Dickson

The appellant appealed a decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, applying the rule adopted in Mezzo v. The Queen regarding directed verdicts and the sufficiency of identification evidence.

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Charter of the French Language that required the exclusive or joint use of French in commercial signage and business.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions were intra vires the province as they related to commerce within the province.

However, the Court found that freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter includes the freedom to choose one's language of expression.

The requirement for the exclusive use of French was not justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter or s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, and those provisions were struck down.

The provisions requiring the joint use of French were upheld as reasonable limits.

The infant respondent was seriously injured when struck by a train operated by the appellant.

The action was commenced more than three years after the accident.

The appellant argued the action was barred by the two-year limitation period in section 342(1) of the federal Railway Act.

The respondent argued the applicable limitation period was the provincial Limitation of Actions Act, which extended the time for infants.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 342(1) of the Railway Act is ultra vires the federal Parliament to the extent that it purports to apply to a common law action for negligence in the operation of a railway.

The establishment of general limitation periods for personal injury is not an integral part of federal jurisdiction over railways.

The appellant was arrested in his apartment during the execution of a search warrant for narcotics.

Upon arrest, he was read his rights but was prevented from telephoning his lawyer until the police had secured the premises, which took approximately forty minutes.

During the search, police found marijuana and related paraphernalia.

The trial judge excluded the evidence due to a violation of the right to counsel and acquitted the appellant.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant's right to counsel was violated, there is no strict causal requirement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter, but its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the good faith of the officers and the nature of the real evidence.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after persistently refusing the approaches of a police informer over six months.

He eventually sold drugs to the informer due to persistent requests, threats, and a large monetary inducement.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and entered a stay of proceedings, holding that entrapment is not a substantive defence but an aspect of abuse of process to be decided by the trial judge.

The Court established an objective test for entrapment, finding that the police conduct in this case went beyond merely providing an opportunity and amounted to an abuse of process.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking after selling marijuana to an undercover police officer.

The meeting was arranged by a friend of the appellant who was acting as a police informant in exchange for consideration on his own pending charges.

The appellant argued he was entrapped into committing the offence due to persistent phone calls and pressure from his friend.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the police acted on reasonable suspicion and merely provided an opportunity to commit the offence, without employing tactics that would induce an average person to commit the crime.

The appellant broke into the complainant's apartment and assaulted her while heavily intoxicated.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that his self-induced intoxication raised a reasonable doubt as to his intent.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal, holding that breaking and entering and committing an assault is an offence of general intent to which the defence of drunkenness does not apply.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming that the offence is one of general intent and the rule in Leary applies.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years under Criminal Code provisions enacted after the offence was committed.

Had she been tried under the law in force at the time of the offence, her parole ineligibility would have been between 10 and 20 years.

After serving 10 years in an Ontario penitentiary, she applied for habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing her continued detention under the 25-year ineligibility period violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ontario courts had jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus, that the remedy was appropriate to review the legality of her parole ineligibility, and that applying s. 7 to her continuing deprivation of liberty did not constitute a retrospective application of the Charter.

The Court declared her eligible for parole.

The parties were involved in a labour dispute during which the employer dismissed 24 striking employees for alleged misconduct.

The issue of the dismissals was referred to a consensual arbitrator, who found that the employer had no power to impose discipline during a legal strike and ordered the employees reinstated.

The employer successfully applied for judicial review, and the Court of Appeal upheld the decision to set aside the award.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the union's appeal, holding that even if the arbitrator erred in law, the error was not jurisdictional in nature and therefore the award was not subject to judicial review.

The appellant was stopped and searched at a border crossing by customs officials acting on a tip from the RCMP that he was attempting to import narcotics.

He was directed to an interview room, frisked, and arrested after cocaine was found on his person, but was not informed of his right to counsel until after the initial search and arrest.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was detained within the meaning of s. 10(b) of the Charter when he was ushered into the interview room and his right to counsel was violated.

