Court of Appeal for Ontario

CITATION: R. v. May, 2011 ONCA 172

DATE: 20110303

DOCKET: C48922

Before: Moldaver, Cronk and Juriansz JJ.A.

BETWEEN

Her Majesty The Queen

Respondent

and

Robert Dean May

Appellant

Counsel:

Timothy E. Breen and Diana Lumba, for the appellant

Deborah Calderwood, for the respondent

Heard and endorsed: March 2, 2011

On appeal from the dangerous offender finding by Justice Michael Brown of the Superior Court of Justice, dated October 3, 2077 at Whitby, Ontario.

APPEAL BOOK ENDORSEMENT

[1] The sentencing judge gave cogent reasons for concluding that the appellant presents a very high risk of re-offending in domestic relationships. He also found that the appellant’s prospects for treatment are speculative, that he is not motivated to obtain treatment and that he rationalizes his behaviour and does not accept responsibility for the severe psychological harm he inflicts on his domestic partners. The record also indicates an accelerating risk of serious physical harm.

[2] Contrary to the appellant’s submission, the sentencing judge clearly recognized the nature of the particular risk posed by the appellant and the circumstances in which that risk would materialize. The sentencing judge was satisfied that apart from speculation, there was no evidence that the risk posed by the appellant could eventually be effectively managed in the community. That finding is amply supported by the record which, as the sentencing judge observed, establishes among other things:

(1) The appellant’s propensity for violent behaviour towards women with whom he is or has been in a relationship;

(2) His persistent abuse of alcohol;

(3) His poor record while on community supervision;

(4) His anti-social personality disorder and significant psychopathic traits;

(5) His lack of insight into his problems; and

(6) His history of lying, manipulation and deceit.

[3] Nor do we agree that the sentencing judge erred by requiring positive evidence of the utility of treatment. The impugned comments of the sentencing judge simply reflect the state of the record before him.

[4] In all the circumstances, we see no basis for interfering with the sentencing judge’s disposition.

[5] Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.