Charles T. Hackland

The applicant, a 61-year-old senior draftsperson with 3.5 years of service, was terminated without cause.

The employer relied on a termination clause in the employment agreement to limit his entitlements.

The court applied the Waksdale framework, finding the 'for cause' provision violated the Employment Standards Act by contracting out of the statutory 'wilful misconduct' standard, thereby rendering all termination provisions void.

The court awarded 6 months of common law reasonable notice based on the Bardal factors and dismissed the employer's argument that the applicant failed to mitigate his damages.

Following a trial where the defendants successfully defended a claim regarding riparian rights and water access, the court determined the appropriate quantum and scale of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on a Rule 49 offer, while the plaintiffs argued for a lower amount.

The court found the Rule 49 offer was not a true compromise and awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, fixed at $16,000 plus disbursements and HST, noting the reasonable conduct of both parties.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging that the defendants' boathouse, located in the water in front of the plaintiffs' shoreline, interfered with their riparian rights of access.

The court found that the boathouse did significantly restrict the plaintiffs' riparian rights.

However, because the boathouse had been in its location for over 50 years, the court held that the plaintiffs' claim was statute-barred and extinguished by the 10-year limitation period under sections 4 and 15 of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court declined to read the discoverability principle into the RPLA.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant purchased a property formerly owned by a library board, which was subject to a registered restrictive covenant prohibiting commercial use.

The registered covenant failed to identify the benefitted lands, rendering it legally unenforceable.

The respondent, owner of the adjacent lands, successfully applied to a motion judge to rectify the Land Titles Registry to include the benefitted lands.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the rectification, holding that the appellant was a bona fide purchaser for value without actual notice of the benefitted lands.

The court emphasized that constructive notice is insufficient to defeat a registered interest under the Land Titles Act, and the appellant was entitled to rely on the registry's mirror and curtain principles.

The appellants brought a motion in writing to amend a previous decision of the Divisional Court, which had allowed their appeal but did not award costs of the underlying action due to a misunderstanding that they were not sought.

As no order had yet been issued or entered, the court remained seized under Rule 59.06(2)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the appellants were entitled to costs of the action based on their successful appeal, and awarded $25,000 in costs.

The Plaintiff, Wael Musa, succeeded in a slip and fall personal injury trial against the Defendants, Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 255 and 6669981 Canada Inc. The court then determined the quantum of costs.

The Plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs up to the date of their Rule 49 offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, having bettered their offer.

The Defendants made no offer.

The court awarded the Plaintiff $113,000 in fees and $28,804.71 in disbursements, acknowledging that costs could exceed damages in complex trials and that counsel's billing rates and contingency fee agreements are relevant but not determinative.

The applicant mother brought an urgent interim motion seeking an order to permit her to have the parties' seven-year-old child vaccinated against COVID-19.

Under an existing final order, the respondent father had final decision-making responsibility for the child's health.

The father opposed the vaccination, citing concerns over safety and the changing pandemic environment.

The court held that while it could take judicial notice of Health Canada advisories regarding the safety and efficacy of the vaccine, the mother failed to establish a material change in circumstances on an interim basis to justify overriding the father's decision-making authority.

The motion was dismissed, with the issue to be determined at the final hearing of the Motion to Change.

This personal injury action concerned a slip and fall on an icy condominium roadway.

The plaintiff sued the condominium corporation and its snow removal contractor for negligence.

The contractor was deemed an occupier under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The central issue was whether the contractor applied road salt in a sufficiently timely manner to prevent dangerous icy conditions.

The court found the contractor negligent for failing to apply road salt concurrently with or immediately after plowing, which led to the formation of a hazardous icy surface.

The contractor's operational system, which relied on the owner personally handling all salting for numerous properties, was identified as problematic and overstretched.

The court dismissed the defendants' claim of contributory negligence against the plaintiff and found the defendants liable for the plaintiff's injuries.

This decision addresses a motion and cross-motion for production of documents in a personal injury case.

The plaintiff sought production of defence medical expert files from Soma Medical Assessments and further documentation related to the defendants' surveillance evidence.

The defendants sought production of documents from the plaintiff's recently settled disability claim against Great West Life.

The court refused the request for Soma files, deeming it a fishing expedition and subject to litigation privilege.

