Christopher M. Bondy

The applicant mother unilaterally suspended the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child, Mileena, citing COVID-19 risks.

The respondent father brought a motion for compliance and broader relief, while the applicant mother brought a cross-motion.

The court previously ordered the mother to restore access.

In this decision, the court found the respondent father's current motion for compliance was no longer urgent because the applicant mother had restored access.

The court emphasized the parents' obligation to ensure access and protect the child from parental conflict, warning against future non-compliance and potential police enforcement.

An earlier order regarding COVID-19 precautions was amended by consent.

The applicant mother unilaterally ceased the child's access to the respondent father, citing COVID-19 concerns, contrary to existing court orders.

The respondent father brought a motion to reinstate access and address primary residence.

This endorsement addresses the urgency of the respondent's motion.

The court found the matter urgent, involving the child's well-being and alleged wrongful retention, and allowed the motion to proceed.

The court noted that the mother's non-compliance with clear court orders raised serious concerns about her appropriateness as the primary residence parent.

Procedural orders were issued for the substantive motion.

This decision addresses costs following a motion brought by the applicant mother concerning child access for their medically fragile child amidst COVID-19 risks.

The motion, while unsuccessful in terminating the respondent father's face-to-face contact, served to highlight both parents' unreasonable conduct and failure to prioritize the child's best interests.

The court found both parties exposed the child to unnecessary risks and used affidavits for venting frustrations.

Applying principles of reasonableness and proportionality, the court awarded the respondent father $1,000 in all-inclusive costs, significantly less than requested, due to his own unreasonable behaviour and the divided success of the motion.

The applicant mother sought to suspend the respondent father's access to their medically fragile child for three weeks due to the child's unusually high risk from the Covid-19 virus.

The respondent father cross-moved to continue access.

The court found both parents had exposed the child to unnecessary risks and failed to make full disclosure.

Balancing the child's best interests, including the need for both parents' support during disorienting times, against the risks of Covid-19, the court dismissed the mother's motion and ordered that the existing access schedule continue with strict safety protocols for both parents and during transportation.

The appellant, Ronald Contreras, appealed a sentence imposed for breach of probation.

The sentencing judge departed from a joint submission by adding a 12-month probation order with an absolute abstinence condition for alcohol and illegal substances.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to defer to the joint submission, inadequate consideration of Gladue principles, insufficient opportunity for counsel to make submissions, and inadequate reasons for sentence.

The Superior Court found multiple errors in principle, including a lack of understanding of Gladue principles and the high threshold for rejecting joint submissions.

The appeal was allowed, and the probation order was deleted.

The defendant, Glenn Swinton, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action commenced by the plaintiff, John Miceli, as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP suit).

The court found that Swinton's Facebook posts, which accused Miceli (a municipal CAO and public figure) of corruption, fraud involvement, and undue influence, related to a matter of public interest.

However, the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that his claim had substantial merit, that the defendant had no valid defence (such as truth, fair comment, or responsible communication), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression, especially given the false nature and vindictive tone of the posts.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the sale of a medical clinic, asserting a right of first refusal (ROFR).

The court found the plaintiffs' case for an ROFR to be very weak, noting that the condition precedent for the ROFR (plaintiff acting as Medical Director and Quality Advisor without compensation) was never fulfilled.

Furthermore, the court found no irreparable harm, as the third-party purchaser offered to continue the plaintiff's association agreement, and the plaintiff's claims of uniqueness for the clinic were speculative.

The balance of convenience also favored dismissing the injunction, as granting it would cause significant harm to the defendants and potentially the clinic's operations.

The interim injunction was terminated, and the request to continue it was denied.

The Crown applied to qualify Constable Philip Kolody as an expert witness in a drug trafficking case.

The accused opposed, citing alleged bias and lack of impartiality due to the Constable's minor involvement in a prior traffic stop related to the accused.

The court applied the three-step test for expert evidence admissibility (scope/purpose, threshold requirements, discretionary gatekeeping).

It found the evidence logically relevant and necessary, and Constable Kolody qualified.

Despite an initial discrepancy in his testimony regarding prior involvement with the accused, the court found him credible and unbiased, noting his minimal role in the traffic stop and his history of objective expert reports.

The court concluded that the potential benefits of admitting the evidence outweighed the risks.

The applicant, Sean Walters, charged with possession of cocaine for trafficking, sought to exclude evidence obtained during his detention and arrest.

Walters argued that he was illegally searched, arbitrarily detained, and denied his right to counsel, contrary to sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including unlawful investigative detention, unconstitutional searches (pat-down, identification/CPIC, and two subsequent physical searches), and delayed facilitation of the right to counsel.

Despite the reliability and importance of the drug evidence to the prosecution, the court concluded that the seriousness and pattern of police misconduct, approaching recklessness, and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, necessitated the exclusion of the evidence to maintain the administration of justice's repute.

