Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CV-24-00723147-0000 Date: 2024-07-25 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Re: William Gallos, Plaintiff -and- The City of Toronto, Tom Jakobek, Ann Borouah, Ted Tipping, Donna Perrin, Defendants

Before: Robert Centa J.

Counsel: William Gallos, self-represented litigant Christopher Henderson, for the defendants

Heard: July 25, 2024

Endorsement

[1] On July 11, 2024, I directed the registrar to provide notice to the plaintiff, William Gallos that I had reviewed the statement of claim and was considering dismissing the action as frivolous or vexatious or an abuse of the court’s process. The registrar notified Mr. Gallos of my concerns and invited him to provide any submissions within 15 days. Mr. Gallos provided his submissions, which I have reviewed.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I dismiss this action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.

Rule 2.1

[3] Rule 2.1.01 permits the court to stay or dismiss a proceeding if the proceeding appears on its face to be frivolous or vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process of the court. In Gao v. Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board), 2014 ONSC 6100, Myers J. explained:

Rule 2.1 is not meant to apply to close calls. It is not a short form of summary judgment. But that does not mean that it is not to be robustly interpreted and applied. Where a proceeding appears on its face to meet the standards of frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of process, the court should be prepared to rigorously enforce the rule to nip the proceeding in the bud. Rigorous enforcement of this rule will not only protect respondents from incurring unrecoverable costs, but should positively contribute to access to justice by freeing up judicial and administrative resources that are so acutely needed to implement the “culture shift” mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada. The new rule tailors appropriate procedural fairness for the category of cases involved and is an example of early resolution of civil cases that is very much in line with the goals set out in Hryniak.

[4] The Court of Appeal approved of this approach in Scaduto v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2015 ONCA 733.

[5] A frivolous or vexatious motion lacks a legal basis or legal merit or has been brought without reasonable grounds. Frivolous and vexatious proceedings are often identified by, among other features, their use of rambling language which makes discerning a legitimate cause of action very difficult: Van Sluytman v. Orillia Soldiers' Memorial Hospital, 2017 ONSC 692, at para. 11.

[6] The court is not to use rule 2.1.01 for close calls. However, neither the opposing parties nor the court should be required to devote scarce resources to proceedings or motions that are clearly frivolous and vexatious. Allowing such proceedings to occupy space on the court docket takes time away from other, more meritorious cases. There is simply no benefit to allowing clearly frivolous and vexatious proceedings to continue: Dunning v. Colliers Macaulay Nicolls Inc., 2023 ONSC 73, at para. 26; Foley v. Victoria Hospital London Health Services Centre, 2023 ONSC 4978, at para. 5.

The action is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process

[7] Mr. Gallos issued the statement of claim in this proceeding on July 3, 2024. He sued the City of Toronto, former councillor Tom Jakobek, Ann Borouah, Ted Tipping, and Donna Perring. Mr. Gallos sought judgment of $250,000 against the defendants and an order “compelling the City of Toronto to reissue a building permit.” The key paragraphs of the statement of clam read as follows:

1. City counsellor [sic] Tom Jakobek mislead the City in issues stated in the city's omitted memorandum dated December 5th 1996.
2. Tom Jakobek caused illegally shutting down my restaurant.
3. Tom Jakobek caused arson to my restaurant.
4. Tom Jakobek emptied his neighbouring building before setting mine on fire.
5. Tom Jakobek caused the Plaintiff to be charged under a bylaw that did not exist.
6. The City of Toronto failed to make full and timely disclosure of facts relied on to charge the plaintiff.
7. The City executives charged the plaintiff without an application record in order to effect conviction of the plaintiff.
8. The City executives placed undue evidence on the fire marshal in attempt to frustrate his investigations.
9. The city executives illegally entered my property and caused severe damages.
10. The City executives attempted to obstruct the course of justice by contacting the court of appeal with false information.
11. The City caused the police to falsely charge me with alcohol related charges.
12. All defendants conspired between themselves to injure the plaintiff, his business, and property.
13. All defendants conspired not to allow the plaintiff to cause after fire restoration to his building.

