Eileen E. Gillese

The appellants, Vito Buffone and Jeffrey Kompon, appealed their convictions for conspiracy to import cocaine and several substantive offences following a 50-day jury trial.

The appeal raised four grounds: the admissibility and scope of analyst's certificate evidence under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA), the trial judge's instructions on conspiracy (specifically the three-step Carter analysis), the instructions regarding inferences to be drawn from a third party's actions concerning an encrypted cellphone, and the instructions on the substantive counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions.

The appellant, Norman Howes, appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of credibility, despite a minor inconsequential error in characterizing evidence.

The court affirmed the fairness of the trial and proper application of the burden of proof.

However, the sentence was varied by setting aside a s. 161(1)(a.1) order, which the Crown conceded was improperly made in light of R. v. K.R.J.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a narcotic for the purposes of trafficking.

The Crown conceded the appeal, acknowledging that trial counsel unintentionally misled the appellant regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, which were central to his decision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed convictions for procuring a person under 18 for prostitution and making child pornography, challenging the constitutionality of a cellphone seizure under section 8 of the Charter.

The appeal hinged on the factual determination of whether the arrest occurred in a hotel hallway (lawful) or the hotel room (unlawful).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the arrest occurred in the hallway, affirming the trial judge's credibility assessment of police officers' evidence despite minor inconsistencies.

The Court found no material misapprehension of evidence or uneven scrutiny, dismissing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision declaring s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code, which imposes a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for procuring a prostitute under 18, unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's finding that the mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate for a reasonable hypothetical offender with significantly reduced moral culpability, such as a victim-offender.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of the Crown's premature notice of appeal, finding no prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant, Jamie Simpson-Fry, appealed an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence imposed following convictions for sexual assault, forcible confinement, and threatening death.

The appeal challenged the sentencing judge's weighing of the appellant's statements to psychiatric experts, arguing it effectively penalized him for not testifying and violated his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach, which considered the statements in light of the entire evidentiary record and afforded them less weight due to the lack of cross-examination.

The appellant, Jeffrey Shuman, appealed his 15-year global sentence for seven counts of robbery with a firearm, arguing that the sentence was demonstrably unfit and that the sentencing judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences, the paramountcy of deterrence and denunciation, and the sentencing judge's adequate reasons which considered aggravating and mitigating factors and was clearly alive to the totality principle.

The mother appealed a Superior Court decision that overturned a trial judge's order permitting her to relocate with the child to Mongolia.

The Court of Appeal considered the application of recent amendments to the Children’s Law Reform Act (CLRA) and Divorce Act regarding relocation and parenting time, which came into effect during the appeal process.

The court found that the appeal judge erred by reweighing the trial judge's findings, misapplying the test for relocation, and incorrectly assessing the evidentiary record.

The Court of Appeal restored the trial judge's order, allowing the relocation, and varied the winter access provision based on fresh evidence.

The appellant, Odain Gardner, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

He was tried jointly with Erick Reid, who was convicted of manslaughter.

Gardner argued the trial judge erred by failing to properly relate material evidence to the issues for the jury and by giving an erroneous after-the-fact conduct instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's instructions were not perfect, they were adequate in conveying the central issues of identity and credibility to the jury.

The court also found no reversible error in the after-the-fact conduct instruction, noting it was not circular or prejudicial.

The appellants, triplets born with serious disabilities, appealed the dismissal of their negligence claim against a physician who prescribed a fertility drug to their mother pre-conception.

They alleged the physician failed to provide informed consent and prescribed a contraindicated medication.

The Court of Appeal, in a majority decision, dismissed the appeal, affirming that a physician does not owe a duty of care to a future child for alleged negligence occurring pre-conception, citing policy concerns regarding conflicting duties and women's autonomy.

The dissenting judge argued that the allegation of a contraindicated drug could distinguish the case and warrant a full trial to determine if a novel duty of care exists.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for firearm offences, which arose from an incident where he intended to commit suicide with a sawed-off shotgun.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence without adequately considering the appellant's suicidal intent and the attenuated danger to the public.

