David L. Corbett

In the context of numerous proceedings involving a vexatious litigant, the respondent sought the recusal of the case management judge and failed to comply with previous court directions, citing an intention to appeal.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction, noted that the judgment is not stayed pending appeal without a specific order from the Court of Appeal, and directed the respondent to comply with the required materials by a final deadline, failing which the underlying litigation would proceed based on her non-compliance.

In a supplementary judgment following a family law trial, the court addressed two outstanding property equalization issues that were not decided in the main judgment.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $6,946.41 to the applicant for her share of the net proceeds from the sale of a condominium.

The court deferred the issue of a $53,764.73 RRSP spousal rollover, directing the parties to address it during oral submissions on costs.

The court also appended a list of typographical corrections to the main judgment.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on two counts of first-degree murder and committing him only on second-degree murder.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by impermissibly weighing evidence, assessing pieces of evidence in isolation, and selecting between competing inferences rather than accepting the inferences most favourable to the Crown.

The application was granted, the discharge was quashed, and the matter was remitted to commit the accused on two counts of first-degree murder.

The appellant appealed the calculation of damages from a successful summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal against his former employer.

He argued the motions judge erred by not awarding overtime, statutory holiday, and vacation pay.

The Divisional Court upheld the motions judge's finding that the parties agreed to average hours of work, despite the employer's technical non-compliance with the notice requirements of the Canada Labour Code.

The court found the non-compliance caused no prejudice to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties separated after a 10.5-year relationship.

The respondent, a high-earning cardiac surgeon, continued to deposit his income into a joint account managed by the applicant for seven years post-separation.

In 2008, the parties signed a separation agreement providing the applicant with $29,000 per month in indefinite spousal support.

The respondent sought to set aside the agreement and claim damages for breach of fiduciary duty regarding the applicant's use of the joint funds.

The court dismissed the fiduciary duty claim, finding no such duty existed between the spouses in these circumstances.

While the court upheld the separation agreement as valid under the Family Law Act, it applied the Miglin framework to override the spousal support provisions under the Divorce Act.

The court found the support quantum was based on significant tax defalcation and far exceeded the applicant's entitlement.

Spousal support was terminated after a short transition period.

The appellant faced criminal charges for sexual assault and was also sued civilly by the complainant.

In the civil action, the appellant obtained discovery evidence, which his civil counsel shared with his criminal counsel to impeach the complainant at the criminal trial.

The motion judge ruled that the appellant needed court leave under rule 30.1(8) to use the evidence for impeachment and that sharing it with criminal counsel breached the deemed undertaking.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that rule 30.1(6) permits the use of discovery evidence for impeachment without prior court authorization, and that sharing the evidence with legal advisors does not breach the undertaking.

The applicants, Saugeen First Nation and Chippewas of Nawash Unceded First Nation, sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to issue a limestone quarry license to the respondent proponent.

The applicants argued the Crown failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate their Aboriginal and treaty rights.

The Divisional Court found that while the duty to consult was triggered and assessed at the middle of the spectrum, the Crown failed to discharge this duty by repeatedly changing its consultation process, failing to provide agreed-upon capacity funding for expert reviews, and prematurely issuing the license.

The application was allowed, the license was set aside, and the matter was remitted for adequate consultation.

This family law trial addressed child custody, access, travel documents, divorce, imputation of income, child and spousal support, and equalization of property.

The respondent's pleadings regarding financial and property issues were struck due to non-compliance with disclosure orders.

The court granted joint custody with primary residence to the applicant, established specific access terms, and ordered the parties to obtain a divorce in Ontario, refusing to recognize a prior Sri Lankan divorce obtained for deceptive purposes.

The court imputed income to the respondent, ordered significant retroactive and prospective child and spousal support, and determined equalization of property, setting off the equalization payment against support arrears.

The respondent's constructive trust claim over the matrimonial home was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from soliciting customers and making defamatory statements.

The parties agreed to adjourn the main motion, but the court had to decide a jurisdiction challenge and a request for an interim injunction.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction, as the exclusive forum clause in the parties' recent Termination Agreement superseded the Quebec forum clause in their earlier Dealership Agreement.

