David Slessor

Joshua Burton was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother and grandmother to death.

This decision concerns the sentencing, specifically determining the period of parole ineligibility.

The Crown sought 18 years, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the nature of the offences, the circumstances surrounding their commission (including the brutality, disposal of bodies, and impact on victims), the offender's character (lack of prior record, but also lack of insight and empathy), and the divided jury recommendations.

The judge imposed a concurrent parole ineligibility period of 17 years for each count, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant was convicted of three counts of murder.

The court previously imposed concurrent life sentences with 25 years of parole ineligibility for the first two counts, adjourning the third count pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bissonnette.

Following the release of Bissonnette, which struck down s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, the court imposed a concurrent life sentence with a concurrent 25-year period of parole ineligibility for the third count.

This decision addresses the parole ineligibility period for the defendant, Cory Fenn, who was convicted of three counts of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought a 72-year parole ineligibility period, while the self-represented defendant requested the minimum 10 years.

The court imposed a 25-year parole ineligibility period for the murders of the intimate partner and one child, finding these acts to be part of a continuous criminal enterprise.

The sentencing for the third murder (of the second child) was adjourned pending the Supreme Court of Canada's decision on the constitutionality of consecutive parole ineligibility periods under section 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

The court emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, particularly in cases involving domestic homicide and abuse of minors, citing the brutal nature of the offences and the defendant's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

The accused was charged with three counts of second-degree murder for the killings of his partner and her two children.

The accused admitted to the killings but argued he lacked the requisite intent for murder due to a cocaine-induced psychosis.

The court rejected the intoxication defence, finding the accused's actions and post-offence conduct inconsistent with a psychotic state.

The court found the accused had the specific intent for murder for all three victims and found him guilty on all counts.

During a trial for three counts of second-degree murder, a voir dire was held to determine the voluntariness of the accused's videotaped statement to police.

The accused, who was self-represented with the assistance of amicus curiae, argued the statement was involuntary due to excessive force during arrest, oppressive conditions in custody, and a lack of an operating mind.

The court found that the police use of force was a reasonable response to the accused's resistance, the custody conditions were not oppressive, and the accused demonstrated an operating mind throughout the interview.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown brought a motion to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct and the deceased's ante-mortem statements in a trial for second-degree murder.

The Crown sought to show the accused's animus and motive by introducing evidence of jealousy, arguing, and prior assaults.

The court applied the tests for prior discreditable conduct and threshold reliability for hearsay.

The court admitted evidence of recent threatening behaviour, jealousy, and a recent assault, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect and the statements met threshold reliability.

However, the court excluded evidence of older alleged assaults and a threat without context, finding them insufficiently reliable or probative.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on an alleged infringement of his right to trial within a reasonable time.

The information was sworn on August 16, 2017, and the trial was scheduled to conclude on June 20, 2019, totaling 673 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan and R. v. Cody to determine whether the delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court identified two key issues: whether delay in retaining counsel constituted defence delay, and whether delays caused by three audits of interpreter translations constituted exceptional circumstances.

The court found that 89 days of defence delay should be deducted for the period when the accused switched between Legal Aid and private counsel retention.

The court also found that all delays caused by the three interpreter audits (totaling 99 days) constituted discrete exceptional events that could not be reasonably mitigated by the Crown or justice system.

After deducting 188 days total, the net delay fell below 18 months, and the application was dismissed.

Hasibullah Sakhiyar, charged with firearm offences, applied for a review of a bail decision that detained him in custody.

The application was a reverse onus bail hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the bail justice did not err in law by failing to apply the "ladder principle" (which is inapplicable to reverse onus hearings), that the original decision was not clearly inappropriate in its weighting of detention grounds, and that the proposed new release plan did not constitute a material and relevant change in circumstances.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting a sleeping woman in her own bedroom during a Christmas party.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9-12 months followed by probation, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 8 months and 24 days (9 months less 7 days credit for collateral consequences) followed by 2 years' probation.

The court found that while the accused was a first offender with mitigating circumstances, the serious aggravating factors—including digital penetration of a sleeping, non-consenting victim in her own home, persistence despite refusal, breach of trust as a guest, and significant ongoing harm to the victim—required incarceration to adequately address denunciation and deterrence.

A conditional sentence was found to be insufficient to reflect the gravity of the offence and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

The defendant was charged with multiple counts of assault, sexual assault, and forcible confinement arising from a domestic relationship spanning from 2004 to 2017.

The trial involved only two witnesses: the complainant and the defendant.

The complainant testified to a series of criminal acts; the defendant denied all allegations.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of both parties' evidence.

Although the judge found the complainant to be largely credible, significant reliability concerns undermined her testimony, including memory blocking, delayed disclosure, lack of corroboration, and inconsistencies between her police statement and trial testimony.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The accused applied for an order permitting him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his upcoming trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the accused's lengthy criminal record and past courtroom outbursts, though acknowledging he was not an escape risk.

