David Sischy

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) decision terminating his tenancy at a retirement residence for substantially interfering with the reasonable enjoyment of the complex through abusive behaviour towards staff and residents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error of law in the LTB's application of the substantial interference test.

The Court also rejected arguments that the LTB hearing was procedurally unfair or that the LTB failed to properly consider the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic when ordering the eviction.

The Professional Centre brought a motion for summary judgment against The Ottawa Hospital concerning the interpretation of parking provisions in a 49-year lease and related Memorandum of Agreement.

The Professional Centre alleged breaches regarding the availability of 250 parking spaces, remittance of revenue from 40 parking spaces, and unauthorized use of encroaching parking spaces and an access road.

The Hospital denied any breach, asserting it exercised contractual discretion in good faith.

The court dismissed all of the Professional Centre's claims, finding no breach of the lease, that the Hospital had an implied easement over the access road, and that the Professional Centre failed to prove damages, including a high vacancy rate, were caused by the alleged parking issues.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim, arguing the new claims were statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, clarifying that because the motions judge did not finally dispose of the limitations defence, the order was interlocutory.

The defendants remain free to plead the limitations defence in response to the amended claim at trial.

The appellant, a former senior compliance manager at Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD Bank), appealed the dismissal of her application for lack of standing.

She sought to uncover and remedy alleged regulatory infractions and trust breaches by TD Bank in its mutual fund administration, claiming unjust enrichment and wrongful dismissal.

The motion judge dismissed her application, finding she lacked standing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the court's inherent jurisdiction to supervise trusts does not negate standing requirements, that the private interest standing test (requiring a personal and direct interest) was correctly applied, and that the appellant failed to plead facts establishing such standing, including as a constructive trustee.

The court also rejected the argument that public interest standing principles should inform private interest standing or that her whistleblower status conferred standing for private litigation.

Marian Carroll, a former TD employee, brought an application seeking an order to compel The Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries (TD Waterhouse Private Investment Counsel Inc. and TD Asset Management Inc., as Trustees of the TD Mutual Funds Trust and TD Private Funds Trust) to pass their accounts, alleging misconduct and breaches of trust.

The Respondents moved to strike the application for lack of standing.

The court found that Carroll lacked private interest standing as she was not a beneficiary or unitholder and had no direct financial interest in the trusts.

The court also rejected public interest standing, concluding that the application was not a reasonable and effective means to bring the matter before the court, given other available avenues for beneficiaries and regulatory bodies.

The Respondents' motion to strike was granted, and Carroll's application was dismissed with costs.

Staff of the Commission brought a motion to compel the respondents to deliver Witness Summaries of their own anticipated evidence prior to the hearing on the merits.

The respondents argued that they had not yet decided whether to testify and that requiring them to provide summaries before making that decision would violate procedural fairness.

The Commission held that Rule 27(3) of the OSC Rules requires a respondent to deliver a Witness Summary of their own anticipated evidence before the hearing, even if they have not yet decided whether to testify.

The Commission found that this requirement does not violate the duty of fairness and ordered that the respondents may not testify without permission unless they deliver their Witness Summaries by the specified date.

The respondent Sidders brought a motion to sever his hearing from that of the other respondents in an insider trading and tipping case.

He argued that most allegations did not involve him and that a joint hearing would cause prejudice and delay.

The Commission applied the factors from R v Last and concluded that the legal and factual nexus between the transactions, the risk of inconsistent verdicts, and the desire to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings strongly favoured a joint hearing.

The motion for severance was dismissed.

The appellant, a registered representative, appealed an Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) decision that overturned an IIROC Hearing Panel's penalty decision and imposed a two-year suspension of her registration.

The appellant had recommended and facilitated off-book investments in second mortgages without her employer's knowledge or approval, and without ensuring prospectus requirements were met.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OSC's decision to intervene and impose a suspension was reasonable, justified, and within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The Applicants, two registered dealers under common ownership, requested a hearing and review of a Director's Decision that imposed terms and conditions on their registrations due to a long history of compliance deficiencies.

The Ontario Securities Commission found that the Applicants had failed to comply with Ontario securities law in numerous respects over a period of years, including inadequate governance, failure to instill a culture of compliance, inadequate compliance resources, and recurring deficiencies.

The Commission confirmed the Director's Decision and ordered that each firm retain an independent consultant to review and improve their compliance systems.

Following dismissal of an employee’s action alleging multiple breaches of an employment agreement, the employer sought costs of the action.