However, the court denied the interim injunction, finding that the plaintiffs' year-long delay in bringing the motion undermined their claim of irreparable harm pending the return of the main motion.

The appellant general contractor appealed an order reducing the security required to bond its construction liens off title from over $32 million to approximately $13.8 million.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that an order reducing lien security under section 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act is a final order, not interlocutory.

On the merits, the court upheld the motions judge's finding that the appellant improperly calculated its lien claim on a 'costs plus' basis despite having a fixed price contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The applicant sought a stay of small claims court proceedings pending an application for judicial review of a deputy judge's interlocutory order granting an adjournment on terms, specifically an order for particulars.

The Divisional Court denied the motion for a stay and quashed the application for judicial review, holding that judicial review of interlocutory small claims court decisions is restricted to narrow jurisdictional issues.

The court found no jurisdictional error in the order for particulars and concluded the application was manifestly devoid of merit.

The applicant police officer faced misconduct allegations under the Police Services Act.

He brought a motion for the hearing officer to recuse himself due to alleged bias and lack of jurisdiction, which the hearing officer dismissed.

The applicant then commenced an application for judicial review.

The Chief of Police moved to quash the application on the basis of prematurity.

The Divisional Court granted the motion and quashed the application, holding that judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions is only available in exceptional cases, which this was not.

The appellant purchased a used car from the respondent that proved defective.

At trial in Small Claims Court, the appellant was awarded repair costs but denied damages for a 34-month car rental and a full refund.

The appellant cross-appealed the damages and costs awards.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the lengthy rental costs were unforeseeable, rescission was not pleaded, and costs were appropriately capped at 15 percent under the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance concerning the employer's amendment to its photo identification policy.

The amendment discontinued the practice of allowing non-management employees to bring an occasional visitor on transit vehicles without paying a fare.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable, as the plain wording did not require consideration of past practice.

The Court also found that the arbitrator reasonably concluded the employer's past practice did not give rise to an estoppel, as there was no representation by the employer that the practice would continue.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation claim against a hotel and its night manager.

The claim arose from a log entry made by the manager describing the appellant and her husband as 'very intoxicated' and belligerent during a late-night dispute over a hotel room.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was not intoxicated, the description of her belligerent behaviour was justified and the log entry was protected by qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions on justification, qualified privilege, and the absence of malice.

The lien claimants appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's mortgage had priority over their construction liens.

The respondent challenged the Divisional Court's jurisdiction, arguing the priority decision was not a 'judgment' under the Construction Lien Act.

The court held it had jurisdiction because the priority decision was a final order.

On the merits, the court upheld the motions judge's factual finding that the mortgage funds were advanced to the owner as a joint borrower, rather than merely serving as collateral security, thereby giving the mortgage priority under section 78(6) of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's damages award in an undefended defamation action involving statements made by his nephew on Facebook.

The appellant sought $1,000,000 in damages, arguing the trial judge's award of $30,000 in general and aggravated damages was too low.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error and the award was within the appropriate range for personal defamation.

The appeal was allowed only to rectify typographical errors in the formal judgment to reflect the trial judge's actual award and to add pre-judgment interest.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order that found they breached a settlement agreement regarding trademark infringement and directed a reference to fix damages.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court held that under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act, an order directing a reference for damages where the claim exceeds $50,000 does not fall within the Divisional Court's monetary jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction and transferred to the Court of Appeal.

Lang Michener LLP was entirely successful on a motion and counterclaim for professional fees against Gregory P. King.

The counterclaim involved serious allegations against senior counsel and sought indemnity for an Italian judgment, making it a substantial and complex piece of litigation.

The court fixed Lang Michener's costs of the motion and counterclaim at $45,000, applying the proportionality principle and considering the seriousness and complexity of the issues.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the defendants were substantially, but not entirely, successful, having secured the dismissal of two out of three claims.

The defendants sought two-thirds of their partial indemnity costs, calculated at $12,877.35.

The plaintiff argued that costs should be deferred to the trial judge or that no costs should be awarded due to divided success.

The court found the defendants' claim for costs to be entirely reasonable and ordered the plaintiff to pay the specified amount within 30 days.