However, applying the Collins framework, the Court concluded that the evidence of the narcotics should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because it was real evidence, the officers acted in good faith relying on a prior appellate decision, and the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was subjected to a strip search by customs officers upon entering Canada, which revealed concealed cannabis resin.

She was not informed of her right to counsel prior to the search.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a strip search at customs constitutes a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter, meaning the appellant's right to counsel was violated.

However, the Court found that the search provisions of the Customs Act do not violate s. 8 of the Charter due to the lower expectation of privacy at international borders.

Despite the s. 10(b) violation, the Court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), reasoning that it was pre-existing real evidence and the officers acted in good faith pursuant to statutory authority.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of unlawful possession of restricted weapons after police found unregistered handguns in his home.

He challenged the constitutionality of section 106.7(1) of the Criminal Code, which placed the onus on the accused to prove they held a valid registration certificate, arguing it violated the presumption of innocence under section 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the provision did not impose an impermissible reverse onus because the production of a certificate resolves all doubts in favour of the accused and provides an absolute defence.

Alternatively, the Court found that any infringement would be justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident and taken to a hospital.

While he was unconscious, a doctor took a free-flowing blood sample for medical purposes.

The doctor later handed the sample to a police officer without the respondent's consent or a warrant.

The sample was analyzed and used to convict the respondent of impaired driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police officer's taking of the blood sample from the doctor constituted an unreasonable seizure under section 8 of the Charter, as it violated the respondent's reasonable expectation of privacy in his bodily substances.

The Court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter, and dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The appellant sought compensation from the Law Society of Alberta's compensation fund after being defrauded by a lawyer.

The Law Society denied the claim, and the appellant successfully obtained an order of mandamus at first instance, which was overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the order of mandamus and holding that the Law Society does not have the discretion to deny a claim in toto when statutory prerequisites are met.

The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions.

The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated.

Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection.

The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

During a legal strike, the appellant union picketed a court-house.

A union member and court employee crossed the picket line to work, prompting the union to initiate internal disciplinary proceedings against him.

The respondents successfully obtained an injunction restraining the union from proceeding with the discipline.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the union's appeal, holding that picketing a court-house constitutes criminal contempt of court because it impedes access to justice.

Consequently, the union had no lawful right to discipline a member for refusing to respect an unlawful picket line.

During a lawful strike, the appellant union picketed all law courts in British Columbia, issuing passes to those it deemed permitted to cross the picket line.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued an ex parte injunction on his own motion to restrain the picketing, finding it constituted criminal contempt by impeding access to the courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the injunction, ruling that while peaceful picketing is protected under section 2(b) of the Charter, the injunction was a justified limit under section 1 to ensure unimpeded access to the courts and maintain the rule of law.

The respondent newspaper challenged the constitutionality of s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code, which mandated a publication ban on the identity of a complainant in a sexual assault case upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the mandatory ban infringed the freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1.

The Court found that the objective of encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward by protecting them from the trauma of publication was of pressing and substantial concern, and that a discretionary ban would not achieve this objective as it would deprive victims of certainty.

The Court also held that the provision did not infringe the accused's right to a public hearing under s. 11(d).

The appellant was convicted of break, enter and theft after police found recently stolen goods in his bedroom.

The appellant offered no explanation for his possession of the goods.

The trial judge convicted him based solely on the doctrine of recent possession, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that unexplained recent possession of stolen property permits, but does not mandate, an inference of guilt for theft or offences incidental thereto, such as break and enter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was found impaired and slumped over the steering wheel of his parked vehicle with the keys in the ignition.

He was charged with having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

At trial, he argued that the statutory presumption in s. 237(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which deems a person in the driver's seat to have care or control unless they establish they did not enter the vehicle to set it in motion, violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the reverse onus provision does infringe s. 11(d) by requiring a conviction even if a reasonable doubt exists, it is saved under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified to protect the public against drunk drivers.