Favreau

The applicant law firm sought a declaration of entitlement to $32,100 held in trust by the respondent law firm, representing unpaid legal fees for services provided to a former client.

The respondent estate argued the claim was statute-barred and the applicant lacked standing.

The court found the respondent law firm's undertaking to protect the account was binding on the estate and stopped the limitation period from running.

The court declared the applicant entitled to payment subject to an assessment of the account, finding special circumstances warranted an extension of the statutory time limit for assessment due to the lack of particularity in the account and mutual delay.

The accused was charged with trafficking crack cocaine and possession of proceeds of crime following three undercover drug purchases.

The sole issue at trial was identity, specifically the reliability of the undercover officer's identification of the accused from a photo lineup.

The court found that although the photo lineup was not videotaped or audiotaped as recommended by the Sophonow inquiry, the identification was reliable due to the officer's multiple interactions with the accused and independent confirmatory circumstantial evidence.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The applicant, charged with fraud and related offences, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of her right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The total delay from the date of charges to the anticipated end of trial was over 35 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework to determine whether periods of delay caused by defence counsel's unavailability should be deducted as defence delay.

The court concluded that certain periods of unavailability for rescheduled preliminary inquiry and trial dates constituted defence delay, reducing the net delay to 27 months.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction against former employees who started a competing business, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and improper solicitation of customers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the plaintiff failed to provide clear and non-speculative evidence of irreparable harm.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the defendants, as an injunction could financially ruin their new business, whereas the plaintiff showed no evidence of actual damage.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff landlord for unpaid commercial rent.

The court applied the test for setting aside default judgment and found that the defendants failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for their default, failed to explain the five-and-a-half-year delay in bringing the motion, and lacked a meritorious defence.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, an 81-year-old widow, brought a motion to continue and expand a Mareva injunction and obtain further Norwich orders against her deceased husband's former bookkeeper, who allegedly misappropriated funds.

The court continued the existing Mareva injunction freezing $185,000 related to the sale of a restaurant property, finding a strong prima facie case.

However, the court dismissed the request to expand the injunction to cover the sale of a farm property due to conflicting evidence.

The court also dismissed the request for further Norwich orders, noting the litigation was no longer at the pre-action stage, and ruled that much of the plaintiff's evidence, provided via a law clerk's affidavit, was inadmissible hearsay.

The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendants' assets based on allegations of unpaid loans and fraudulent conveyance of proceeds from the sale of a house.

On the motion to continue the injunction, the plaintiffs sought to introduce new evidence obtained through the ex parte order.

The court refused to admit the new evidence, holding that a motion to continue is a hearing de novo where the responding party can test the original record.

The court found the original record insufficient to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious risk of dissipation against the defendant daughters, and terminated the injunction against them.

The applicants sought to enforce an agreement of purchase and sale for a condominium unit.

The respondent attempted to terminate the agreement due to construction delays and changes to the floor plan, offering to sell the unit back to the applicants at a higher price.

The court found that the respondent had no unilateral right to terminate the agreement and that the contract was not frustrated.

The court granted specific performance, finding the property unique and the respondent's conduct unjustified.

The plaintiff employee sued for wrongful dismissal, seeking common law notice and punitive damages.

The employer relied on a termination clause in the employment contract that limited the employee's entitlement to the minimum statutory notice and benefits under the Employment Standards Act.

The court found the termination clause was unambiguous and enforceable, and that the employee had received his full entitlement.

The court also dismissed the claim for punitive damages, finding the employer's conduct did not meet the high threshold of being harsh, vindictive, reprehensible, and malicious.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the corporate defendant for breach of a commercial lease.

The corporate defendant failed to pay rent and was noted in default.

The individual defendant had filed for bankruptcy, staying the action against him.

The court found the plaintiff established the breach and took reasonable steps to mitigate its losses.

Default judgment was granted for rent arrears and lost future rent totaling $1,311,672.05, plus substantial indemnity costs.

The applicant tenant operated an adult entertainment club and sought a declaration that a notice of termination from the respondent landlord was invalid.

The tenant argued the lease had been validly extended by oral agreement with the previous landlord, while the new landlord argued the extension violated the Statute of Frauds and was unregistered under the Land Titles Act.

