David Chernos

This costs endorsement followed a motion with divided success.

The applicant succeeded on minor issues (dismissing a sealing order motion), while the respondent succeeded on the major issue (establishing privilege over documents and obtaining an order for their delivery/destruction).

The court found the major issue occupied significantly more time.

Applying Family Law Rule 24(6), the court apportioned costs, awarding them to the respondent due to greater success on the major issue.

The applicant's failure to provide a costs outline, while criticizing the respondent's counsel's time investment, was noted as an 'attack in the air'.

The respondent's costs outline was deemed reasonable given the complexity and effort involved.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $81,275.65 in costs.

The respondent, Eli Dadouch, brought a motion seeking the return and destruction of solicitor-client privileged notes surreptitiously photographed by the applicant, Anita Bielak, and for orders sealing the court file and restraining the applicant from discussing the litigation with their adult children.

The court found the notes to be privileged and ordered their return and destruction.

However, the court dismissed the requests for a sealing order and a gag order, emphasizing the principle of open courts and the impracticality of such an order given the adult children's awareness and the need for therapeutic, not legal, intervention for their distress.

The defendant, The Corporation of the City of Brampton, brought a summary judgment motion seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action, but later abandoned it.

The plaintiff, Inzola Group Limited, sought costs for the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to partial indemnity costs for the period up to September 2016 and substantial indemnity costs for the period between September and November 2016, concluding that the defendant acted unreasonably in delaying the abandonment of the motion after critical evidence emerged.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the defendant to the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs in two related actions brought motions for the production of information by the corporate defendants under the Business Corporations Act.

The parties settled the motions 'except for costs' and filed written costs submissions.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motions were unnecessary as the defendants ultimately consented to the relief sought.

The court declined to award costs, holding that costs generally should not be awarded when parties settle 'except for costs.' The court reasoned that determining costs in such circumstances would require a hypothetical adjudication of the merits, which is an inefficient use of judicial resources and runs counter to the principle that costs are an incident of the determination of rights, not the subject matter of the dispute itself.

The parties contacted the court following the release of the Reasons for Judgment to advise that the consent damages calculation of $2,214,895.00 inadvertently omitted a one-time payment of $562,000.00.

The court issued an addendum amending the damages awarded to the plaintiffs to $2,776,895.00.

The deceased, Albert Latner, commenced two actions against his son Joshua and Joshua's company.

The first action sought payments owed under a written support agreement.

The second action sought the return of a $13 million payment, claiming it was held on a resulting trust.

The estate continued the actions after Albert's death.

The court allowed the first action, finding that an alleged oral waiver of the support payments violated the parol evidence rule and the agreement's entire agreement clause.

The court dismissed the second action, finding that the defendants successfully rebutted the presumption of resulting trust by proving the $13 million was intended as a gift to equalize financial treatment among the children.

The appellant employee deleted and took confidential information upon the breakdown of her employment.

The respondent employer sued and moved for an injunction.

The parties negotiated a settlement, but a dispute arose over whether the agreement included a full forensic sweep of the appellant's devices.

The respondent insisted on the sweep and adjourned its injunction motion, while the appellant claimed the respondent had repudiated the settlement.

The motion judge found a binding settlement without the forensic sweep term and held the respondent had not repudiated it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the respondent's insistence on the term and its steps to preserve the status quo via the injunction did not objectively evince an intention not to be bound by the settlement agreement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to extensive undertakings and refusals arising from discoveries in a municipal procurement action alleging biased disqualification, misleading of council, and improper favouring of the successful bidder.

The court imposed a staged timetable for outstanding undertakings, rejected the respondent's request for a lengthy extension, and held that certain questions said to require expert analysis instead sought fact evidence.

On refusals, the court required narrower questioning regarding the Integrity Commissioner's investigations, ordered production and answers concerning the final agreements with the successful bidder, and held that communications between municipal councillors and counsel were not protected by solicitor-client privilege solely because councillors were decision-makers.

Applying litigation privilege principles, the court required disclosure of non-privileged communications and particulars for any privilege claims, while resolving the remaining refusals on a question-by-question basis.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a $52,000 costs order made against them following their successful motion to amend the statement of claim.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge misapplied the 'indulgence' principle by awarding costs against the successful moving party.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the highly discretionary, fact-specific costs award.

The court held the stringent test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4) was not met.

The defendant accountant sought leave to appeal an order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim to add a new claim against him.

The defendant argued the new claim was statute-barred and that the motion judge erred in leaving the issue of discoverability to the trial judge without requiring sufficient evidence from the plaintiffs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, as the jurisprudence establishes that factual disputes regarding discoverability on a Rule 26.01 motion should generally be left to the trial judge.

The plaintiff employer brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking judgment enforcing a settlement allegedly reached through email exchanges with a former employee.

The dispute concerned whether the parties had agreed to a settlement and, if so, the scope of an IT consultant’s work to delete and certify the destruction of confidential electronic information taken by the employee prior to departure.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement through their email correspondence, despite subsequent disagreement when counsel attempted to draft formal minutes of settlement.

Interpreting the emails objectively, the court concluded the parties had agreed to the employee’s proposed process for wiping devices, but using the employer’s chosen IT consultant at the employee’s cost.

The employer’s later insistence on a broader “full sweep” did not amount to repudiation of the settlement.

Judgment was granted enforcing the settlement on the terms determined by the court.

