Ashley Brooke Audet

The applicant sought to exclude evidence obtained via search warrants, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material omissions regarding the credibility and reliability of the primary source.

The court found that the police affiant breached the "full, fair, and frank" disclosure obligation due to severe negligence and inexperience, which subverted the pre-authorization process.

Although the corrected ITO could still have provided reasonable grounds for the warrants, the court exercised its residual discretion to set them aside, deeming the police conduct as "bad faith" for the purpose of this discretion.

Consequently, the searches were unauthorized and breached section 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing conduct and the impact on the applicant's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in admitting the reliable evidence of serious firearms offences, leading to the exclusion of the handgun, conducted energy weapon, and brass knuckles found.

This is a sentencing decision for Salman Ahmed, who was convicted of second-degree murder.

The primary issue was determining the period of parole ineligibility, which carries a mandatory life sentence with a general 10-year ineligibility period, extendable up to 25 years under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 25 years, while the defence argued for 12 years.

The court considered the jury's recommendation (which was given little weight), the violent nature and circumstances of the carjacking and murder, and the offender's character, including his youth, first-time offender status, and challenging background, balanced against his poor conduct in custody.

The court ultimately imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 18 years, emphasizing deterrence and denunciation due to the use of firearms and forcible confinement.

The offender was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He acted as upper management in a commercial cocaine trafficking conspiracy that purchased cocaine at the kilogram level and sold it at the quarter-kilogram level and below.

The Crown sought 4-5 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the scale of the operation and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary for conspiracy and 2.5 years concurrent for trafficking.

The accused was charged with sexual services offences and uttering threats.

After the Crown withdrew a sexual assault charge, the accused argued that the rape shield provisions under s. 276 of the Criminal Code no longer applied to his proposed cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior sex trade work.

The Crown and the complainant argued that s. 276 or the common law Seaboyer regime should apply.

The court held that s. 276 does not apply to sexual services offences unless there is a connection to a listed offence, which was absent here.

The court also declined to extend the Seaboyer common law regime, ruling that the trial judge is best suited to exercise a gatekeeping role over the proposed cross-examination.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine and conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The Crown's case relied on intercepted communications, police surveillance, two cocaine seizures, and expert evidence on drug terminology.

The court found that the intercepted communications, which heavily featured drug slang, established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was part of an ongoing buy-sell conspiracy to traffic cocaine from the Greater Toronto Area to Sudbury.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking after police found 19.07 grams of heroin in a safe inside an apartment he frequented.

The accused testified that he had obtained the safe for a friend to secure her belongings and did not know it contained heroin.

The friend testified and corroborated his account, admitting the heroin was hers.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the defence witnesses credible and their explanations reasonable, raising a reasonable doubt as to the accused's knowledge and possession of the drugs.

The accused was found not guilty.

The applicant, P.K., sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on the tertiary ground for serious charges including robbery and firearm offences.

The application argued a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the time spent in custody, and a proposed release plan with sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court acknowledged COVID-19 as a material change but found the proposed plan insufficient to address the substantial risk to public safety (secondary ground) and maintain confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground), given the applicant's violent history and non-compliance with previous orders.

The bail review was dismissed, and detention continued.

The accused was arrested without a warrant for drug trafficking following a confidential informant tip and several days of police surveillance.

Searches incident to arrest, including a strip search at the police station, yielded a loaded handgun, cash, and drugs.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8 and 9 rights, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the totality of the circumstances, including the corroborated tip and surveillance observations, provided objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent searches.

The accused was charged with nine offences arising from a shooting incident in Brantford on October 9, 2017.

The Crown alleged the accused discharged a firearm at an individual, while the accused denied involvement.

The trial focused on identity of the shooter.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a firearm was used, that any weapon was carried in a concealed manner, or that the accused was the person involved in the incident.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The offender, Elidio Moran, was convicted of possession for the purpose of trafficking a Schedule 1 controlled substance (crack cocaine).

The court considered an application to exclude evidence based on an alleged s.8 Charter violation, which was denied.

In sentencing, the court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature and quantity of the drug and the offender's significant criminal record with prior drug offences and probation breaches, against mitigating factors such as the efficient conduct of his defence.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the Defence proposed 13 months' imprisonment followed by two years' probation.

