Christine Tier

The appellant mother was convicted of child abduction under s. 282(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after taking her two children to Singapore for seven months, depriving the father of his court-ordered access.

The trial judge imposed a 12-month conditional sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge made no errors in concluding the mother intended to deprive the father of access.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal and substituted an absolute discharge, noting the hardship a criminal record would cause the appellant's professional travel and the fact she had already served her conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, including a dangerous offender finding.

He alleged bias regarding the appointed expert and relied on his own affidavit.

The Court of Appeal found the appellant's affidavit not credible and concluded that trial counsel's agreement to the expert's appointment was justified.

The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The Crown conceded the error.

However, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the Johnson framework to find no reasonable possibility that the designation would have been different.

The court noted the appellant's high risk to reoffend, diagnoses of pedophilia and sexual sadism, and unsuitability for control in the community.

The Crown appealed the summary conviction appeal judge's decision to acquit the respondent.

The respondent had been convicted at trial for an offence involving a poster depicting explicit sexual activity with a complainant who was under 18 years old.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by being improperly influenced by the fact that the complainant was nearly 18.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and restored the trial judge's conviction, emphasizing Parliament's intention to prevent the sexual exploitation of young persons.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal on three counts of sexual assault and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the objective test for sexual assault.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised its power under section 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to substitute a conviction, as the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature and the appellant would necessarily have been convicted but for the trial judge's error of law.

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction several years later.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, but a three-judge panel subsequently granted it.

The Crown applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to overturn a single judge's decision.

The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the leave application under section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act, overruling previous jurisprudence to the contrary.

However, the Court dismissed the application, finding that it raised no question of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave.

The Crown appealed acquittals on multiple sexual exploitation and sexual assault counts arising from alleged touching of teenage complainants during youth camping trips.

The court held that the trial judge erred in law on one sexual assault count by considering only s. 265(3)(d) and failing to apply s. 273.1(2)(c) concerning inducement by abuse of trust, power or authority.

The court also held that the trial judge erred in law on other sexual assault counts by treating sexual purpose as an essential element, contrary to the objective framework in Chase.

The appeal was allowed in part: convictions were substituted on three sexual assault counts, a new trial was ordered on one sexual assault count, and the sexual exploitation acquittals were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first-degree murder of a 17-month-old child.

He argued that the trial judge failed to adequately explain the difference between intent and motive regarding the sexual component of the assault, and failed to properly instruct the jury on a possible break between the sexual assault and the fatal assaults.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge was impeccable and the assaults formed an uninterrupted continuum.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after striking his wife in the head multiple times with a heavy mortar.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the definition of 'recklessness' under s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code and erred in admitting the deceased's ante-mortem statements regarding his prior abusive conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in the recharge on recklessness, the error was sandwiched between correct instructions and did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The court also upheld the admission of the hearsay statements, finding they met the threshold reliability test and their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences.

At trial, the defence called a witness who testified that the appellant was with her and not involved in the robbery.

The trial judge characterized this as an alibi defence and instructed the jury that they could draw an adverse inference from the defence's failure to disclose the alibi prior to trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law, as the defence was not an alibi but rather an admission of some involvement in the events coupled with a denial of the crimes.

The Crown did not need advance notice to investigate the witness, who was already known to them.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding a witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no need for the warning as the trial judge was aware of the witness's problems.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and arson with intent to defraud insurers.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to make a threshold ruling on the admissibility of a witness's evidence regarding a conversation between the appellant and an accomplice, and in his jury instructions regarding the accomplices' prior convictions, guilty pleas, and the Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of assaulting and sexually assaulting his wife over a four-year period.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of evidence across counts, that the indictment violated the single transaction rule, and that the jury instructions compromised the requirement of unanimity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the multiple incidents constituted a pattern of conduct properly charged as a single transaction, and that individual jurors are entitled to reach different conclusions on which specific incidents occurred provided they are unanimous on the essential elements of the offence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued that police conducted an unauthorized search and breached his s. 10(b) Charter rights following an investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the Charter arguments as they were not raised before the trial judge.

Furthermore, the court found that the police's actions did not amount to a search, as the appellant's clothing was in plain view and no pat-down occurred until after his arrest.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant sought a reduction of his 4.5-year sentence to a reformatory term to contest a deportation order.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within an acceptable range and a major adjustment was not warranted.

The applicant sought leave to appeal, alleging procedural inadequacies at trial.

The Court of Appeal refused the application, finding no basis on the record to conclude that any procedural inadequacies occasioned a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and driving offences.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching his vehicle after he was arrested for failing to identify himself under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police did not know the appellant's identity with certainty and that the search of the vehicle for identification was progressive and reasonable.

The conviction and the five-year sentence were upheld, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of prohibitions.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder and breach of probation.

The jury acquitted him of attempted murder but convicted him of aggravated assault.

The trial judge inadvertently instructed the jury on self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code instead of s. 34(2), despite agreement among counsel that only s. 34(2) applied.

The Crown conceded this was a serious legal error.

Additionally, the trial judge withdrew the breach of probation count from the jury and recorded the conviction himself, which he lacked jurisdiction to do.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside both convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, designated a dangerous offender in 1997, sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence after a ten-year delay.

The delay was caused by the negligence and inaction of his previous lawyers.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the applicant had a bona fide intention to appeal, satisfactorily explained the delay, and raised an arguable ground of appeal based on the trial judge's failure to consider the newly enacted long-term offender provisions.

The young person appealed his conviction for sexual assault and the resulting sentence of one year in secure custody.

The trial judge had rejected the young person's exculpatory evidence based on an alleged lack of detail during examination-in-chief.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's credibility assessment was flawed and unsupported by the record, as the young person had simply answered the questions put to him by his counsel.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

On consent, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, varied the sentence to time served, and vacated the restitution order.

The probation order was extended to two years with an added condition prohibiting the appellant from attending specific locations.