D. S. Crane

The appellant tripped and fell on a ramp while exiting the respondent's store, sustaining injuries including a torn rotator cuff.

At trial, the judge awarded $13,598 in damages after finding the appellant 50% contributorily negligent and concluding her shoulder injury was not caused by the fall.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by ignoring medical and lay evidence regarding causation and misapplying the principles of causation and apportionment.

The Court reduced the appellant's contributory negligence to 15% and reassessed damages, awarding a total of $104,044.41.

The appellant applied for compensation after a child under 12 injured another child with a slingshot.

The Criminal Injuries Compensation Board dismissed the claim, finding no crime of violence occurred because the child lacked criminal intent.

On appeal, the appellant argued that s. 16(2) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act deemed the child to have intent, overriding s. 13 of the Criminal Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 13 creates a blanket prohibition against criminal accountability for children under 12, which s. 16(2) does not displace.

The applicant sought judicial review of an arbitral decision regarding a policy grievance on contracting out.

The arbitrator found that a worker provided by an agency was not an employee of the applicant, but nevertheless concluded by analogy that the worker could not work for the applicant for more than two weeks under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding that the arbitrator exceeded his jurisdiction and effectively amended the collective agreement by creating a third class of worker.

The court held the decision was patently unreasonable as it conflicted with the express provision allowing contracting out.

The appellant appealed an order of the Licence Appeal Tribunal upholding the Director's decision to require audited financial statements as a condition for renewing children's residence licences.

The appellant argued the Director lacked statutory authority to use this information to set per diem rates.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the statute and reasonable in concluding the information was not being sought for an unauthorized purpose.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision that allowed a former employee to pursue a pay equity complaint despite having signed a full and final release upon termination.

The Divisional Court (majority) quashed the Tribunal's decision, holding that the release was a binding contract that barred the complaint, and the Tribunal's interpretation to the contrary was incorrect.

A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the application, emphasizing the systemic and proactive nature of the Pay Equity Act and the Tribunal's specialized jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ministry of Transportation's decision to deny him a religious exemption from the requirement to have a digital photograph on his driver's licence.

He argued the requirement violated his freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, citing beliefs based on the Book of Revelations and the Second Commandment.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that his objection was based on a sincere religious belief, noting inconsistencies in his practices and evidence that his true concerns were secular privacy issues.

The appellant appealed a Tribunal decision finding breaches of the Mortgage Brokers Act and revoking its licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no breach of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, ample evidence of regulatory breaches, and no apprehension of bias.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the penalty, finding the Tribunal erred in law by imposing licence revocation without allowing submissions on penalty, considering alternatives, or reviewing similar cases.

The revocation order was set aside and replaced with conditions on the appellant's licence.

The appellant, the Corporation of the City of Kawartha Lakes, appealed a correcting decision made by a referee regarding appeals from the Ontario Drainage Tribunal.

The appellant sought to have the correcting decision set aside and the original decision confirmed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was sufficient confusion at the time of the hearing to justify the correcting decision.

The court held that issues regarding the appropriateness, timeliness, and jurisdiction of the respondents' motion under section 47 of the Drainage Act were matters for the referee to determine.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award which found that the employer could not discharge a grievor for events that were already known and covered by a prior one-day suspension.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's conclusion was entirely reasonable on the record and not patently unreasonable.

Costs of $4,500 were awarded to the respondent union.

The appellant appealed an order of Master MacLeod, arguing procedural unfairness because the order was allegedly made without formal notice or supporting materials, precluding an explanation for its defaults.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the record disclosed full notice to the appellant and there was no palpable and overriding error or erroneous exercise of discretion by the Master.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer her complaint to a Board of Inquiry.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable and was supported by the evidence.

The Court also rejected the applicant's argument that the Commission was bound by a prior finding of the Board of Referees under the Employment Insurance Act, noting the issues were entirely different.

Three employers applied for judicial review of arbitration awards that reinstated employees who had been discharged following criminal convictions for sexual assault in the workplace.

In each case, the arbitrators had allowed the unions to collaterally attack the criminal convictions and had concluded the employees were innocent.

The Divisional Court granted the applications and quashed the arbitration awards, holding that a criminal conviction cannot be collaterally attacked at a subsequent arbitration.

The doctrine of abuse of process prevents an arbitrator from retrying a criminal case and treating a conviction as merely prima facie evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry, which held that it had jurisdiction to continue hearing a human rights complaint after the Ontario Human Rights Commission withdrew its carriage of the proceeding.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that under the Human Rights Code, a Board of Inquiry may not proceed in the absence of the Commission.

The Court held that the Commission cannot delegate carriage of the complaint to the complainant, and that the public interest representation of the Commission is required for the hearing to proceed.