Evelyn M. ten Cate

Appeal under s. 80 of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 from a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming a health practitioner's finding that the appellant was incapable with respect to proposed treatment in the classes of antipsychotic medications, mood stabilizers, and anxiolytics.

The appellant argued the Board erred by accepting a seven-day gap between the psychiatrist's last capacity assessment and the hearing, misapprehending a social worker's note as a clinical assessment, and failing to carefully weigh hearsay.

The court found the Board applied the correct legal test from Starson, acknowledged the presumption of capacity and onus on the health practitioner, and reasonably concluded that incapacity persisted as of the hearing date based on enduring lack of insight and corroborative clinical entries.

Appeal dismissed and Board's decision confirmed.

The defendants brought motions to strike the self-represented plaintiff veterinarian's statement of claim arising from disciplinary proceedings by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario.

The plaintiff alleged abuse of process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, Charter breaches, and defamation related to a nearly two-decade disciplinary history.

The court struck the claim without leave to amend, finding it was a collateral attack on prior proceedings, that the College enjoyed statutory immunity under s. 45(1) of the Veterinarians Act absent particularized bad faith, and that the claim against the Attorney General was a nullity for failure to provide 60 days' notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The claims against the Minister of Agriculture disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

Following a prior motion decision, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought partial indemnity costs after prevailing on the motion.

The responding party argued that any costs should instead be borne by a third party municipality, alleging administrative error and a breached undertaking not to take a position on the motion.

The court found the municipality had merely consented to the motion and had filed no evidence or submissions beyond that consent.

As there was no pleading supporting liability against the municipality, the court ordered the unsuccessful responding party to pay partial indemnity costs to the moving party.

On a pre-trial Charter application, the moving party sought exclusion of statements and physical evidence seized from a BMW, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9 and 10(b).

The court found a psychological detention, breaches of counsel and silence rights, and an unreasonable search in the manner police compelled production of a key fob.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the moving party’s verbal and non-verbal statements, including the key-fob handover.

The court admitted the drugs, firearm, ammunition, and related physical evidence because they were independently discoverable under a valid vehicle warrant.

The application was allowed in part.

The plaintiffs brought motions to set aside Registrar's dismissal orders issued in May 2024 in two related inmate assault and conditions of confinement actions commenced in 2015.

Applying the Piedrahita framework, the court found the delay was adequately explained by consent timetables, pandemic disruptions, and counsel's early-2024 practice upheaval.

The motions were brought promptly after the dismissals became known, and the Crown did not demonstrate significant prejudice precluding a fair trial, particularly given its own participation in setting the litigation pace.

The dismissal orders were set aside and the actions reinstated on a strict enforceable timetable.

The defendant municipality appealed an interlocutory order of an Associate Justice granting the plaintiff leave under Rule 31.03(2)(b) to conduct a limited, one-hour examination for discovery of a second corporate representative, supplemented by up to two pages of written questions.

The appellant argued the Associate Justice committed palpable and overriding errors by relying on a non-existent agreement between the parties regarding a hybrid examination process and by misapplying the strict test for examining a second corporate representative.

The court found the Associate Justice correctly applied the test from Fischer v. IG Investment Management Ltd., made findings grounded in the record, and fashioned a proportionate remedy addressing discovery incompleteness.

The appeal was dismissed.

This standalone costs decision followed reasons continuing an interim injunction and certificate of pending litigation until trial.

The successful moving parties sought partial indemnity costs and disbursements, while the responding parties argued costs should be in the cause or reduced.

Applying the ordinary rule that costs follow the result and the discretion applicable to interlocutory injunction proceedings, the court fixed costs itself rather than reserving all costs to trial.

The court found the moving parties were largely successful and awarded reduced partial indemnity costs plus limited disbursements, while reserving transcript-cost issues to the trial judge.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a home in Ilderton, Ontario.

The defendants refused to close, alleging the home was heavily saturated with cigarette smoke that was not disclosed.

The court found no reliable evidence of smoke, no representations made by the plaintiff regarding smoking, and no objectively reasonable danger posed by any smoke present.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, awarding damages of $280,612.08 plus prejudgment interest, finding no genuine issue requiring trial.

The City of London brought a motion to dismiss an application by Global Waste Disposal London Ltd. seeking to quash By-law No. S-6225-109 on grounds of unreasonableness, arbitrariness, and bad faith.

The City alternatively sought conversion of the application to an action.

The court rejected both requests, finding the application was not moot as a live controversy remained regarding the applicant's ability to connect to municipal storm sewers, and that the issues were suitable for determination through the application process rather than conversion to trial.