The court found the lease extension was valid due to part performance and binding on the new landlord because it had actual notice of the tenancy.

However, the court held the landlord was not required to maintain the municipal owner's licence for the club.

The court declared the termination notice invalid and granted the tenant relief from forfeiture, providing a reasonable time to obtain its own licence.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision staying his motion to change a final family law order due to his egregious and exceptional non-compliance with prior court orders.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's exercise of discretion under Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules, finding the appellant had willfully ignored numerous obligations, including support, tuition, life insurance, and costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to specify the exact conditions the appellant must satisfy to lift the stay and proceed with his motion to change.

The Court also confirmed that a prior $10,000 costs award was a debt under a support order not released by the appellant's bankruptcy.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against the defendants for breach of a commercial lease and an associated indemnity agreement.

The defendants stopped paying rent, leading the plaintiff to terminate the lease and re-enter the premises.

Despite being served and given extensions to retain counsel, the defendants did not defend the action or respond to the motion.

The court found the plaintiff established liability and damages, granting default judgment for rent arrears, lost future rent, and costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The defendants brought a motion to vary a Mareva injunction to permit payments for legal fees and living expenses out of frozen funds.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the defendants failed to demonstrate they lacked access to other assets.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the moving parties failed to discharge their onus because they did not provide evidence explaining why related corporate defendants (Incryptex and ApexDX) could not fund the litigation, nor did they provide sufficient details of their living expenses or account for other funds.

The defendant real estate brokerage brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction requiring the plaintiff to vacate a jointly operated branch office, or alternatively, preventing the plaintiff from posting notices at the premises.

The parties were engaged in an acrimonious dispute over a joint venture agreement.

The court refused to grant the mandatory injunction requiring the plaintiff to vacate, finding the defendant failed to establish a strong prima facie case.

However, the court granted a limited injunction preventing the plaintiff from papering the front window with copies of a previous court order, as this conduct risked damaging the defendant's reputation and causing a default under the lease.

The defendants, a lawyer and his law firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for solicitor negligence and improper retention of funds.

The plaintiffs sought an adjournment on the day of the hearing, which was denied due to issue estoppel and lack of a change in circumstances.

The court found the plaintiffs' responding evidence, consisting solely of a law clerk's affidavit, to be largely inadmissible.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial as the lawyer had met the standard of care, followed instructions, and properly accounted for all funds.

The plaintiffs sued the defendant architectural firm for negligent misrepresentation regarding the construction costs of a stacked townhouse project.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the 'entire agreement' exclusion clause in their contract precluded the plaintiffs from suing based on pre-contractual representations.

The court found that the exclusion clause applied to the alleged misrepresentations and that it was not unconscionable to enforce it.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.

The defendant physician brought a motion to dismiss the medical negligence claims of two minor plaintiffs on the basis that plaintiffs' counsel commenced the action without authority from their respective mothers, who were named as litigation guardians.

The evidence showed counsel had been unable to contact or obtain instructions from the mothers.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the minors' claims under Rule 15.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the dismissal was without prejudice to the minors' right to commence their own actions upon turning 18.

The plaintiff was defrauded by her spouse, who she met online.

She sued her former landlord (Minto) and her former law firm (Faskens), alleging they had a duty to protect her by warning her of her spouse's fraudulent background.

Minto had conducted a credit check on the plaintiff without her explicit consent when her spouse applied for a lease.

Faskens had been retained for estate planning prior to the marriage.

Both defendants brought motions for summary judgment.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions and dismissed the claims against both defendants, finding that neither the landlord nor the law firm owed a duty to investigate the spouse or protect the plaintiff from his fraud.

The applicant and respondent owned adjoining properties with a shared laneway.

The respondent, developing a condominium, entered into an agreement to pay the applicant for encroaching on the laneway.

After the agreement's initial term expired, the respondent stopped paying but continued to obstruct the laneway.

The applicant sought $75,000 for 10 months of continued obstruction.

The court admitted a late affidavit from the applicant, found that the agreement had been implicitly extended, and alternatively found that the respondent substantially interfered with the applicant's right of way.

The court awarded the applicant $67,500 for nine months of obstruction, plus costs.