Carole J. Brown

The plaintiffs moved for default judgment against John Vella, a director of Dual-Temp Insulation Incorporated, seeking $196,836.89 in unpaid wages, vacation pay, and trust fund contributions.

The defendants were noted in default.

The court found Vella personally liable under section 131 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act and for breach of trust under sections 8 and 13 of the Construction Lien Act, based on the deemed admission of facts in the statement of claim.

The plaintiff, Gladys Levy, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully prosecuting her claim for $21,183.20 and successfully defending a counterclaim for $310,000.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $55,837.02, inclusive of HST and disbursements, to the plaintiff.

This decision was based on the defendant Sylvie Levy's reprehensible and inappropriate conduct throughout the 24-day trial, which unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings, included courtroom outbursts, arguments with the court, and denial of facts that should have been admitted.

An addendum dated August 10, 2016, clarified that a $5,000 award for an earlier application was included in the total costs.

The defendant, Compagnie Nationale Royale Air Maroc, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim and dismiss his action on three grounds: preclusion by Article 35 of the Montreal Convention, being statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and being barred by issue estoppel, collateral attack, and abuse of process due to a prior Canadian Transportation Agency decision.

The court found that the claim was extinguished by the Montreal Convention's two-year limitation period, was statute-barred by the Limitations Act, and constituted an impermissible collateral attack on a final administrative decision.

The motion was granted, the statement of claim was struck, the action was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the defendant.

The court issued an interim order staying all proceedings initiated by Citifinancial Canada Inc. to obtain vacant possession and sell the premises at 83 Borough Drive, Suite 2110, Toronto.

This stay is pending the release of the court's full decision in the matter.

The accused, Andrew Medford, was found guilty on all five counts of a criminal indictment following a trial without a jury.

The charges included sexual assault with a weapon (knife), choking with intent to commit an indictable offence, uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, assault, and possession of a weapon for the purpose of committing an offence.

The court accepted the complainant's testimony, finding that an initial consensual sexual encounter became non-consensual when the complainant attempted to withdraw consent.

DNA evidence linked the accused to the scene, and an eyewitness corroborated parts of the physical altercation.

The court addressed inconsistencies in witness testimony and the complainant's credibility, including her history of drug use and prior dishonesty, ultimately finding her evidence reliable regarding the essential elements of the offences.

The plaintiffs and a successful co-defendant sought costs following a summary judgment motion that determined liability for a chain-reaction motor vehicle accident.

The unsuccessful defendants argued that costs should not be awarded until damages were resolved and disputed the scale of costs.

The court held that liability costs could be fixed immediately and awarded partial indemnity costs to both the plaintiffs and the successful co-defendant, as the parties seeking substantial indemnity costs failed to provide evidence of their formal offers to settle.

The plaintiff brought an action against her sister for unpaid loans related to the purchase and maintenance of a residential property held in trust.

The defendant counterclaimed for damages, alleging the plaintiff breached the Trust Agreement and her fiduciary duties.

The court found that the plaintiff had advanced loans to the defendant which remained unpaid, and that the plaintiff did not breach the Trust Agreement.

The plaintiff's claim was granted in the amount of $21,183.20, and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a wrongful dismissal action arising from the closure of automobile dealerships after General Motors discontinued franchise relationships.

He alleged inducement, common employer liability, unpaid bonus and salary amounts, disability-related entitlements, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and aggravated and punitive damages.

The court rejected the plaintiff's evidence on most disputed facts, found no common employer relationship, no unpaid bonus entitlement, no compensable mental suffering, and no basis for aggravated or punitive damages.

Applying the Bardal factors, and taking into account an undertaking that prior seniority would be recognized, the court awarded 20 weeks of pay in lieu of notice, less statutory amounts already paid and mitigation income earned during the notice period.

The applicant, having successfully obtained a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend, sought costs of the application on a substantial indemnity basis.

The applicant argued that the respondent's position was contrary to established law and that the respondent caused undue delay.

The court found that while there were some delays, they did not warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a partial indemnity scale in the amount of $18,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff, having been wholly successful at a three-day trial, sought costs.

The plaintiff had served a Rule 49 offer to settle that was less than the damages awarded at trial.

The defendants failed to provide costs submissions.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, totaling $36,102.54.

The court also ordered the release of $23,000 previously paid into court by the plaintiff as security for costs.

The defendants brought a motion to remove the plaintiff’s counsel and law firm as solicitors of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest.

They argued that the lawyer had previously interacted with one defendant while representing a related corporation during regulatory proceedings involving dealership licence suspensions, and had allegedly received confidential information and provided legal advice.

The court applied the principles governing disqualification of counsel, including the test from MacDonald Estate v Martin regarding prior relationships and confidential information.

The court found no solicitor-client relationship between the lawyer and the defendants and no evidence that confidential information about the defendants had been imparted.

As no conflict of interest or breach of duty of loyalty was established, the motion to remove counsel was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a master's report following a lengthy construction lien trial arising from a residential development joint venture.

