Christine Tier

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he drugged the complainant, failed to fairly assess his videotaped statement, and failed to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the complainant's testimony amply supported the finding that she was drugged.

The court also held that the trial judge properly assessed the appellant's statement and that the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent had no air of reality given the finding that the appellant drugged the complainant.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, wearing a disguise, and possession of property obtained by crime, as well as his three-year sentence.

The key issue at trial was identity, with the defence alleging a third party committed the robbery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or Crown conduct.

Although hearsay evidence was improperly admitted, the Court found it did not occasion a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence, despite the appellant's youth and aboriginal heritage.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including sexually assaulting two 14-year-old boys, and was designated a dangerous offender by the trial judge.

On appeal, the appellant argued he should have been designated a long-term offender, asserting his risk could be managed in the community with chemical castration and strict supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not err in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The court noted the appellant's unwillingness to take sex-inhibiting drugs and the unavailability of the required level of community supervision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidentiary record did not support the essential ingredient that the accused's conduct caused the victim reasonably to fear for her safety.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellants appealed jury convictions for two murders arising from a drug-debt execution theory advanced through accomplice and jailhouse informer evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge failed to provide an adequate Vetrovec caution regarding key unsavoury witnesses and also committed several additional reversible errors, including admitting highly prejudicial investigative hearsay, admitting evidence of a co-accused’s manslaughter conviction, excluding exculpatory portions of a recorded statement under the whole statement rule, permitting inadmissible hearsay concerning one appellant’s alleged admission to his girlfriend, and failing to control prejudicial Crown cross-examination and oath-helping evidence.

The court rejected the reasonable apprehension of bias claim and declined to intervene on several discrete evidentiary rulings, but found the cumulative and individual errors too serious for the curative proviso.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and failure to stop for police, arguing unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, errors in credibility assessment, and failure to establish the elements of the offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter violation, proper application of the W.D. analysis for credibility, and ample evidence supporting the convictions.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with a sexual offence.

The trial judge had found the evidence of non-consensual sex overwhelming, except for the complainant's muted response and her accompanying the respondent behind a building.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on the muted response to raise a reasonable doubt about consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second degree murder and attempted murder, as well as his 15-year parole ineligibility period.

He argued the trial judge failed to provide a special instruction regarding identification evidence from neighbours who had picked out photos of other persons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the standard instructions were adequate and noting no objection was made at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 15-year parole ineligibility period was within the appropriate range given the brutal nature of the attack, the home invasion, and the finding that the appellant killed the deceased to eliminate a witness.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of criminal negligence causing death after driving a van with a friend on the hood, resulting in the friend falling off and suffering fatal injuries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding his conduct constituted criminal negligence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge committed a palpable and overriding error by failing to make a specific finding that the driving was a marked departure from the norm, and by failing to consider all surrounding circumstances, including the victim's instigation and the appellant's youthfulness, in assessing wanton or reckless disregard.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that in the context of a short trial with only three witnesses, the trial judge adequately explained his credibility findings and the basis for finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant previously appealed his sentence, which the Court of Appeal varied to four months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

The Court subsequently issued this supplementary endorsement to add three probation conditions that were inadvertently omitted from its original order, including a prohibition on associating with the complainant or persons under 16.

The variation was made on consent of both parties.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and that a mistrial should have been granted because the trial judge had also presided at the pretrial conference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding sufficient evidence to support the verdict and noting that no prohibited discussions occurred during the pretrial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the restitution order as a fit component of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

He argued the verdict was unreasonable because there was no evidence the complainant feared for her safety.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant feared for her safety.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in rejecting a joint submission for a global sentence of six months custody.

The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection of the joint submission, noting the appellant's persistent behaviour and related criminal record made the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault of a young girl.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso to find that the appellant's brief absence from the courtroom and pre-charge conference caused no prejudice.

The Court granted the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's recommendation of four to six months to ensure treatment without an evidential foundation.

The sentence was varied from nine months to four months' imprisonment, followed by two years' probation with a treatment condition.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider self-defence and by failing to apply the middle ground of the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the self-defence claim and concluding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, properly applied the W.(D.) principles in rejecting the accused's evidence and finding it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was abandoned as the custodial portion had been served.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's comments on the performance of witnesses demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge that while the comments were ill-advised and could cause concern if taken out of context, they did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his guilty plea was not voluntary.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant likely maintained his innocence to his counsel and pleaded guilty only because he incorrectly perceived he had no alternative.

He sought to withdraw the plea almost immediately prior to sentencing, and the Crown did not oppose.

The Court allowed the appeal, struck out the guilty plea, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault carrying a weapon, arguing that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on related extortion charges and that the trial judge misapprehended a defence witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not violently at odds because there was confirmatory evidence of the assault, while the extortion charges lacked sufficient proof.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the defence witness's evidence.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a telemarketing scheme.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that the mens rea for aiding the principal offender under s. 21(1)(b) of the Criminal Code could be satisfied by recklessness.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error, as party liability requires purpose or intent, which can be established by actual knowledge or wilful blindness, but not mere recklessness.

The court also found a similar error in the conspiracy instruction.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant stole a van and engaged in a police pursuit that damaged several cruisers, while absent without leave on parole and under a driving prohibition.

He appealed his three-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's long and serious criminal record, and the trial judge did not overemphasize deterrence and denunciation.