Brian Snell

The 15-year-old appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for counselling and encouraging her boyfriend to kill the victim.

She appealed her conviction, arguing that two videotaped statements to police were inadmissible under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, and appealed her adult sentence of life imprisonment without parole for seven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant was not detained during the first interview and had validly waived her right to counsel in the second.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge correctly concluded that a youth sentence would not provide sufficient long-term supervision to protect the public given the appellant's psychological profile and risk of reoffending.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of kidnapping and robbery arising from two incidents.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrators.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but held that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury about specific frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including generic descriptions, lack of distinguishing features, and discrepancies in height.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited weapon and his sentence of 3.5 years' imprisonment.

He argued that his takedown and search by police breached his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police lawfully exercised their common law power of investigative detention in a volatile situation involving a firearm.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the trial judge erred in denying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody merely because the appellant pursued a weak Charter motion.

The Court granted enhanced credit at a ratio of 1.5:1 due to harsh remand conditions and ineligibility for remission, reducing the remaining sentence.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence was deemed irrelevant as the 3.5-year sentence was otherwise fit.

The appellants pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and forcible confinement after subjecting a vulnerable victim to 17 days of torture.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for one appellant and the Crown's proposal for the other, imposing significantly higher sentences without providing reasons or allowing counsel to make submissions.

The Court of Appeal found this was an error in principle, as a joint submission should not be rejected unless it is contrary to the public interest and brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeals were allowed and the sentences were reduced to align with the original submissions.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 9 years (8 years for aggravated assault) less 3 years credit for pre-trial custody.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by inappropriately balancing his mistreatment in pre-trial custody against the severe injuries inflicted on the victim.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge's comments were unfortunate, he did not err in principle in exercising his discretion to assess the appropriate credit for pre-trial custody.

The sentence was fit and within the range for the offences committed.

The appellant was convicted of threatening and criminally harassing his former common law wife.

Following the finding of guilt, defence counsel requested a psychiatric assessment, which led to a finding that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) due to alcohol-related dementia and delusions.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the NCRMD finding was unreasonable and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer raised his mental state without instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the NCRMD verdict was reasonable and that the appellant failed to prove his counsel acted without instructions or that the counsel's performance resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and conspiring to import heroin after a controlled delivery of a package to a third party's apartment.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the evidence of the third party, who claimed the appellants orchestrated the importation.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge's jury charge was fatally flawed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the charge failed to properly instruct the jury on assessing credibility, gave an inadequate Vetrovec warning, improperly exhorted minority jurors to reconsider their views, and failed to separately review the evidence against each appellant.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding frailties in the complainant's eyewitness identification evidence and in permitting the Crown to cross-examine him on his prior criminal record if he testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately addressed the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Corbett ruling, noting she properly balanced probative value against prejudicial effect and appropriately sanitized the prior convictions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in his final instructions on reasonable doubt and that the jury selection process was compromised by late disclosure of an annotated juror list by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge's short-form instructions on reasonable doubt were problematic, the charge as a whole did not leave the jury under any misapprehension of the standard of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not cause a miscarriage of justice, as defence counsel was provided with the same information and chose not to use it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed jury convictions for multiple sexual offences arising from allegations by several complainants in circumstances involving crack cocaine use and alleged coercive sexual conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the similar fact evidence was admitted, there was at least an air of reality to possible inadvertent collusion through media reports, rumours, and street communications, and the jury should have been left to assess that possibility when weighing the evidence.

The court also held that, after severing counts involving one complainant to preserve the accused’s ability to testify only on those counts, the trial judge erred in then admitting that complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, effectively undermining the accused’s right to silence and control of the defence under ss. 7 and 11(c) of the Charter.

The combined errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his concurrent life sentences for two counts of counselling to commit murder.

While incarcerated for offences against his ex-wife, the appellant attempted to hire an undercover police officer to kill his ex-wife and her boyfriend.

The trial judge imposed a life sentence based on the appellant's future dangerousness, despite the Crown not bringing a dangerous offender application.

The Court of Appeal found the life sentence disproportionate and outside the range for similar offences, citing R. v. Goyette.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the life sentence, designated the appellant a long-term offender, and imposed a 16-year determinate sentence less pre-sentence custody, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The Court also varied a non-communication order to allow contact with the appellant's adult daughter upon her written consent.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing the deceased in the appellant's apartment.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence.

The trial judge instructed the jury that they could consider the appellant's failure to retreat from his own home when assessing the reasonableness of his actions.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as there is no duty to retreat from one's own home when attacked, nor is it a factor for the jury to consider under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the 18-year period of parole ineligibility imposed following a conviction for a brutal domestic homicide.

The trial judge treated the appellant's mental state as a marginal mitigating factor, which was outweighed by significant aggravating factors including the brutality of the crime, a history of violence, and disregard for court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and breaking and entering, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a co-perpetrator's out-of-court statement, failed to properly caution himself about unsavoury witnesses, and seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a witness's recantation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was properly admitted, the trial judge did not need to explicitly articulate a Vetrovec warning to himself, and the fresh evidence of the recantation was incredible and lacked sufficient impeachment value to affect the verdict.

The appellant appealed his sentence for drug offences committed while on probation for the same offence.

The Court of Appeal found no error with the global sentence given the appellant's record and the nature of the drugs.

However, the court agreed that the trial judge erred by failing to give credit for pre-sentence custody.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, and the sentence on count 6 was reduced to 22 months' imprisonment.

The appellant, who was 16 years old at the time of the offence, appealed his adult sentence of life imprisonment with seven years of parole ineligibility for second-degree murder.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not considering declining pre-sentence custody credit to make a youth sentence sufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adult sentence was supported by the appellant's age and the violent, unprovoked nature of the crime.

The Court also declined to alter the sentence based on fresh evidence of recent progress in custody, noting this could be addressed in future applications under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and manslaughter in relation to the deaths of two sisters.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge made several evidentiary errors, including admitting frail eyewitness non-identification evidence, excluding evidence of the co-accused's motive and prior bad acts, admitting hearsay statements of the deceased, and failing to properly instruct the jury on the defence theory regarding the co-accused's prior inconsistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's discretionary evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while the verdict was not unreasonable, the trial judge failed to mention or apply the W.(D.) principles regarding credibility and the burden of proof, and failed to address defence evidence bearing on culpability.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after fatally stabbing a stranger during an altercation.

At trial, the judge only instructed the jury on self-defence under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on sections 34(1) and 37, failing to give a Baxter instruction regarding the exact measure of defensive action, and failing to adequately answer a jury question.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the other self-defence provisions and concluding that the omission of the Baxter instruction did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his robbery conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to the trial judge's treatment of identification evidence.

The trial judge had rejected the complainant's in-dock identification but convicted based on circumstantial similarities.

The Court of Appeal found significant discrepancies between the complainant's description and the appellant, particularly regarding height and clothing, as well as contextual issues of time and place.

The Court concluded the trial judge's evaluation of the evidence was flawed, rendering the verdict unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.