Eileen E. Gillese

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal in part, finding no error in the trial decision except for the quantum of damages.

The court ordered the judgment to be amended to reduce damages by $1,310,000 to reflect deposits paid by the appellant and to correct the amount of pre- and post-judgment interest.

Costs of the appeal and trial were fixed in favour of the Receiver.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals of James Keena, who was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault involving a complainant aged 14-15.

The court found that the trial judge correctly applied the law regarding the accused’s failure to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s age and was justified in finding recklessness.

The sentence of five years’ imprisonment was found to be within the appropriate range, considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The court rejected the argument that the complainant’s participation was a mitigating factor.

The appellant, Isaiah Todd, appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge’s finding that the confidential informant’s information was compelling and corroborated, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of multiple counts of sexual interference and sexual assault against his nieces and great-nieces, appealed his convictions.

The primary grounds of appeal were that the trial judge erred by admitting similar fact evidence without properly considering collusion among complainants and by applying a different standard of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of collusion, credibility, or the application of similar fact principles.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appealed the Ontario Review Board's decision to uphold her detention order.

The ORB found she remained a significant threat to public safety due to diagnosed schizoaffective disorder and substance use disorders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the ORB's application of the "significant threat" test from Winko v. British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), which requires a real risk of serious physical or psychological harm to the public resulting from criminal conduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the mens rea required for attempted murder by wrongly attributing the actions of other shooters to him, and that the verdicts on four of the five convictions were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's specific intent.

The court held that the evidence amply supported the findings that this was a pre-planned, deliberate attack by shooters working in concert, and that the only reasonable inference was that all shooters had the specific intent to kill the victims.

The appellant, C.D., appealed his conviction for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and sexual assault, and his sentence.

The sentence appeal was abandoned during oral submissions.

The conviction appeal raised three issues: the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct (the "shower incident"), the lack of a caution regarding the complainant's prior consistent statement, and the absence of an instruction against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors by the trial judge.

The court held that the shower incident evidence was admissible for motive and to rebut defence theories, and that the lack of specific jury instructions was a legitimate tactical decision by defence counsel.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion.

The appellant, 4342 Queen St. Niagara Holdings Inc. ('Queen'), challenged a summary judgment ordering it to pay Arcamm Electrical Services Ltd. ('Arcamm') nearly $1 million for electrical repair services.

Queen argued that Arcamm's alleged contributory fault for damages to electrical transformers raised genuine issues for trial and that granting summary judgment risked inconsistent findings with a related subrogated claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to properly address the contributory fault defence and by not recognizing the genuine issues for trial and the risk of inconsistent findings.

The Court affirmed that contributory fault can be raised as a defence in contract actions to apportion damages.

The summary judgment was set aside, and Queen was ordered to bring a motion to consolidate the actions.

The appellant, D.W., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, arguing the trial judge erred by improperly relying on the complainant's lack of embellishment to enhance credibility and by misusing a 2015 Children's Aid Society (CAS) record to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's use of the lack of embellishment was permissible to assess motive to lie, and the CAS record was properly admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut recent fabrication, not for the truth of its contents.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, D.S., appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference involving his niece, T.S. The appeal raised four grounds: the trial judge's reliance on similar fact evidence, misapprehension of the complainant's credibility, illogical reasoning in rejecting the appellant's evidence, and the unreasonableness of the convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's proper application of similar fact evidence principles from R. v. Handy and upholding the credibility findings, noting the high bar for appellate intervention on such matters as per R. v. Kruk.

The appellant, J.E., appealed his conviction for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three significant legal errors in assessing the evidence of a defence witness (the complainant's mother).

These errors included applying the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to individual items of evidence, effectively reversing the burden of proof on the defence, and requiring independent corroboration for defence testimony.

The Court held that these errors were not inconsequential, as the defence witness's testimony, though peripheral, could have contributed to a reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's credibility or reliability.

Consequently, the conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action and awarding costs, which was premised on their failure to pay previously ordered costs and to either appoint counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person after their lawyer withdrew.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the undisputed failure of the appellants to pay the prior costs award of $4,095.

No costs were awarded for the appeal itself.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) in 2016, appealed a 2024 disposition by the Ontario Review Board (ORB) that continued his detention.

