Brian Snell

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault causing bodily harm against two young boys, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, improperly used circumstantial evidence, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

He also challenged the dangerous offender finding, arguing the trial judge unduly relied on psychiatric evidence and erred in finding a pattern of repetitive behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in its entirety, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, concluding that trial counsel's representation was competent, and upholding the dangerous offender designation based on the predicate offences and the appellant's high risk of re-offending.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a lifetime driving prohibition following his guilty pleas to several offences, including driving while disqualified.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in imposing a lifetime prohibition, as the maximum available under the Criminal Code at the time was five years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the lifetime prohibition, and substituted a five-year driving prohibition, noting the appellant's criminal record and the nature of the offences.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing her appeal from convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief to property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the appellant failed to raise a question of law alone as required by section 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, with the consent of the Crown, the court vacated the $300 victim fine surcharge.

The appellant appealed sentences totaling 32 months and a forfeiture order for possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of marijuana and cocaine.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred by giving no weight to the guilty plea and the absence of a commercial motive.

The court reduced the sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking to 28 months, reduced the sentence for possession of marijuana to 10 days concurrent, and set aside the forfeiture order of $320.00 as there was no finding it was drug-related.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, as well as his 40-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting a hearsay statement and by finding intercourse occurred despite a lack of forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the statement was properly admitted as part of the narrative and the lack of forensic evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 40-month term was fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's position of trust and the complainant's age.

The appellant was convicted by jury of intentionally discharging a firearm while reckless as to the life or safety of another person and occupying a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm present.

He did not testify at trial.

On appeal to the SCC, the appellant argued unreasonable verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court held that the strong circumstantial case permitted the Court of Appeal to consider the appellant's silence when assessing his unreasonable verdict argument, and affirmed that the trial judge's clear jury instructions against using silence as a makeweight for the Crown preserved the accused's right to silence.

Appeal dismissed and convictions upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to justify the conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole and in context, clearly showed that he accepted the complainant's evidence of forced sexual intercourse and lack of consent.

The appeal was dismissed, as the reasons were sufficient to allow the appellant to understand his conviction and to permit meaningful appellate review.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and related offences, as well as his sentence of 13.7 years.

He argued the trial judge erred by prohibiting cross-examination of the complainant regarding a conflict in her evidence about recent sexual activity, and by granting pre-trial custody credit at a 1:1 ratio and apportioning only half of it to the current charges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the appellant failed to pursue the mandatory application process under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge's decisions on pre-trial custody credit and apportionment were discretionary and revealed no error in principle.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder after a housekeeper was strangled to death during a break and enter.

At trial, each accused blamed the other for the killing.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding party liability, the use of lies to police, and the evidence of a co-accused's ex-wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the jury instructions on common purpose liability or post-offence conduct, and concluding that the Crown's cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

The primary grounds of appeal related to the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's refusal to admit third-party suspect evidence, jury instructions on out-of-court statements and identification evidence, and alleged Crown misconduct during cross-examination and closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's conduct fell below the expected standard of propriety, the trial judge's strong corrective instructions were sufficient to cure the damage and preserve the right to a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of stolen property, attempted break and enter, and break and enter, receiving a 42-month sentence and a lifetime weapons prohibition under s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code.

He appealed the weapons prohibition, arguing there was no violence used, threatened, or attempted.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's actions, which he admitted scared the victims, constituted an implied threat of violence.

The appeal was dismissed, but the prohibition was varied to 10 years at the Crown's request.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in drawing an inference of knowledge from circumstantial evidence and reversed the onus of proof.

The appellant also sought to tender fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the circumstantial evidence pointed to only one rational conclusion and the trial judge did not reverse the onus of proof.

The court declined to admit the fresh evidence due to the lack of a motion and its irrelevance.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge should have granted 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody rather than 1.5:1.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and appropriately considered the appellant's repeated serious misconduct while in custody.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and accessory after the fact to murder.

At trial, the Crown called the common-law spouses of two of the appellants as witnesses and introduced out-of-court statements made by one of the spouses shortly after the shooting.

The appellants appealed, arguing the spousal incompetency rule should be extended to common-law spouses under s. 15(1) of the Charter, and that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay.

The Court of Appeal held that while failing to extend the spousal incompetency rule to common-law spouses violates s. 15(1) of the Charter, the limitation is justified under s. 1.

The court also upheld the admission of the out-of-court statements under the spontaneous declaration exception to the hearsay rule.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, fatally stabbed a fellow inmate and was convicted of first-degree murder.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence and testified to three prior incidents that were never put to the Crown's witnesses during cross-examination.

The trial judge ruled that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn and remedied the breach with a jury instruction rather than recalling the witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find a breach of the rule and that the jury instruction was a reasonable and proper remedy in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed his sentence, seeking enhanced credit for 20 months of pretrial custody.

The trial judge had only given 1 month of enhanced credit for 44 lock-down days.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Summers, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted 1.5 to 1 credit for the entire 20 months of pretrial custody, reducing the sentence accordingly.

The appellant appealed his convictions for historical sexual assaults, sexual interference, sexual exploitation, and assault simpliciter involving his three daughters.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence, particularly regarding credibility, demeanour, the application of the W.(D.) principles, and the reliability of child witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided comprehensive reasons, properly applied the burden of proof, and made credibility and reliability findings that attracted deference.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by a judge and jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a properly instructed jury could reasonably conclude that the only reasonable inference from the cumulative effect of the evidence was the appellant's guilt.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of first-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery of a drug dealer, during which two victims were unlawfully confined and shot to death.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding the defence of alibi, a third-party suspect, the correction of defence counsel's closing address, the failure to give timely notice of an alibi witness, and the elements of accessorial liability for constructive first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible error in the jury instructions.

The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to leave constructive first-degree murder to the jury for the non-shooter as an aider and abettor, and concluded that the verdicts were not unreasonable.