Douglas C. Shaw

The applicant, Robert Buys, successfully applied for an assessment of 17 accounts rendered by the respondent law firm, Carrel + Partners LLP, totaling $63,378.84.

The law firm opposed the application.

Buys sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the firm should have consented and delayed the process, and that his offer to settle was better than the outcome.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted as the firm's conduct did not meet the threshold of "reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous." The court awarded partial indemnity costs, considering the applicant's success, the moderate complexity of the issues, the significance of the accounts, and the applicant's offer to settle (though not compliant with Rule 49.03).

The court reduced the claimed hours and disallowed certain disbursements, ultimately awarding $5,000 for fees plus HST, and $125 for photocopying and courier costs plus HST.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion for joint custody and equal parenting time after the respondent mother left the matrimonial home with their 16-month-old child.

The mother sought to dismiss the motion as it was brought before a case conference, contrary to Rule 14(4).

The court found it was in the interest of justice under Rule 14(4.2) to hear the motion prior to a case conference, given the 2.5-month delay until the first available date.

The court ordered an interim, interim schedule of alternating days of care for each parent until the return of the motion.

The Crown applied for a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused on a recognizance with a surety.

The accused was charged with two break and enters, one involving a severe assault.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law, made an inappropriate decision, and that new evidence justified detention.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the Justice of the Peace properly considered the tertiary ground, the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and Gladue principles in crafting a strict release plan with a strong surety.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assaulting his common-law spouse.

The conviction relied entirely on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the parties' intoxication and the physical altercation, and subjected the appellant's evidence to a stricter level of scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The claimant law firm sought costs for two motions regarding the enforcement of Certificates of Proof of Claim for unpaid solicitor accounts.

The debtor opposed and sought costs, arguing he was entirely successful on one motion and partially successful on the other.

The court found that success was divided, as the debtor succeeded on one motion but failed in his request to have the accounts assessed, while the claimant was substantially successful on the second motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and ordered that neither party be awarded costs.

The plaintiff was successful on a motion for leave to conduct a second examination for discovery of the corporate defendant and sought substantial indemnity costs due to alleged unreasonable delay by the defendant.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's conduct did not reach the level of aggressive or contumelious behaviour required.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at $1,000 for fees plus disbursements, reflecting a fair and reasonable amount for an uncomplicated procedural motion.

The 65-year-old accused, a first-time offender with an otherwise exemplary background, was found guilty of possessing a large quantity of child pornography.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought the mandatory minimum of six months.

The court weighed the significant mitigating factors, including the accused's low risk of reoffending and positive community history, against the aggravating factor of the large collection of images.

The court sentenced the accused to nine months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation, along with ancillary orders.

The applicant sought an order to assess the accounts of his former family law solicitor, totaling over $63,000.

The accounts had been paid, and the application was brought more than two years after the final account was delivered.

The court found that the initial order obtained by requisition was a nullity as it was outside the one-month time limit under s. 3(b) of the Solicitors Act.

However, the court exercised its discretion under ss. 4(1) and 11 of the Act, finding that 'special circumstances' existed to permit the assessment.

These circumstances included the applicant objecting to the accounts immediately after the retainer ended and the significant total amount of the bills for a relatively simple family law matter.

The applicant father, residing in Ontario, applied under the Alberta Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act to vary a child support order made under the Divorce Act in Alberta.

The respondent mother, residing in Alberta, disputed jurisdiction.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act does not permit variation of a Divorce Act order, and that the proper procedure is to apply for a provisional variation order under section 18 of the Divorce Act.

Following the dismissal of an application for a vesting order regarding a 25% interest in a home, the court determined the issue of costs.

The respondents sought substantial indemnity costs of $9,000.57, while the applicant argued costs should be paid from the estates or not at all.

Applying the modern approach to estate litigation costs, the court held that the 'loser pays' principle applied, as the litigation did not arise from the testators' actions or to ensure proper administration.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $4,750 plus disbursements and HST.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a contractor’s claim arising from a tender competition for construction of a medical centre.

The contractor alleged that the municipality breached Contract A by failing to award the project to it after applying an alternate price credit related to winter suspension of construction.

The court found that construction did not begin in fall 2013 and was never suspended during the winter as alleged in the pleadings, rendering the alternate credit inapplicable.

The municipality was entitled to evaluate bids based on base bid prices and was not required to adjust bids using alternate credits that were irrelevant to the project as ultimately undertaken.

Summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

A law firm sought orders permitting enforcement of two Certificates of Proof of Claim obtained under the former Creditors’ Relief Act by issuing writs of seizure and sale against a former client for unpaid legal accounts arising from matrimonial litigation.

The debtor argued the certificates were invalid due to breaches of the Solicitors Act, including commencing recovery proceedings while accounts were under assessment and bringing a claim within one month of delivering a bill.