[8] As noted above, on July 19, 2024, Mr. Gallos provided written submissions in response to my invitation to address my concerns that the claim was frivolous and vexatious. His submissions, in their entirety, read as follows:

1. My claim is neither frivolous nor vexatious.
2. Irregularity does not declare a document void.
3. The complaining counsel is not acting for all defendants and should not be asking to dismiss a claim against individuals who have not retained him as counsel
4. Dismissing the claim at this stage would put the administration of justice into disrepute.
5. The Request to dismiss without delivering a defense and conducting an examination for discovery is in my respectful submission is premature and has no legs to stand on.

I respectfully ask for an order allowing my action to proceed even without prejudice to the requester to take further steps as he sees proper but only after a defense is delivered.

[9] I find that the action is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of the court’s process for the following four reasons.

[10] First, there are no material facts pleaded about the defendants Ann Borouah, Ted Tipping, and Donna Perring. The only place those names appear is in the title of proceedings. The action against those defendants is frivolous in the sense that it cannot possibly succeed and it is vexatious in the sense that they should not be dragged into litigation in the absence of a factual nexus to any of the alleged injuries suffered by the plaintiff.

[11] Second, the action appears to be brought far outside the two-year limitation period provided for in the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c 24, Sch B. Mr. Gallos pleads that Mr. Jakobek misled the City of Toronto about a memorandum dated December 5, 1996. Mr. Jakobek has not been a member of the council of the City of Toronto since 2000. Mr. Gallos has pleaded no facts and made no submissions to explain how his action in 2024 is not barred by the provisions of the Limitations Act.

[12] Third, Mr. Gallos has made very serious allegations against Mr. Jakobek and others but has pleaded no material facts in support of those allegations. Pleading a claim in this manner is vexatious.

[13] Fourth, Mr. Gallos appears to have litigated some or all of these matters previously and to do have done so in a way that appears to be vexatious. All previous actions have been decided against him and all his appeals, and attempts to re-open appeals, have also been dismissed. See, for example,

a. Toronto (City) v. Gallos, 2008 ONCA 617, application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed [2009] 1 S.C.R. viii (note); b. Gallos v. Toronto (City), (2008) 51 M.P.L.R. (4th) 178 [1], aff’d 2009 ONCA 843, application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed 2010 CarswellOnt 2233. Application to re-open decision on appeal and to file fresh evidence dismissed 2013 ONCA 553; Further application to re-open decision on appeal and to file fresh evidence dismissed 2014 ONCA 818; and c. Gallos v. City of Toronto, application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Number M54551 (dated November 7, 2023, unreported) dismissed 2024 CarswellOnt 10625.

[14] While Mr. Gallos could have persuaded me that this action should be allowed to continue, his written representations did not do so. I find that the action is frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the court’s process. The action is dismissed without costs.

Robert Centa J. Date: July 25, 2024

Appendix: Footnote [1] from Gallos v. Toronto (City), (2008) 51 M.P.L.R. (4th) 178

[1] Per Trotter J. (as he then was),

1. Mr. Gallos has a long-standing dispute with the City of Toronto (the "City") over the size of his restaurant, located in the Beaches area of Toronto. The essence of the dispute is that Mr. Gallos wishes to build a restaurant that does not comply with the applicable by-laws. The City has refused to issue a building permit that is satisfactory to Mr. Gallos.

2. After unsuccessful attempts for relief before the Committee of Adjustments, and then the Ontario Municipal Board, Mr. Gallos applies to this Court for an order compelling the Chief Building Official of the City to issue a building permit to build a restaurant that is more than double the size of what is permitted by the applicable by-law. Mr. Gallos argues that several by-laws that restrict the size of non-residential use properties do not apply to his property. Alternatively, he contends he enjoys a legal non-conforming use of his property. Further, he seeks a declaration that three City by-laws are invalid because City Council did not comply with notice provisions under the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13. Lastly, Mr. Gallos claims $35,000,000.00 in damages.

3. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that this Application must fail. The most important issue before me, whether Mr. Gallos enjoys a legal non-conforming use, has already been decided against Mr. Gallos in a judgment of Simmons J.A., rendered in a related proceeding: see Toronto (City) v. Gallos, 2008 ONCA 617 (Ont. C.A. [In Chambers]). In this judgment, Simmons J.A. considered an application for leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33 in relation to Mr. Gallos' convictions under s. 8(13) of the Building Code Act, S.O. 1992, c. 23 and s. 67(1) of the Planning Act. In my view, the decision of Simmons J.A. is largely dispositive of this Application and I adopt her reasoning completely.