccredited Korean interpreter, which the court found to be necessary to ensure the defendant's Charter rights were protected.

Following the interpreter qualification hearing, the Crown called four police officers to establish impairment.

The court found that while the evidence established reasonable grounds to believe impairment and made it more likely than not that impairment occurred, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt due to the ambiguity of certain indicia.

The defendant was acquitted on the impaired driving count.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three fraud-related charges arising from her employment as a supervisor at a non-profit daycare centre.

Over approximately 3.5 years, she fraudulently established credit accounts in the centre's name, forged board members' signatures on cheques, and doctored petty cash claims, defrauding the centre of approximately $300,000.

The court imposed a blended sentence consisting of 90 days intermittent imprisonment followed by 639 days conditional sentence (totalling two years less a day), with three years probation.

The sentence balanced the serious nature of the breach of trust fraud against the defendant's significant health challenges (multiple sclerosis), first offender status, guilty plea, and genuine remorse.