The appellant argued that the master committed factual and legal errors in rejecting several claims for extras, carpentry services, site supervision services, and in finding that the plaintiff’s construction lien rights had expired.

The court held that the applicable standard of review required substantial deference to a master conducting a trial on a reference, particularly regarding findings of fact and credibility.

After reviewing transcripts and documentary evidence, the court concluded that the alleged errors largely involved disagreements over credibility assessments and weight of evidence.

Finding no palpable and overriding error or error of law, the court confirmed the master’s decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitrator’s decision that snow plow vehicles involved in a motor vehicle accident were “commercial vehicles” under Ontario Regulation 664 and therefore subject to the statutory loss transfer regime under the Insurance Act.

The appellant argued the definition required that a vehicle first be used primarily to transport goods, tools, or equipment before falling within the enumerated list following the phrase “and includes.” The court held that the enumerated list broadens the definition and captures vehicles such as those designed for construction or maintenance purposes even if they are not primarily used for transporting materials.

Applying a contextual and purposive approach to statutory interpretation, the court found the arbitrator correctly interpreted the regulation.

The appeal was dismissed and the arbitrator’s conclusion that the snow plows were heavy commercial vehicles subject to loss transfer was upheld.

The applicant construction contractor sought a declaration that an insurer owed it a duty to defend as an additional insured under a project‑specific commercial general liability policy issued to a subcontractor.

The underlying action involved a pedestrian trip‑and‑fall allegedly caused by a sunken paver installed during a streetcar island construction project.

The insurer argued the policy only applied to liability arising from the subcontractor’s operations and that the pleadings did not allege such liability.

The court held that the pleadings contained undifferentiated negligence allegations against all defendants and could potentially attribute liability to the subcontractor’s work.

Applying established duty‑to‑defend principles, the court found that any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the insured and concluded the insurer had a duty to defend.

Municipal authorities brought a motion under s. 38 of the Building Code Act seeking an order compelling compliance with outstanding building and fire safety orders relating to a residential structure.

Evidence established that the respondents constructed and modified the building contrary to permit plans, ignored multiple inspection orders, and used the property for multi‑residential purposes despite authorization only for a single-family dwelling.

Fire authorities had also issued orders after identifying life‑safety hazards and deficiencies under the Fire Prevention and Protection Act and the Ontario Fire Code.

The respondents filed no evidence and did not attend the hearing.

The court found the requested relief necessary to ensure compliance with building and fire safety legislation and to protect public safety.

Following a trial in which the defendants successfully defended multiple claims including breach of contract, spoliation, unjust enrichment, and property-related torts, the court determined costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs and recovery of professional fees for several witnesses characterized as participating experts.

The court confirmed that participating experts may justify reasonable compensation where their expertise arises from involvement in the underlying events.

Applying Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and principles of proportionality, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the defendants’ offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant for $67,408.88 owing on two equipment leases for vending machines.

The defendant, an unsophisticated retired nurse, argued the leases were unconscionable, she lacked mental capacity due to a brain tumor, and she was induced by misrepresentations from third-party vendors involved in a scam.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the complex issues of unconscionability, capacity, and due diligence required a full trial with viva voce evidence to achieve a fair and just determination.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant was in civil contempt of a prior court order requiring him to cease representing himself as an officer of a community organization and to deliver the organization’s records and financial documentation.

Applying the three‑part test for civil contempt set out in Carey v. Laiken, the court held that the prior order was clear and unequivocal, the defendant had actual knowledge of the order, and he intentionally failed to comply with it.

Evidence demonstrated that the defendant continued to hold himself out as president or director and failed to produce the required records despite repeated demands and an undertaking to do so.

The court ordered the defendant to comply with the original order by a specified date and warned that failure to do so could result in the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.

The plaintiffs, having been wholly successful, were awarded costs.

The plaintiff slipped and fell on an icy municipal sidewalk in Toronto, sustaining a fractured back.

She sued the City of Toronto for gross negligence under the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court found that the City had knowledge of the dangerous sidewalk conditions following a significant weather event but failed to deploy sidewalk clearing crews for over 48 hours.

The court concluded that the City's failure to maintain the sidewalk amounted to gross negligence and held the City liable for agreed-upon damages of $110,000.

In a multi-vehicle “chain reaction” collision case, the plaintiffs and two co‑defendants moved for summary judgment seeking a determination that the rear driver and vehicle owner were solely liable and that the other drivers did not contribute to the accident.

The motion judge considered evidence including a police accident report, transcripts from a related Highway Traffic Act prosecution, and discovery transcripts.

Applying the summary judgment principles articulated in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court held that the evidentiary record permitted a fair and just determination without a trial.

The court found that the rear driver failed to rebut the presumption of negligence applicable to rear‑end collisions and rejected his inconsistent version of events.

Liability was therefore imposed on the rear driver and the vehicle owner, while the other drivers were found not liable.