The defendant municipality brought a motion to strike the plaintiff bridge company's statement of claim, which sought contribution and indemnity for damages and legal costs arising from five nuisance actions brought by local residents.

The residents alleged that the plaintiff's boarded-up houses caused urban blight.

The plaintiff claimed the municipality unlawfully withheld demolition permits, causing the nuisance.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that the action was not an abuse of process nor barred by issue estoppel.

The plaintiff was granted leave to amend its pleadings to better particularize misfeasance in public office and negligence.

The offender was convicted of three counts of attempted murder by arson after pouring gasoline in a bedroom and setting it on fire, trapping his former romantic partner and her seven-year-old daughter.

A one-year-old child was also in the home.

The court weighed the horrific nature of the domestic violence and severe injuries to the victims against the offender's lack of prior violent record and positive prospects for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of 11 years imprisonment and declined the Crown's request to delay parole eligibility under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code.

The accused, D.N., was charged with assault, sexual assault, and choking with intent to commit an indictable offence against the complainant, K.B. The defence argued consensual sex on an earlier date, an unknown third-party assailant, and an alibi.

The court found the accused's evidence lacked credibility and common sense, while the complainant's core testimony was believed despite frailties in peripheral details.

The court found the accused guilty of assault and sexual assault, but not guilty of choking with intent, as the Crown failed to prove the specific intent to overcome resistance.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in law by impermissibly using the complainant's text messages for the truth of their contents and to corroborate her testimony, and by failing to consider plausible innocent explanations for the appellant's text messages.

The appellate court found these were errors of law, concluding that without the impermissible evidence, there was insufficient proof of absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The applicant sought a declaration that he was an insured under two liability policies and entitled to a defence in an underlying personal injury action.

The underlying action arose when the applicant shot his friend in the eye with a BB gun during a game.

The respondent insurers denied coverage based on intentional act exclusions.

The court applied the Scalera framework and found that the applicant's actions constituted an intentional tort, as he intended to shoot and cause some level of injury to the victim.

The court held that the negligence claims were entirely derivative of the intentional act, and therefore the exclusion clauses applied.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant father sought to vary a previous order imputing his income at $100,000 per year, and claimed retroactive and ongoing spousal support, while the respondent mother sought child support arrears.

The court found the father failed to provide adequate financial disclosure and was intentionally underemployed, upholding the $100,000 imputed income.

The father's claims for spousal support were dismissed due to his conduct and lack of need.

Child support arrears were fixed at $60,927.48, with no ongoing child support payable by either party due to a split custody arrangement and set-off.

The applicants, John Kushimo and Shannon Pierce, sought to quash a search warrant, arguing it violated section 8 of the Charter.

The warrant was issued based on an Information to Obtain Search Telewarrant (ITO) relying on information from two confidential informants and police surveillance.

The court reviewed the facial validity of the ITO, assessing the compelling nature of the information, the credibility and reliability of the informants, and corroboration by police investigation.

Despite some weaknesses in informant credibility and the compelling nature of some information, the court found that independent police surveillance sufficiently corroborated the tips, allowing the authorizing Justice to infer that drugs were stored at the applicants' residence.

The application to quash the search warrant was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiffs' counsel, Greg Monforton and Partners, due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The child plaintiff, Sora Al Bidery, was represented by the firm, as were her parents, Amir Al Bidery and Amal Karim, who were also named as defendants by counterclaim for negligent supervision.

The court found an inherent conflict of interest based on the duties of loyalty and confidentiality.

The plaintiffs' counsel had taken positions on behalf of the parents that were adverse to the child's interests and had not obtained informed consent from all parties regarding the conflict.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs' counsel was removed from the record for all three plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a securities class action from Windsor to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs alleged misrepresentations in a prospectus related to the financing of a workforce accommodation complex.

The court conducted a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2).

Although the plaintiffs' choice of venue was deemed reasonable, the court found that Toronto was a significantly better venue because a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was more closely connected to Toronto, and it was more convenient for the parties, counsel, and witnesses.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

The defendants in a securities class action brought a motion to transfer the proceeding from Windsor to Toronto.

The plaintiffs opposed the transfer.

The court considered the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the plaintiffs' choice of venue was found to be reasonable, the court concluded that the defendants established that Toronto was a significantly better venue, given that a substantial part of the damages were sustained there, the subject matter was located there, and it was more convenient for the parties, witnesses, and counsel.

The motion for a change of venue was granted.

The plaintiff brought a motion compelling former counsel to deliver the litigation file after the lawyer removed himself as counsel of record due to unpaid accounts.

The former solicitor asserted a solicitor’s lien over the file under s. 6(6) of the Solicitors Act.

The court reviewed the distinction between situations where a solicitor discharges the client and where the client discharges the solicitor.

Because the solicitor had withdrawn from the retainer, the court held the file must be delivered to allow continuation of the underlying lawsuit, though the solicitor’s lien remained preserved.

The court ordered delivery of the file subject to undertakings from new counsel and maintained the lien against any eventual recovery.