Eight consolidated actions arising from a motor vehicle accident on November 30, 2021, in London, Ontario, in which the defendant driver failed to stop at a red light and struck members of the London 120th Brownies, killing one child and injuring several others.

The court determined whether the defendants' personal liability umbrella policy constituted a motor vehicle liability policy under the Insurance Act and the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage endorsement.

The court held that the umbrella policy was not a motor vehicle liability policy and therefore the defendants were inadequately insured motorists.

The plaintiffs were entitled to access their own OPCF 44R coverage, with the aggregate available insurance limits of $2.3 million to be divided pro rata among all eligible claimants.

This is a decision on costs following a judgment in which both parties received monetary awards, but the net result favoured College Grain Inc. The court considered the parties’ offers to settle, the proportionality of costs, and the policy behind the Simplified Rules.

Ultimately, the court awarded College Grain Inc. $50,000 plus HST for fees and $35,886.52 for disbursements, for a total of $92,386.52, to be paid by Wilhelm Concrete.

The court considered costs following motions regarding possession of property and a certificate of pending litigation.

The Plaintiff sought full indemnity costs, while the Defendant argued for each party to bear their own costs or for a reduction.

The court reviewed the Bill of Costs, found the Plaintiff’s claim excessive, and awarded a reduced sum of $33,250, including disbursements, to the Plaintiff.

The decision discusses the principles for awarding costs, including contractual entitlements and the requirement that costs be fair and reasonable.

This decision concerns a dispute between Wilhelm Concrete and College Grain Inc. (and Jay Shackelton) regarding the construction of concrete silos.

Wilhelm Concrete sought payment for unpaid invoices, while College Grain counterclaimed for damages due to alleged construction deficiencies causing water infiltration in two silos.

The court found that there were construction deficiencies in Silos 2 and 4, resulting in water infiltration, and awarded damages to College Grain for repairs and increased labour costs.

The court also determined the amount owing to Wilhelm Concrete for unpaid invoices, resolved the issue of pre-judgment interest, and found that Jay Shackelton was not personally liable.

The court provided a detailed analysis of the limitation period and the appropriate means test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory prejudgment interest (PJI) rate under the Courts of Justice Act in favour of a higher rate, following a breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The plaintiff sought a higher PJI rate based on market returns and the circumstances of the case.

The court found that the statutory rate undercompensated the plaintiff and, after reviewing the relevant statutory factors and case law, exercised its discretion to award a higher average rate of 3.17%.

The court considered competing motions regarding possession of a commercial property and the discharge of a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) in the context of a mortgage default.

The Plaintiff, a holding company, sought to set aside an ex parte order granting the CPL and to be declared in possession of the property.

The Defendant argued an oral agreement allowed indefinite interest-only payments and challenged the Plaintiff’s right to possession.

The court found the Defendant failed to make full and frank disclosure on the ex parte motion, that the Plaintiff was entitled to possession under the mortgage and the Mortgages Act, and that the CPL should be vacated.

The Plaintiff’s motion was granted and the Defendant’s dismissed.

The court considered whether an agreement of purchase and sale (APS) for a residential property between Kevin Curridor and Millstone Homes Inc. was valid and enforceable, and determined the appropriate quantum of damages.

The APS was found to be valid and enforceable under the "indoor management rule" of the Business Corporations Act, as there was no evidence that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of any internal irregularities or fraud.

The court awarded damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price and the market value, with certain deductions.

This decision concerns the costs arising from an application to enforce Letters Rogatory in a class action context.

The Applicants sought production of source code and deposition from Modiface Inc., a non-party to the underlying U.S. litigation.

The court ordered Modiface to provide compiled and obfuscated code and to submit to deposition, but limited the scope of production.

The decision addresses the appropriate quantum and basis for costs, ultimately awarding $150,000 all-inclusive to the Respondent, balancing the principles of indemnity, proportionality, and reasonableness.

These supplementary reasons correct a previous decision regarding liability under s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court, upon discovering a Court of Appeal decision (Mazur v. Elias et al.), clarified that co-owner consent is not required for liability to attach to both owners under the Act.

This correction amends paragraph 29 of the original reasons, affirming that liability attaches to co-owners regardless of consent flow.

The plaintiff and her insurer brought a motion for a determination of a question of law regarding whether the "personal" consent of a co-owner is required for a motor vehicle policy to provide insurance coverage for liability arising from the use of an insured automobile.

The court examined the interplay between section 239(1) of the Insurance Act and section 192(2) of the Highway Traffic Act, particularly in light of the 1990 amendment to the Insurance Act which removed the word "personally." The court determined that the personal consent of the co-owner was not required, as consent could flow through an intermediary, and the two statutory schemes operate independently.