Carolyn J. Horkins

The moving party brought a motion seeking leave to appeal an order of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) that adjourned the hearing of an appeal from an Official Plan Amendment.

The OMB had adjourned the hearing until the municipality enacted a development permit by-law, despite acknowledging it could not order the municipality to pass such a by-law.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's order raised a question of law of sufficient general or public importance regarding whether the municipality is entitled under s. 17(44) of the Planning Act to have its appeal adjudicated before enacting a development permit by-law.

The appellants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating their tenancy and requiring them to pay $24,351.50 for mould damage.

The Board found the appellants negligently caused the mould by maintaining a hot and humid environment despite warnings from the landlord.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the damage was reasonably foreseeable and that the Board's reasons were adequate.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating her tenancy for persistently failing to pay rent on time.

The tenant sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the Board erred in law by refusing to consider the landlord's conduct under section 82 of the Residential Tenancies Act and by denying her natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence as it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law, as section 82 did not apply to a termination under section 58, and the Board had provided procedural fairness and properly exercised its discretion under section 83.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee Panel finding he engaged in professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a 15-year-old patient.

The appellant argued the Panel misapprehended the evidence by failing to address inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, improperly considering post-incident conduct, and applying unequal scrutiny to the evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Panel's credibility assessments and factual findings were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The appellant, a former recipient of income support, appealed the Director's decision to pay his medical transportation benefit directly to a taxi company.

The Social Benefits Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal under s. 21(2) of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court held that regardless of whether extended health benefits constitute income support, s. 21(1) limits appeals to decisions affecting eligibility or the amount of benefits.

As the direct payment decision affected neither, the Tribunal's decision was reasonable and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought a declaration that a Fire Marshal guideline regarding fire alarm audibility was invalid and an injunction prohibiting its enforcement.

The applicant had previously appealed an inspection order to the Fire Marshal and then to the Fire Safety Commission, but sought judicial review before the Commission hearing proceeded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances or true question of jurisdiction that would justify bypassing the ongoing administrative process.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that denied her claim for $100,000 in general damages.

The Tribunal had found that the Ministry's subcontracting rules under the Ontario Disability Support Program discriminated against the applicant based on her disability.

However, applying the Mackin rule, the Tribunal held that damages were not available because the government's conduct in applying the policy was not clearly wrong, in bad faith, or an abuse of power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that the Tribunal's application of the Mackin rule to the policy directive and its conclusion that no exceptions applied were reasonable.

The appellant, MA Fire & Safety Protection, appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for unpaid services and granting the respondent temple's claim for $12,500 against Ayube Mohamed personally.

The dispute arose from a contract to install a fire suppression and commercial kitchen exhaust system.

The trial judge found the appellant fundamentally breached the contract by installing an inadequate electrical heater instead of a gas one and failing to ensure sufficient space for required 3M wrap.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error of fact or error of law, and rejected arguments regarding quantum meruit and mutual mistake.

The appellant father appealed a final custody and access order to the Divisional Court.

The panel raised the issue of jurisdiction, noting that the order was made in a proceeding where both parties sought a divorce.

Under section 27 of the Children's Law Reform Act, claims for custody and access are stayed in favour of the Divorce Act when a divorce is claimed.

Because the order was made under the Divorce Act, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, not the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court found the father had a meritorious appeal regarding the termination of his access and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board consent order terminating the tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears.

The tenant had appealed the order, which automatically stayed the eviction, arguing she was coerced into the agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the tenant failed to obtain leave to appeal a consent order, raised no question of law, and brought the appeal solely for the purpose of delay to remain in the premises without paying rent.

The plaintiff was acquitted of murder following a 'Mr. Big' sting and sued the police for negligent investigation, as well as the Crown attorneys who provided legal advice to the police.

The police defendants cross-claimed against the Crown attorneys for contribution and indemnity based on negligent legal advice.

The Crown attorneys moved to strike the cross-claim under Rule 21.

The motion judge declined to strike the cross-claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that prosecutorial immunity applied to claims by police.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the cross-claim, holding that Crown attorneys enjoy absolute immunity from civil suits in negligence arising from the exercise of their official functions, including providing legal advice to police during an investigation.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board review decision that upheld an eviction order for rental arrears.

The tenant argued that his obligation to pay rent was discharged because the landlord's staff mistakenly refused his attempt to pay the arrears in cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the LTB's conclusion that a refused payment does not erase the debt.

The Court also found the LTB's refusal to set aside the eviction order was reasonable given the tenant's stated refusal to comply with any order to pay arrears.

However, the Court granted the tenant a final opportunity to pay the arrears in cash to avoid eviction.

The appellant brought a motion in writing seeking an order to compel the Landlord and Tenant Board to produce transcripts and the record of proceedings for her statutory appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, clarifying that under the Rules of Civil Procedure, the obligation to order transcripts and prepare the appeal book lies with the appellant, not the tribunal.

The court granted the appellant an extension of 30 days to comply with the Rules and perfect her appeal.

The applicant was expelled from a private career college for alleged theft.

After an internal appeal was denied, she filed a complaint with the Superintendent of Private Career Colleges.

The Superintendent's delegate investigated and found no contravention of the Private Career Colleges Act.

The applicant sought judicial review of this finding.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Superintendent's review of a student complaint is a discretionary administrative determination, not a statutory power of decision.

Applying the factors from Setia and Air Canada, the court concluded the matter lacked sufficient public character to be subject to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The applicants sought to stay a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board pending judicial review.

The Board had certified the respondent union, finding the applicants were the true employer of construction labourers on the application date, and had refused to admit post-application evidence regarding the workers' roles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay, holding that the 'strong prima facie case' test applied and that the applicants failed to meet this threshold, as the Board's refusal to admit the evidence was a valid exercise of its statutory discretion rather than a denial of natural justice.

The applicant employer brought a motion for an interim stay of a grievance arbitration award that reinstated an employee who had been dismissed for allegedly subletting his rental unit improperly.

The court determined that the applicable test for staying a labour arbitration award requires the moving party to establish a strong prima facie case, rather than merely a serious issue to be tried.

The court found the employer failed to meet this threshold because it had called no direct evidence at the arbitration to challenge the employee's testimony.

The motion for a stay was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondent union.

The applicants brought a motion for an interim order staying the school board's decision to transfer a student to another school following a suspension for an assault.

The motion was dismissed because the transfer had already taken place and the relief sought was identical to the relief requested in the pending application for judicial review, which must be decided by a full panel.

The Toronto Transit Commission (TTC) sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) that adjourned an appeal under the Occupational Health and Safety Act pending the outcome of a related grievance arbitration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature.

The court held that the OLRB's decision was an interlocutory adjournment and did not constitute a refusal to exercise jurisdiction.

The court found no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review of an interim administrative decision.

The appellant, a physiotherapist, appealed a finding of professional misconduct and penalty imposed by the College's Discipline Committee after she failed to appear for a caution and subsequent disciplinary hearings.

The appellant argued she was denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant waived her procedural rights by intentionally failing to attend the hearings, and that her specific allegations of procedural unfairness, bias, and improper evidence consideration lacked merit.

The finding of professional misconduct and the penalty were deemed reasonable.

The plaintiffs appealed a Small Claims Court order that dismissed their claim against the personal defendants.

The Small Claims Court judge made the order on her own initiative without providing notice or an opportunity for submissions, contrary to Rule 12.02(4).

The Divisional Court granted an extension of time to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the order, finding it was made without jurisdiction and in breach of procedural fairness.