The court granted the application, preferring the line of authority that locating an accused outside the prisoner's dock better reflects the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered that the accused be permitted to sit at counsel table, subject to discreet security measures.

The accused was sentenced following conviction for assault causing bodily harm in a domestic violence context.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months imprisonment (credited as seven months and eight days with pre-sentence custody), followed by three years of probation.

The sentence took into account the accused's extensive criminal history involving violent offences dating back to 2007, the domestic nature of the assault, and the demeaning and violent manner in which the assault was perpetrated.

The court credited the accused minimally for time spent on bail release conditions.

The probation order included conditions requiring the accused to keep the peace, report to a probation officer, attend domestic violence counselling programs, maintain no contact with the victim, and remain at least 100 metres from places the victim frequents.

A lifetime weapons prohibition was imposed under section 109 of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order was made.

A $200 victim fine surcharge was imposed with one year to pay.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's witness, an off-duty Toronto Police Constable, testified that the accused deliberately engaged in a pattern of aggressive driving on Highway 401, including sudden lane changes without signalling, aggressive braking, and blocking maneuvers designed to prevent the witness from passing.

The accused testified he had no specific recollection of his driving actions and denied deliberately engaging in dangerous conduct.

The court found the Crown witness credible and reliable, rejected the accused's evidence as vague and inconsistent, and convicted the accused of dangerous driving, finding both the actus reus and mens rea established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving, fail to stop for police, and drive while disqualified arising from a high-speed chase on November 17, 2015.

The Crown sought consecutive sentences totalling 12-15 months, while the defence sought a global 12-month sentence, arguing for reduced sentences due to serious immigration consequences.

The court imposed consecutive sentences totalling 12 months (6 months for impaired driving with 3-month credit for restrictive bail conditions, 4 months for fail to stop for police, and 2 months for drive disqualified), along with a 10-year driving prohibition and 3 years probation.

The court considered collateral immigration consequences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act but ensured sentences remained proportionate to the offences.

The accused was charged with robbery with a knife, possession of a knife for a dangerous purpose, and unlawfully being in a dwelling house arising from a home invasion robbery.

The Crown's case relied primarily on identification evidence from the victim and a witness who called 911.

The victim could not identify the assailants.

The witness provided identification through a 911 call but later testified he only "vaguely" identified the accused based on information from a third party rather than direct observation.

The court found the identification evidence unreliable due to multiple factors including the witness's drug use at the time, significant discrepancies in physical descriptions (particularly height), inconsistencies between the 911 call and trial testimony, and the fleeting nature of the observation.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with assaulting the complainant with a garden clipper, mischief under $5000, threatening the complainant's dog, and theft under $5000.

The defendant pleaded guilty to mischief and threatening the dog.

At trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of assault—one on June 5, 2015 (kicking the complainant in the chest) and one on June 7, 2015 (throwing garden shears at the complainant's face).

The court rejected the defendant's testimony as implausible and internally inconsistent, finding it contradicted by photographic evidence of bruising and the defendant's own voice messages.

The theft charge was dismissed by the Crown.

The defendant sought a stay of prosecution for charges of possession of child pornography, accessing child pornography, and possession of a firearm, alleging a failure by the Crown and police to disclose relevant evidence.

During pre-trial motions, it was revealed that significant information had not been disclosed to the defence, constituting a breach of the defendant's section 7 Charter rights.

The court found no bad faith but acknowledged negligent oversights.

While the Crown conceded a Charter infringement, it argued against a stay of proceedings.

The court dismissed the application for a stay, opting instead to exclude the non-disclosed evidence, allowing the trial to proceed with the remaining evidence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.

At a house party, after the victim attacked him, the defendant repeatedly punched the victim in the head, causing a broken orbital bone requiring plastic surgery and resulting in hospitalization by air ambulance.

The Crown sought a 90-day jail sentence, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected both positions and imposed a four-month conditional sentence with house arrest for the first two months, followed by a curfew for two months, and one year of probation.

The court found that a conditional sentence was appropriate to balance denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, particularly given the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, and positive personal circumstances.

The accused pleaded guilty to attempted theft while armed with bear spray and wearing a mask with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The offences arose from a planned armed robbery attempt on Garda Security guards making a cash delivery of approximately $200,000 to a TD Bank.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of four to five years, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of 18 months to two years less one day.

The court imposed a sentence of four years less pre-trial custody, with enhanced credit for 11 months of pre-trial custody at a rate of 1.5 months per month, resulting in a net sentence of 31.5 months.

The court also imposed a lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture order, no-contact order with victims, and DNA order.

A young person challenged a guilty plea entered for robbery with a handgun, alleging that late disclosure of investigating officer's notes constituted a breach of Charter rights under section 7.

The Crown conceded that the notes should have been disclosed with initial disclosure despite an ongoing Special Investigations Unit investigation.

The court found a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecution standards and awarded costs of $13,000 plus HST against the Crown as a remedy for the constitutional breach.