The court also found an error in failing to consider the causal link between the appellant's mental health issues and addiction and his criminal conduct.

Given the appellant's significant rehabilitation efforts, the court substituted the custodial sentence with a conditional sentence.

Sutherland Law appealed two orders from the Superior Court of Justice: a Directions Order and a Charging Order.

The plaintiff, Pasquale Scetto, moved to quash the appeal of the Directions Order due to Sutherland Law's lack of standing and sought dismissal of the Charging Order appeal, arguing no fund existed for a charging order.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash the appeal of the Directions Order, finding Sutherland Law lacked standing as it was no longer counsel of record and was not a party to the Directions Motion.

Consequently, with the Directions Order standing (which determined the defendant's share of net sale proceeds was $0), the appeal of the Charging Order was dismissed as there was no fund over which a charging order could be made.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to prevent his daughter from changing elementary schools to a Catholic school, and the associated costs order.

The respondent mother, who had sole decision-making authority, sought to enroll their daughter in the local Catholic school due to bullying at the current school and the academic superiority of the new school.

The motion judge found the mother was committed to raising the daughter in the Jewish faith and had secured exemptions from religious instruction at the Catholic school, thus finding no breach of the prior order for the daughter to be raised in the Jewish faith.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error in the motion judge's decision or costs award, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant, a youth convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, and reckless discharge of a firearm stemming from a mass shooting, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred by misunderstanding the Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) program and by failing to consider collateral immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, concluding that the alleged IRCS error did not impact the sentence and that immigration consequences could not reduce a sentence to a point disproportionate to the gravity of the offence or the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition from the Ontario Review Board that imposed a detention order with community living privileges, arguing the Board failed to adequately consider a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal found that the Board's decision was supported by the treating psychiatrist's opinion, which cited the appellant's poor insight and ambivalence to medication.

The court also addressed a moot issue regarding temporary liberty restriction due to early COVID-19 protocols, noting the Board's reasons properly advised the Hospital to consider individual clinical opinions in future.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Bradley Kennedy, appealed his conviction for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on anecdotal expert testimony regarding typical personal use quantities of methamphetamine, citing R. v. Sekhon.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's opinion was grounded in objective facts, not inadmissible anecdotes, and that the trial judge did not rely on the impugned testimony.

The court also found the verdict was reasonable, as the trial judge was entitled to draw an inference of guilt after rejecting the appellant's testimony, given the significant quantity of drugs and lack of indicia of personal use.

The appellant, Mohammed Hakimzadah, sought leave to appeal a nine-year sentence for multiple counselling offences, including the murder of his wife and her family law lawyer.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected arguments that the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient notice of a higher sentence or adequately explain reasons.

The court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the egregious nature of the offences, which put multiple persons, including a justice system participant, at risk.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant, P.P., appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony.

The complainant, the appellant's nephew, testified about abuse occurring when he was a child.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings, which were amply explained and supported by the record, and dismissed the appeal.

This costs endorsement followed successful appeals by the Fram and Kerbel entities against Romandale Farms Limited.

Romandale had initially been awarded substantial indemnity costs for four intertwined actions tried together.

The Court of Appeal, applying the principle of overall success rather than issue-by-issue determination, found that Fram and Kerbel were entitled to partial indemnity costs for the original actions, having achieved overall success on appeal and having beaten a joint settlement offer.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences following a traffic stop and arrest.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the stop and arrest were tainted by racial profiling, which would render the firearm evidence inadmissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge found Charter breaches (ss. 8 and 9) due to an arrest without reasonable and probable grounds but admitted the evidence, concluding no racial profiling because he found the officers were not "lying" about their motivations.

The Court of Appeal (majority) held that the trial judge erred in applying the test for racial profiling by focusing on whether officers deliberately lied, failing to adequately consider unconscious bias.

A new trial was ordered.

The dissenting judge argued the trial judge correctly applied the law and considered all factors.