The employer relied on earlier offers to settle and argued it should receive substantial indemnity costs after the first refused offer.

The court held that elevated costs outside Rule 49.10 require reprehensible or egregious conduct by the opposing party.

Finding no such conduct and noting the action was hard fought but not frivolous, the court declined substantial indemnity costs and instead awarded a reduced amount under Rule 57.01.

The plaintiff, a successful retail stockbroker, sued his former employer for breach of contract, alleging he was owed a 10% finder's fee on several large corporate finance transactions under an April 11, 2006 agreement.

The court found that the agreement was exclusively a retail document and did not apply to transactions involving the employer's Capital Markets group.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for negligent overpayment of his assistant, unjust enrichment, bad faith, and entitlement to unvested deferred stock units.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act for a proposed securities class action.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the company's ability to maintain its dividend, causing shareholders and debenture-holders to sustain losses when the dividend was cut.

The court dismissed the leave motion, finding no reasonable possibility that the secondary market misrepresentation claims would succeed at trial, as the defendants' statements were based on a genuine belief in their growth strategy at the time.

The court also dismissed the certification motion, holding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure for the remaining common law negligent misrepresentation claims, which require individualized proof of reliance.

The Ontario Securities Commission held a sanctions and costs hearing following a merits decision finding that the respondents engaged in unregistered trading and fraudulent conduct.

Gillani and the Corporate Respondents, who orchestrated a sophisticated scheme that defrauded investors, were ordered to pay a $1 million administrative penalty, disgorge $719,000, pay $200,000 in costs, and were permanently banned from the capital markets.

Driscoll, who acted in furtherance of trades by recruiting investors but was not involved in the fraud, was ordered to disgorge $66,000 in commissions, pay a $30,000 administrative penalty and $15,000 in costs, and received a conditional two-year market ban.

The moving defendant sought summary judgment dismissing the action on the basis that the claim was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged that a former business partner misrepresented that a joint electricity transmission project had been abandoned while secretly continuing the project through other corporations.

The court held that the discoverability principle applied and that the plaintiff did not learn facts giving rise to the claim until after a reporter’s inquiry in 2007, after which he conducted due diligence.

On the record before the court, there was evidence capable of supporting a discoverability date after April 2007, making the 2009 action potentially timely.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed and substantial indemnity costs were awarded due to the unmeritorious nature of the motion.

Following a trial judgment awarding over $16 million to the plaintiff in a commercial dispute, the court determined the appropriate costs award and prejudgment interest.

The court held that although the plaintiff’s Rule 49 offer was served slightly outside the formal timing requirements, it could still be considered under Rules 57.01 and 49.13.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date of the settlement offer and for work responding to a serious trading‑manipulation allegation later abandoned by the defendant.

However, the court found the plaintiff’s claimed hours excessive and reduced the requested fees.

The court fixed total fees at $1,400,000 inclusive of taxes, allowed disbursements of $191,813, and awarded prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date the cause of action arose.

The plaintiff, a junior oil and gas exploration company, sued the defendant underwriter for breach of a 'bought deal' engagement letter.

The defendant failed to close the transaction, arguing the letter was merely an agreement to agree and relying on 'out clauses' due to a drop in oil prices.

The court found the engagement letter was a binding contract and that the defendant could not rely on the out clauses, as it had not negotiated an underwriting agreement and the drop in oil prices did not constitute a material adverse change or disaster.

The plaintiff was awarded over $16 million in damages, representing the difference between the contract price and the replacement financing price, plus interim loan costs.

Following a successful motion removing a litigation guardian and counsel due to conflict of interest, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful defendants sought approximately $19,500 in costs.

The court considered whether costs should be ordered personally against the litigation guardian who defended the motion rather than against the incapable plaintiff represented by the guardian.

Relying on jurisprudence concerning the role and protection of litigation guardians, the court held that personal cost consequences should generally not be imposed absent bad faith or frivolous conduct.

The motion had been defended unsuccessfully but not improperly, and costs were therefore awarded against the plaintiffs rather than personally against the litigation guardian.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff's litigation guardian and her solicitors of record due to conflicts of interest.

The litigation guardian, who is the plaintiff's daughter, was also defending a third-party claim brought by the defendants, creating a conflict between her personal interests and her duties to the plaintiff.

The solicitors of record represented the daughter in both her capacity as litigation guardian and personally as a third party.

The court found that both the litigation guardian and the law firm were in an irreparable conflict of interest and ordered their removal.