Elisha C. Jamieson-Davies

This endorsement addresses costs following a wrongful dismissal trial where the plaintiff, Melvin Yee, was largely successful in his claim for damages but unsuccessful in his claim for bad faith damages.

The defendant, Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), failed to disclose a critical employment contract until late in the proceedings, causing unnecessary litigation.

The court found HBC's conduct "worthy of sanction" under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Despite the plaintiff's divided success and the defendant's offers to settle, the court awarded the plaintiff reduced substantial indemnity costs, emphasizing that the defendant's conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceeding.

The plaintiff, a 62-year-old former Director of Product Design and Development with 11.65 years of service, sued for wrongful dismissal after his employment was terminated.

The court applied the Bardal factors and awarded a 16-month reasonable notice period, including base salary, unpaid bonus, benefits, and pension contributions.

The plaintiff's claim for bad faith damages, based on the employer's late disclosure of a superseding employment contract, was dismissed as the conduct did not meet the required threshold.

In a national class action for unpaid overtime, the defendant bank brought a motion for a class-wide limitations order to time-bar claims falling outside provincial limitation periods.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the reasonable discoverability of the claims—specifically whether taking legal action was appropriate—required individualized assessments.

Evidence of power imbalances, fear of reprisal, and reasonable reliance on the bank's misrepresentations rebutted the statutory presumption of discoverability on a class-wide basis.

The plaintiff's cross-motion to strike the limitations defence entirely was also dismissed.

At a case conference, the plaintiff sought permission to bring a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant objected, arguing that allegations of bad faith, mental distress, and discrimination created genuine issues for trial requiring credibility assessments.

The court permitted the plaintiff to proceed with the motion, noting that judges have powers to determine credibility and address contested facts under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and set a timetable for the motion.

This decision addresses cross-motions for summary judgment on damages issues in a class action for unpaid overtime.

The court previously found the defendant bank liable for breaching federal labour law regarding overtime.

In this stage, the court considered common issues related to unjust enrichment, remedies, and punitive damages, and crucially, whether to add aggregate damages as a common issue.

The court found that while the defendant was enriched, restitutionary relief was not available due to the breach of contract claim.

Punitive damages were denied as the bank's conduct, though careless, did not meet the "malicious, oppressive and high-handed" standard.

Most significantly, the court certified aggregate damages as a new common issue, finding a "reasonable possibility" that the plaintiff's proposed methodology, based on time-stamped computer data, could determine damages without individual proof, despite previous appellate court reservations about sampling.

The determination of the final aggregate damages quantum was adjourned pending expert reports and data access.

The representative plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment on the liability common issues in a class action for unpaid overtime on behalf of customer service employees of the defendant bank.

The court found that the bank's overtime policies, which required pre-approval, and its failure to record actual hours worked, violated the Canada Labour Code.

The court concluded that the bank permitted uncompensated overtime by failing to prevent it, thereby breaching its statutory and contractual duties to the class members.

The applicant sought judicial review of three decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his complaints of discrimination and reprisal against the Middlesex-London Health Unit.

The complaints arose from a student practicum and a subsequent unsuccessful job application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decisions reasonable and rejecting the applicant's claims of procedural unfairness, bias, and Charter violations.

The court held that the Tribunal properly assessed the evidence and correctly applied the legal tests for discrimination and reprisal.

The Plaintiff, Algoma District School Board (ADSB), brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the Defendant, Algoma Insurance Brokers Ltd. (AIB), alleging negligence and breach of contract in insurance brokerage services from 1965-1986.

AIB brought a cross-motion for dismissal of ADSB's claim for delay.

The court dismissed ADSB's motion for partial summary judgment, finding it inappropriate given the complexity and lack of efficiency.

The court granted AIB's motion to dismiss for delay, concluding that the 13.5-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and ADSB failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice to AIB, particularly concerning the fading memories of elderly witnesses and the death of key individuals.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability following his termination.

The respondent sought early dismissal of the application because the applicant had signed a full and final release in exchange for a severance package.

The applicant argued the release should be set aside due to economic duress, lack of capacity due to visual impairment, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had realistic alternatives to signing the release, had the capacity to understand it, and failed to establish that the respondent intentionally deceived him.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

In three related wrongful dismissal actions, the employer sought consolidation to reduce duplicative discovery while the plaintiffs were pursuing summary judgment motions.

The court expressed concern that the parties' motion practice might be obscuring the real dispute about the scope of necessary discovery and emphasized efficiency, affordability, and proportionality.

A timetable was set for delivery of motion materials, identification of proposed cross-examinations and summonses, and a further case conference at which consolidation, hearing together, and the scope of examinations could be addressed.

The applicant filed an application alleging employment discrimination based on disability.

A preliminary hearing was scheduled to determine whether the application should be dismissed on the basis that the applicant had signed a full and final release.

At the commencement of the hearing, it became evident that the respondent had not received the applicant's further written submissions, which argued the release should be set aside due to misrepresentation and the applicant's disabilities.

To ensure procedural fairness, the Tribunal adjourned the preliminary hearing to provide the respondent an opportunity to prepare a response.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability after being denied a volunteer opportunity at a withdrawal management centre.

The applicant named both St. Leonard's Community Services and Brant Community Healthcare System (BCHS) as respondents.

BCHS filed a request to be removed as a respondent, arguing it had no role in the operation of the centre.

The applicant agreed in writing that BCHS was not a proper respondent and did not oppose the request.

The Tribunal granted the request and ordered BCHS removed as a respondent.

The applicant alleged discrimination based on disability after being denied a volunteer position on an advisory committee at a detoxification centre where he was an active client.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed at a preliminary stage, arguing that committee membership is not a 'service' under section 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding it was not plain and obvious that the application fell outside its jurisdiction, as volunteer work may be considered 'employment' under section 5 of the Code.