In complex estate and commercial litigation arising from estate planning transactions and a will that effectively disinherited family members, the plaintiffs sought leave to further amend their statement of claim to add allegations of knowing assistance in breach of trust and fiduciary duty against an accountant and additional particulars against other defendants.

Several defendants opposed the amendment on the basis of prejudice and limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure leave to amend should be granted unless non-compensable prejudice would result, and that disputes about discoverability and limitation periods should be determined by the trial judge on a full evidentiary record.

As discoveries were ongoing and trial remained more than a year away, any prejudice could be addressed through costs.

Leave to amend was granted with costs awarded to certain defendants for prejudice arising from the amendments.

A non‑party developer sought a protective order restricting disclosure of its financial and project financing documents produced in litigation concerning a municipal RFP process.

The moving party argued the information was confidential and that disclosure to a competitor should be limited to counsel and experts and sealed from the public record.

Applying the test in Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), the court held the evidence did not establish a real and substantial risk of harm or a sufficiently important commercial interest.

The court emphasized the open court principle and the public interest in transparency where allegations of political influence and misconduct in a municipal procurement process were raised.

The motion for a protective and sealing order was dismissed, though the court ordered reciprocal disclosure of equivalent financial documents relating to the plaintiff’s proposal.

The appellant, Jetport Inc., appealed a Master's order regarding discovery refusals in three related actions arising from an aviation insurance coverage dispute.

The court allowed the appeal in part, ordering the respondent insurer to answer questions about its course of conduct with other insureds regarding policy exemptions, finding them relevant to the pleadings.

The court also relieved the appellant from answering a question about claims against other third parties, as it was not relevant to mitigation.

However, the court upheld the Master's order requiring the appellant to answer questions about whether its employee sought legal advice from in-house counsel regarding a pilot clause, finding that disclosing the fact of such discussions did not breach solicitor-client privilege.

The appellant appealed a case management master's order compelling answers to various discovery questions in litigation arising from the crash of a Bombardier Global 5000 aircraft and a subsequent insurance coverage dispute.

The appellant argued the questions were irrelevant because the case turned solely on contractual interpretation of a pilot training clause and also asserted statutory privilege over information related to a Transportation Safety Board investigation.

The court held that the circumstances of the accident, pilot training, and statements provided to the Transportation Safety Board were relevant to issues raised in the pleadings, including whether simulator time satisfied the contractual pilot training requirement.

The court further held the statutory privilege argument was improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, in any event, the public interest in the proper administration of justice outweighed the claimed privilege.

The master's discovery orders were upheld.

Following the dismissal of appeals from a master's decision rejecting claims of litigation privilege, the court determined costs.

The responding parties sought partial indemnity costs reflecting significant legal work and extensive materials filed on the appeal.

The court applied the principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that costs must be fair and reasonable and should reflect the parties’ reasonable expectations.

The court rejected arguments that the large volume of materials filed by the appellant should influence the award and noted that the appellant advanced an arguable legal position without misconduct.

The court awarded $8,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and tax to each group of respondents.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of a defamation action against an unknown defendant and sought default judgment.

The defendant had posted numerous anonymous defamatory statements about the plaintiff online, continued publishing further statements after the action commenced, refused to identify himself despite a court order, and was noted in default.

The court held that the registrar’s dismissal should be set aside because the plaintiff had received no notice and had not been dilatory.

The court found the statements plainly defamatory and entered judgment in default.

The plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

Appeal from a Master's order compelling production of communications and answers on discovery despite a claim of litigation privilege.

The appellant argued that emails and a meeting with its insurance broker were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation following denial of insurance coverage for an aircraft crash.

The court held that the appellant failed to establish an evidentiary basis that the dominant purpose of the communications was litigation, noting that the available evidence suggested the discussions focused on advancing the insurance claim rather than preparing for litigation.

The court further held that any common interest litigation privilege between the insured and the broker would have been dissolved once the insured commenced an action against the broker.

The Master's order compelling disclosure was upheld.

The applicant sought an order under s. 6 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 referring a contractual dispute to arbitration under a specific multi‑party arbitration procedure contained in a power supply contract.

The respondent agreed the dispute should proceed to arbitration but argued that a different contractual arbitration clause governed, requiring a single arbitrator to determine issues of contractual interpretation before any broader arbitration process could be triggered.

The court interpreted the contract as containing both a universal arbitration clause for general disputes and a limited clause applicable only if certain economic conditions were established.

The court held the dispute concerned interpretation of the agreement and therefore fell within the general arbitration clause.

The motion was dismissed and the matter directed to proceed before a sole arbitrator.

Appeals and cross-appeals arising from the collapses of two airlines operating leased aircraft and leaving substantial unpaid airport and civil air navigation charges.

The Court held that legal titleholders were not personally liable for unpaid navigation charges under s. 55 of the Civil Air Navigation Services Commercialization Act because 'owner' was limited to persons with legal custody, control, or possession in the statutory context.

However, the seizure and detention remedies under s. 56 of that Act and s. 9 of the Airport Transfer (Miscellaneous Matters) Act operated against aircraft owned or operated by the defaulting airlines and could not be defeated by leasing arrangements or by separating attached engines.

The remedies extended to security posted in substitution for the aircraft, subject to the motions judges’ supervisory discretion to craft fair terms.

Interest continued to run until payment, posting of security, or bankruptcy.