Deborah Calderwood

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on firearms offences, which resulted from the trial judge excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge delivered a brief oral decision and promised written reasons later that day, but did not release them until 25 months later, after the Crown had perfected its appeal based on the inadequacy of the oral reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that the 25-month delay, combined with the trial judge's repeated unfulfilled promises to release the reasons and her knowledge of the Crown's appeal, rebutted the presumption that the written reasons truly reflected her original reasoning process.

As the written reasons could not be considered and the oral reasons were inadequate, the Court found an error of law, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a stabbing during a fight.

He appealed his conviction on four grounds, including an improper closing address by the Crown, misleading jury instructions regarding expert pathology evidence, an unreasonable verdict, and systemic underrepresentation of aboriginal on-reserve residents in the jury roll.

The Court of Appeal split the appeal into two parts.

The Court dismissed the first three grounds, finding the trial was fair, the jury instructions were adequate, and the verdict was reasonable.

The Court adjourned the appeal to hear submissions on the discrete issue of the jury roll composition.

Two sets of proposed interveners sought to be added as parties to two separate criminal appeals in order to cross-examine witnesses and tender evidence regarding the jury panel selection process.

The court dismissed the motions to add them as parties, noting that adding strangers as parties to a criminal appeal is inappropriate.

However, the court granted the applicants intervener status as friends of the court and, exceptionally, exempted them from the usual condition of accepting the record as it exists, allowing them to potentially augment the record and cross-examine witnesses.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and misapplied the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by misapprehending the appellant's testimony regarding whether intercourse occurred and by requiring the appellant's evidence to establish a finding of fact rather than merely raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.

The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.

Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender finding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentencing judge's conclusion that the appellant presented a very high risk of re-offending in domestic relationships, had speculative prospects for treatment, and lacked motivation to obtain treatment.

The Court found no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of the risk or the requirement for positive evidence of the utility of treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder for the brutal beating death of his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement to police, failing to correct Crown closing arguments, and failing to properly instruct the jury on post-offence conduct and mens rea.

He also appealed the 15-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and upholding the sentence due to the severe aggravating factors of the offence.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for a home invasion committed against his ex-wife in the presence of their children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence, which included a three-year probation period, to be fit and even lenient given the horrific nature of the offence.

Although the appellant had taken courses while incarcerated to address anger management and addiction issues, the court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's sentence.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson following the strangulation of his common-law partner and subsequent burning of their home.

He appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was too high given the mitigating factors, including a successful provocation defence.

He also appealed the calculation of his pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-year sentence, finding it was not clearly unreasonable given the aggravating factors of domestic violence and extreme violence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct an error in the pre-sentence custody credit, reducing the net sentence to 6 years and 3 months.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion motivated by a mistaken belief about a marijuana grow operation.

The Crown's case relied on K.G.B. statements from two accomplices who recanted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the verdicts reasonable and upholding the trial judge's decision to take judicial notice of the general location and movement of cell phones based on cell tower signals without expert evidence.

However, the sentence appeal for one appellant was allowed, reducing his sentence from 10 years to 8 years due to his younger age, lesser criminal record, and the parity principle.

The appellant appealed her conviction for fraud over $5000 against her employer and sought leave to appeal her three-year sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in ruling her daughter an adverse witness, allowing improper cross-examination, refusing to edit her criminal record, and failing to inquire into jury observations of her driving outside court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no significant prejudice or unfairness despite some procedural shortcomings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was fit given the $50,000 fraud, her prior record for crimes of dishonesty, and the devastating effect on the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the evidence did not support a finding of lack of consent, there were inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence, and the trial judge erred in finding he was in a position of trust.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons sufficient, the evidence of lack of consent adequate, the treatment of inconsistencies proper, and the finding of a position of trust supported by the evidence.

The respondents were charged with sexual assault.

The trial judge stayed the charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to a 25-month delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date, attributing the delay beyond the Morin guidelines to the Crown's late disclosure.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by failing to deduct 7.5 months for inherent time requirements and by isolating the delay in the Superior Court.

After deducting the intake period, the 17.5-month delay fell within the Morin guidelines.

The stay was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of 14 offences of domestic abuse against his wife and sentenced to an effective term of 10 years and 4 months.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was beyond the acceptable range of 5 to 7 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the absence of mitigating factors and the presence of significant aggravating factors, including excessive violence, offences committed while on probation and bail, and incidents witnessed by children.

The appellant, a former teacher, appealed his convictions for sexual offences involving five former students.

He argued that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof, applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and provided inadequate reasons for rejecting his testimony.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and properly relied on the totality of the evidence, including compelling similar fact evidence from the complainants.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for choking and assault in a domestic violence context.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility, and provided deficient reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not treat the case as a mere credibility contest, and provided adequate reasons for the convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual offences against a child.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to take judicial notice of physical signs of sexual intercourse in a child and by treating his failure to contact his family as after-the-fact conduct indicative of guilt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's refusal to take judicial notice or in his treatment of the after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant appealed his two convictions for assault and his sentence of fourteen months less four months credit for pre-trial custody.

He argued the trial judge failed to consider relevant evidence regarding credibility and failed to give adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not ignore material evidence and provided adequate reasons.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to consider mitigating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge's statement that there were no mitigating factors meant he had considered and rejected them.

Given the young age of the victim, the fact of penetration, and the threat of violence, the sentence was deemed fit, even having regard to the totality principle.

The conviction appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentence was within the acceptable range and the trial judge made no error in principle.

The court noted that this was not a case of a joint submission, and the sentence imposed was not a significant departure from the Crown's suggested range.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.