Douglas A. Wallace

The appellant, a part-time supply teacher, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed loss of earning capacity benefits.

The parties disagreed on how to convert her part-time income to full-time income under s. 86 of the SABS-1994, given her seasonal work pattern.

The Arbitrator found that the conversion should be based on the 194-day school year, resulting in a lower pre-accident earning capacity.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate held that the Arbitrator erred in law by disregarding the strict formula in s. 86, which mandates a 52-week year calculation.

The appeal was allowed, and the insurer was ordered to calculate the pre-accident earning capacity based on the higher gross annual income.

The applicant, a part-time supply teacher, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed a loss of earning capacity benefit.

The parties disagreed on the method to convert her part-time pre-accident income to full-time income under section 86 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the reasonable method for establishing the number of hours in a regular work week for a full-time teacher must take into account the fixed number of school days (194) and the corresponding annual salary.

The arbitrator determined the applicant's gross annual income to be $36,714, rejecting the applicant's argument for a higher amount based on her personal and vocational characteristics.

The insured sought a declaration that a full and final release was null and void due to lack of capacity, undue influence, and the insurer's failure to comply with statutory notice requirements.

The motion judge dealt with the capacity and undue influence issues on a Rule 21 motion, which the Court of Appeal found was an error as those issues depended on disputed facts.

However, on the cross-appeal, the insurer conceded based on recent jurisprudence that its failure to comply with the statutory requirements rendered the release null and void.

The cross-appeal was allowed and the appeal was dismissed as moot.

The respondent, an 80-year-old woman, slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk after disembarking from a city transit bus.

She sued the appellant city in both negligence and breach of contract.

The trial judge found the negligence claims statute-barred but allowed the contract claim, holding that section 266 of the Insurance Act did not preclude it.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while section 266 does not automatically foreclose genuine actions in contract where a motor vehicle is merely incidental, the respondent's claim was essentially a disguised negligence claim.

As there was no independent contractual obligation imposing liability, the action was statute-barred and the appeal was allowed.