The ORB concluded he remained a significant threat to public safety primarily due to ongoing cannabis use.

The Court of Appeal found that the ORB's reasons did not adequately explain how the legal test for "significant threat to the safety of the public" was met, particularly regarding the causal link between cannabis use, mental state deterioration, and a substantial risk of serious criminal harm.

The court noted the appellant's medication adherence and lack of recent violent behaviour, questioning the ORB's conclusion that intervention was the sole reason for no deterioration.

The appeal was allowed, the ORB's disposition set aside, and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a differently constituted panel.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, despite the delay being below the Jordan ceiling.

The application judge erred by assessing the reasonableness of the delay against a hypothetical scenario where judicial vacancies were filled, rather than the actual systemic circumstances.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the constitutional yardstick for below-ceiling delays is not an ideal state but the real-world conditions, and that delays due to judicial vacancies, while concerning, are not per se "unreasonable" under s. 11(b) if the overall delay remains presumptively reasonable.

The appeal was granted, the stay set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Marc Owusu-Boamah, appealed his conviction for administering a noxious substance and his global ten-year sentence following a kidnapping and extortion.

The trial judge found the appellant was a central player in a coordinated criminal scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the drugging was part of the coordinated plan, making the appellant culpable under s. 21(1) or s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal sentence and reduced the concurrent sentence for administering a noxious substance from six years to one year, as the original sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

The global sentence remained unaffected.

The appellant, Rashawn Salmon, appealed his convictions for various drug and firearms offences, arguing that the reviewing judge erred in dismissing his pre-trial Charter motion.

Specifically, he challenged the lawfulness of search warrants for his condo unit and vehicle, alleging s. 8 breaches regarding CCTV footage and the sufficiency of grounds for the warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the reviewing judge's conclusions that the police obtained information from authorized persons, that there were reasonable grounds for the search warrants, and that the vehicle seizure was lawful.

The court reiterated that a piecemeal approach to warrant review is inappropriate and that property management can consent to police access to common areas.

This is an appeal from a conviction for sexual assault and a Crown appeal from sentence.

The appellant challenged the conviction based on alleged errors in the trial judge’s reasoning, including the *Browne v. Dunn* rule and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings.

The Crown appealed the two-year less a day conditional sentence, arguing it was unfit.

The Court declined to interfere with the sentence, finding it was an exceptional case justified by the offender's remorse, commitment to rehabilitation, insight, and the severe family consequences of incarceration.

Both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal were dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case.

The trial judge had excluded Event Data Recorder (EDR) evidence, finding an unreasonable search and seizure (s. 8 Charter violation) and police bad faith.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in law by concluding that police lacked reasonable grounds to seize the vehicle under s. 489(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in EDR data after lawful seizure, and in the s. 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Court held that EDR data, being objective and impersonal, does not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy post-lawful seizure.

It also found police acted in good faith given conflicting caselaw.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered with the EDR evidence admitted.

This appeal addressed whether relief from forfeiture is available to an insured under a professional liability insurance policy when the claim was not reported to the insurer during the policy period.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the policy was a "claims made and reported" policy, meaning that reporting the claim within the policy period was a condition precedent to coverage.

As coverage was not triggered due to the late reporting, relief from forfeiture was not available.

The court clarified that the principle from *Stuart v. Hutchins* remains undisturbed by *Kozel v. Personal Insurance Co.*, maintaining the distinction between non-compliance with a condition precedent and imperfect compliance.

The Crown appealed a lower court's decision to stay drug trafficking charges against the respondent, Angelo Kirkopoulos, on the grounds of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge had found a net delay of 35.5 months, exceeding the Jordan ceiling, after accounting for defence delay and 14 months attributed to COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance.

The Crown argued that an additional 8-month period, which the application judge classified as institutional delay due to court backlogs, should also be considered an exceptional circumstance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, affirming the application judge's characterization of the 8-month period as institutional delay.

The court emphasized that while the pandemic caused exceptional circumstances, the Crown must still demonstrate reasonable efforts to mitigate delay, and deference is owed to a trial judge's factual findings and local knowledge regarding delay attribution.