Dr. Klassen

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.

The accused appealed convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and possession of child pornography, challenging the admission of similar fact evidence, the finding that the assault was sexual in nature, and the refusal to exclude seized pornographic material under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court held that the prior misconduct evidence was properly admitted, that the assault was objectively sexual in nature based on the words accompanying the force, and that the trial judge did not err in admitting the seized evidence despite an overbroad warrant paragraph.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, the court held that the dangerous offender finding was unchallenged and that the trial judge erred in imposing a determinate sentence without evidence that the offender could be rehabilitated within a fixed period.

The determinate sentence was set aside and replaced with an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown appealed an order transferring a 17-year-old charged with second degree murder from ordinary court to youth court under the Young Offenders Act.

The appeal turned on whether the respondent had shown likely rehabilitation within the seven-year dispositional period, given psychiatric evidence of schizophrenia and possible conduct disorder.

The court held that the youth court judge misconstrued and misapplied the psychiatric evidence by making a definitive finding excluding conduct disorder despite significant evidentiary gaps.

Because the respondent failed to establish likely rehabilitation within the statutory period, the transfer order was set aside and the matter was directed to remain in ordinary court.