The court held that proceedings under the Creditors’ Relief Act constituted an “action” for the purposes of the Solicitors Act.

As a result, the first certificate was a nullity due to breach of s. 6(4), while the second certificate was partially unenforceable because part of the claim violated s. 2(1).

The sheriff was directed to enforce the second certificate only for the reduced amount calculated by the court.

Following a family law trial between long-term unmarried spouses, the court addressed costs and the form of the final order.

The applicant had partially succeeded on a claim for unjust enrichment and was successful on spousal support, while failing to include the respondent’s pension in the unjust enrichment calculation.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court emphasized the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs and the principle of reasonableness.

The applicant sought $15,000 in costs but the court determined that a reduced award was appropriate given the mixed property outcome.

Costs of $10,000 plus HST and disbursements were awarded, with $5,000 deemed enforceable as a support order.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion seeking a declaration that its former employee was in civil contempt of a consent order prohibiting solicitation of certain clients.

The alleged breach was based on an affidavit recounting statements and an email from a third‑party client asserting that the defendant had contacted the client and obtained an order.

The defendant denied solicitation and filed responding affidavit evidence explaining that the contact related to compensation for defective furniture supplied by his new employer.

The court held that the moving party’s evidence consisted entirely of hearsay concerning contested facts and therefore breached Rule 60.11(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing contempt motions.

Because contempt is quasi‑criminal and requires strict procedural compliance and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the hearsay evidence was inadmissible and there was no admissible evidence to support the allegation.

The applicant sought to quash a general warrant authorizing surreptitious entry into a commercial room used to store suspected narcotics and to exclude resulting evidence under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The court reviewed whether the issuing justice had reasonable grounds to authorize the warrant under s. 487.01(1) of the Criminal Code based on an Information to Obtain supported by confidential informants and police surveillance.

Applying the deferential standard of warrant review, the court held that the ITO contained sufficient credible and reliable evidence that could reasonably support issuance of the warrant.

The informant information was corroborated by surveillance and other investigative steps linking the applicant and his associate to the location.

The court found no Charter breach and declined to exclude the evidence.

The applicant, an estate trustee and beneficiary of a 25% interest in a home, applied for an order vesting his interest or compelling the respondent estate trustees to sell the home.

The home was subject to a life interest granted to another beneficiary under a related estate.

The respondent estate trustees relied on their discretionary power under the wills to postpone the sale of the property.

The court dismissed the application, applying the Court of Appeal's decision in Di Michele, holding that the estate trustees' power to postpone the sale ousted the three-year vesting rule under section 9 of the Estates Administration Act, and their decision to allow the life interest to continue was a valid exercise of discretion.

The applicant spouse brought an interlocutory motion in an uncontested family proceeding after the respondent failed to file an answer.

The court considered entitlement to interim spousal support, pension valuation, and the sale of jointly owned real properties pending trial.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines and considering the parties’ lengthy marriage, the respondent’s income, and the applicant’s medical inability to work, the court ordered interim spousal support.

The court also authorized the applicant to obtain the family law value of the respondent’s pension without his consent and ordered that jointly owned real properties be listed for sale under the Partition Act.

The accused brought an application to quash a General Warrant authorizing covert entry onto a third party’s property and sought exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a breach of s. 8.

The primary issue was whether the accused had standing to assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in property owned by his brother.

Applying the totality of the circumstances analysis from R. v. Edwards, the court held the accused lacked sufficient possession, control, or authority over the property to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy.

As a result, he had no standing to challenge the warrant.

The court further held that, even if standing had existed, leave to cross‑examine the affiant would not have been granted because the challenge raised was facial rather than sub‑facial.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking relief from child support obligations for two past periods and requesting renewed access to the child.

She asserted that health issues and a leave of absence from employment justified suspension of support for a recent period and that earlier mental health difficulties justified rescission of support for an earlier period.

The court found insufficient medical and financial evidence to establish an inability to work and also found the request to vary historical support unreasonably delayed.

The court further held there had been no material change since prior orders and a Children’s Lawyer report recommending extremely limited contact.

The motion to rescind child support and the motion for access were both dismissed.

In a wrongful dismissal and Human Rights Code action, the plaintiff sought leave under Rule 31.03(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to examine a second corporate representative of the defendant.

The initially examined representative had not reviewed a large disability insurer file produced in the litigation and lacked knowledge of communications with the insurer.

The court held that requiring numerous undertakings from an unprepared witness would cause undue expense and inefficiency.

Because another corporate officer had direct knowledge of the relevant communications, leave to conduct a limited second discovery was appropriate.

The examination was restricted to questions arising from the insurer’s long-term disability file and capped at 1.5 hours.