Christopher Joseph Henderson

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the respondent municipality.

The applicant, a community organization, sought judicial review of an Ontario Land Tribunal decision dismissing their request to reconsider a zoning by-law amendment.

The amendment permitted a housing development for people leaving homelessness on a property already containing seniors' housing.

The applicant argued the development should be restricted to seniors leaving homelessness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable and consistent with the Provincial Planning Statement, as restricting zoning by age would violate equality rights.

The Court also found no procedural unfairness despite inappropriate submissions by the respondent's counsel, though it denied costs to the successful respondent as a result.

The plaintiff's action against the City of Toronto and several individuals was dismissed by the court on its own motion under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the statement of claim lacked material facts against some defendants, was brought far outside the limitation period for events dating back to 1996-2000, contained serious but unsubstantiated allegations, and represented a re-litigation of matters previously decided against the plaintiff in numerous prior proceedings and appeals.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, on referral from the registrar's office following a request from the defendants, reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 for being frivolous and vexatious.

The court found the claim appeared to be frivolous and vexatious and ordered that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

Pending the outcome of this review, the plaintiff's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and further filings were restricted.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal from a Divisional Court order that had allowed appeals from a Superior Court order.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the Divisional Court's reasoning and conclusions, dismissing the appeal.

The parties also agreed on an all-inclusive costs award of $35,000 payable by the appellant to the respondents, covering all levels of court proceedings, including the motion for leave to appeal.

The applicant sought a declaration that the proposed use of a property as a municipal shelter was not permitted under Toronto's zoning by-laws, arguing it was not a permitted use and that a proposed patio was prohibited.

The respondents asserted the matter should have been brought as an appeal under the Building Code Act, 1992, and that the intended use was permitted.

The court found the proceeding was properly an appeal of the chief building official's decision, not a Rule 14 application.

The court affirmed the chief building official's decision, finding no error in the determination that the shelter use was permitted and that the patio issue was premature as no final decision had been made on it.

The applicants, who are neighbours of the respondent property owner, sought judicial review of a Committee of Adjustment decision approving minor variances.

Following legislative amendments that removed third-party appeal rights to the local appeal body, the applicants argued they had public interest standing to seek judicial review and alleged procedural unfairness and inadequate reasons.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicants lacked public interest standing, were afforded adequate procedural fairness, and that the Committee's reasons were sufficient when read in context.

The City of Toronto and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision holding that 'Air Parcels'—stratified parcels starting above the ground—are not 'land' under the Assessment Act until fixed to the ground.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that at common law, real property includes the air space above the ground.

The court held that the statutory definition of 'land' in the Assessment Act expanded upon, rather than restricted, the common law definition.

Consequently, the severed air parcels qualify as 'land' and are subject to assessment and taxation even before any structures are built.

The applicant sought a determination on whether an "air parcel" constitutes assessable "land" under section 1(1) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

A.31.

The court concluded that an air parcel, as defined in a strata plan, is not "land" for the purposes of the Act until a physical structure is affixed to the ground.

The decision emphasized that the statutory definition of "land" is paramount, not common law or conveyancing practices, and that legislative amendment would be required to include air parcels for taxation.

The applicant's request for an order was granted, and costs were awarded.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Toronto Local Appeal Body (TLAB) Chair, who had cancelled a TLAB member's decision granting the appellants' application for property severance and minor variances.

The appellants argued they were denied procedural fairness during the review process and that the Chair applied an incorrect standard of review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the TLAB met its duty of procedural fairness by providing notice and an opportunity to make submissions, and that the Chair applied the correct standard of review by identifying compelling grounds of jurisdictional and factual errors before substituting his own findings.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) that approved a zoning by-law amendment to permit a 14-storey hotel, which required the demolition of two buildings designated by the City under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The LPAT, acting exclusively under the Planning Act, found the buildings had no cultural heritage value and approved the rezoning conditional on the developer obtaining a demolition permit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the LPAT exceeded its jurisdiction by impugning the legality of the City's heritage designation under the Ontario Heritage Act while purporting to exercise powers exclusively under the Planning Act.