However, it ordered the production of private investigator information, waiving litigation privilege due to significant privacy intrusion and public policy considerations.

The court also ordered the production of documents from the prior disability action, waiving the deemed undertaking rule given the similarity of issues and the insurer's non-opposition.

Costs were made costs in the cause.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal from a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order.

The landlords argued the appeal was an abuse of process because the tenant had not paid rent for 18 months and was using the appeal's automatic stay to remain rent-free.

The Divisional Court found that while the appeal raised potential questions of law, the tenant's persistent failure to pay rent and avowed intention to continue withholding rent constituted an abuse of process.

The court ordered the appeal quashed and the stay lifted unless the tenant paid all arrears by a specified date.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages and indemnification arising from the purchase of a defective commercial truck.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the contract by failing to provide a reasonably fit vehicle and subsequently failing to honour an agreement to exchange the truck.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on breach of contract and indemnification, finding no palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the contract or the admission of parol evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, dismissing the action against the individual appellants because there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or find them personally liable for the corporation's breach of contract.

The respondent sought to commence a private prosecution against the Premier of Ontario regarding COVID-19 vaccine mandates, which a Justice of the Peace refused to receive.

The respondent then applied for mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to receive the information.

The Crown brought an application to summarily dismiss the respondent's application.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding the respondent's claims of a fake pandemic and vast conspiracy to be frivolous, vexatious, and lacking any air of reality.

Following the settlement of a motor vehicle personal injury action for $300,000 on the eve of trial, the parties could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought $97,749 in partial indemnity fees, while the defendant argued for $35,000 based on a standard settlement formula.

The court found the case sufficiently complex to depart from the standard formula, noting the aggressive litigation tactics employed by both sides over seven years.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $65,000 in fees plus HST, along with agreed disbursements.

Following a trial where the plaintiff Condominium Corporation was substantially successful in collecting common expense arrears, the court determined the quantum and scale of costs.

The plaintiff sought $58,448.97, while the defendants proposed $32,000.

Applying section 85(1) of the Condominium Act, 1998 and considering the plaintiff's unaccepted Rule 49 offer to settle, the court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $50,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements, to be added to the liens registered on the defendants' unit.

The respondent Board brought a motion in a judicial review proceeding to add the subject physician as a party respondent, seal third-party medical records inadvertently included in the record, and strike the self-represented applicant's affidavit, application record, and factum.

The court granted the requests to add the physician and seal the records on consent.

The court struck the applicant's affidavit and portions of her application record as they raised irrelevant policy issues and complaints unrelated to the specific decision under review.

The court declined to strike the factum, finding it provided a manageable summary of the applicant's position for the hearing panel.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 on an unpaid invoice for engineering services.

The trial judge had rejected the appellants' limitation defence, finding the limitation period was suspended during settlement discussions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The court held that the limitation period expired before any settlement discussions took place, as the appellants had refused to pay the full invoice amount more than two years prior to the commencement of the action.

The judgment and costs order were set aside.

The applicant police officer sought a stay of his dismissal from the police service pending judicial review of an Ontario Civilian Police Commission decision that confirmed his termination for discreditable conduct, neglect of duty, and deceit.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the balance of convenience and irreparable harm did not favor the applicant.

The court noted that the applicant's losses were primarily financial and could be remedied with back pay if his judicial review application succeeded, whereas granting routine stays would contravene legislative policy.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order granting summary judgment to the respondent bank for a credit card debt.

The appellant argued that the bank's failure to provide a signed account agreement was fatal to its claim.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error, as the appellant had received and not disputed monthly credit card statements setting out the debts and interest rates over many years.

The applicant brought an application for judicial review of an arbitrator's interpretation of schedules to two expired collective agreements.

Prior to the hearing, the parties ratified new collective agreements.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the matter moot as there was no longer a live controversy between the parties.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, emphasizing that it does not provide advisory opinions and that the applicant had an obligation to bargain scheduling issues rather than await a court decision on expired agreements.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 49.09(a) to enforce a settlement of the plaintiff's motor vehicle personal injury action.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing she did not clearly authorize her former counsel to settle and abandon her case.

The court found that a settlement was reached and that there were no special circumstances, such as marked inadequacy or collusion, to justify exercising its narrow discretion to refuse enforcement.

The motion was granted, the settlement was enforced, and the action was dismissed without costs.