The applicants, commercial real estate developers, sought judicial review of a decision by the City of Toronto Council to deny their applications for property tax rebate grants under a community improvement plan by-law.

The applicants argued that because their projects met the threshold eligibility criteria, the City was required to approve the grants.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the by-law and governing legislation conferred broad discretion on the Council to consider other factors, including whether the grants were economically necessary for the projects to proceed.

The Court also found no denial of procedural fairness and awarded costs to the City.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her action against the City of Toronto and its representative regarding property tax arrears.

The motion judge had found her claims were statute-barred and that the City was entitled to collect the arrears.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in his conclusions, demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, and should not have granted summary judgment while her claim against her former solicitor remained outstanding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors, no reasonable apprehension of bias, and no risk of conflicting judgments.

The applicant residents' associations sought leave to appeal a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal decision that approved a revised development proposal to demolish three houses and build a low-rise apartment in a Heritage Conservation District.

The applicants argued the tribunal made errors of law by deferring to the City's demolition approval under the Ontario Heritage Act, treating demolition as conservation, and failing to assign a higher heritage rating to one of the houses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the tribunal applied the correct legal tests and that the applicants' challenges were directed at findings of fact and mixed fact and law, which are not subject to appeal.

The appellant brought two motions: one to set aside a costs order made by a single judge on an abandoned motion for leave to appeal, and another for leave to appeal a reconsideration decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions.

The court found no error in the costs order, noting the appellant could have simply requested reasons under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act instead of bringing a motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal the tribunal's decision, agreeing that the appellant lacked standing under s. 34(19) of the Planning Act because he did not make oral or written submissions at the statutory public meeting.

The applicant brought an application for a declaration that a right-of-way granted by the respondent municipality in 1971 included the right to permit parking on the property.

The municipality argued the right-of-way only allowed for access and egress.

The court applied principles of contract and easement interpretation, considering the historical context and subsequent conduct of the parties.

The court declared that the right-of-way included the ancillary right to permit parking to access commercial premises, provided it was non-exclusive and did not amount to occupation.

The applicant sought to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of his appeal for delay and requested a 30-day extension of time to perfect his appeal from Superior Court orders dated June 11 and August 7, 2013.

Justice Cronk dismissed the motion and granted the respondent's cross-motion prohibiting the applicant from bringing further motions in the proceeding, except for a motion to a full panel to review Cronk J.A.'s decision.

This panel decision confirms Cronk J.A.'s order, finding no merit to the applicant's submissions regarding lack of competent jurisdiction or denial of due process.

The appellants built an addition to their home without a building permit.

After years of litigation, the City obtained an order under the Building Code Act authorizing an inspection of the addition.

The appellants appealed, arguing that the inspection would violate the section 7 Charter rights of the elderly parents living in the home.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the inspection would endanger the parents' lives and noting that the City was fulfilling its statutory duty to ensure public safety.

The applicant contractor sought an interim injunction staying the City of Toronto Chief Purchasing Official's decision to temporarily suspend it from bidding on city contracts.

The suspension was based on performance issues that occurred before the new Supplier Code of Conduct took effect.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding the applicant established a strong prima facie case that the Chief Purchasing Official lacked authority to suspend for conduct predating the Code, and that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if unable to bid on imminent solicitations.

The appellant municipality appealed a summary judgment finding it owed a duty of care to a class of tenants to provide statutory notices of rent reductions following property tax decreases.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the municipality's specific interactions with the tenants through a pilot project created sufficient relational proximity to establish a prima facie duty of care.

The court further found no residual policy reasons to negate this duty, as the claim was limited to a specific group and did not conflict with the municipality's statutory obligations.

The municipality's failure to send the required notices breached the standard of care.