The court imposed a sentence of 16 months' imprisonment, followed by one year of probation, with credit for pre-trial custody and house arrest.

Mandatory weapons prohibition and a victim fine surcharge were also ordered.

The offender, Jean Guy Thibeault, was sentenced for manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The court found the manslaughter to be an aggravated instance due to the victim's vulnerability, the unprovoked and brutal nature of the attack involving multiple stomping blows, the high moral culpability, and the offender's indifference to the victim's fate.

No mitigating circumstances were identified, and the offender expressed no remorse.

The court imposed a sentence of twelve years imprisonment for manslaughter, reduced to seven years after credit for pre-sentence custody, and a concurrent sentence of two years imprisonment for aggravated assault.

Mandatory lifetime firearm prohibition and DNA orders were also issued.

During a trial for second-degree murder and aggravated assault, a voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of utterances made by the defendant to a detective.

The Crown sought to admit the statements, arguing they were voluntary and that any Charter breach should not lead to exclusion.

The defence contended the statements were involuntary and obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter, and thus should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found the utterances voluntary and no infringement of s. 10(a).

However, it found a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to the police's failure to facilitate access to counsel for 4.5 hours after the defendant asserted his right.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and therefore ruled the utterances inadmissible.

The accused was tried on charges arising from allegations of sexual assault, assaultive conduct, unlawful confinement, uttering a death threat, and breach of recognizance.

The court found the complainant's evidence on the sexual and physical assault allegations suffered from material credibility and reliability problems, including significant inconsistencies on consent, payment, use of a condom, chronology, and the nature of the alleged assaults, and entered acquittals on those counts.

The court accepted the second complainant's evidence that the accused uttered threats to kill and pistol whip her, and applied the objective contextual framework for uttering threats to convict on that count.

The accused was also convicted of breach of recognizance on agreed facts.

T.E., a 32-year-old drug addict with a history of drug offences, was found guilty of three counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and one count of possession of proceeds of crime.

Police seized 131.88 grams of cocaine and $14,500 from her apartment, where she lived with her young son.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the commercial nature of the trafficking and her criminal record, and mitigating factors, such as her abusive past, addiction, psychiatric condition, and harsh pre-trial detention conditions during pregnancy.

The Crown sought a 3 to 3.5-year sentence, while the defence sought 24 months after credit for pre-trial custody.

The court imposed a global sentence of 31 months, reduced to 24 months after credit for 7 months of pre-trial custody (137 days at 1.5:1 enhanced credit).

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime firearm prohibition, and forfeiture of drugs and proceeds.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit a statement made by the accused, Jan Goro, to police in 2003, in a second-degree murder case.

The statement was given after Goro was arrested on a foot impression warrant.

The court found that the police failed to inform Goro that he was free to leave after the warrant was executed, thereby undermining his free will and right to choose whether to speak to police.

Consequently, the statement was deemed involuntary and inadmissible at trial for any purpose, including cross-examination.

Jan Goro, charged with second-degree murder, brought a pre-trial application to admit details of incidents involving a third-party suspect, Jack Laforge, where charges were initiated but no convictions resulted.

The Crown brought a similar cross-application to admit details of incidents involving Mr. Goro where police investigated but no charges were laid.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the unproven allegations had minimal probative value and significant prejudicial effect, especially given that both parties' criminal convictions would already be admitted.

The applicant, charged in 2013 with a 1976 murder, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence.

The lost evidence included the notes of thirteen police officers, an audiotaped confession by a third-party suspect, a videotaped recantation by that suspect, and various occurrence reports.

The court found that the deliberate destruction of police notes and the unexplained loss of the recordings constituted unacceptable negligence, breaching the applicant's section 7 Charter rights.

Concluding that the cumulative prejudice irreparably harmed the applicant's ability to make full answer and defence, the court granted a stay of proceedings.

This voir dire ruling addresses the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Joshua Barreira to police following his arrest for first-degree murder.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to police oppression (cold, sickness, hunger, exhaustion, denial of right to silence) and inducements related to his wife and brother's arrests.

The court found no oppression, noting Barreira was a "savvy and experienced individual" who understood his rights and repeatedly attempted to negotiate a deal.

The court also determined that the idea of a false confession to protect family members was self-generated by Barreira, and the police officer's actions did not constitute improper inducements.

Consequently, the statements were deemed voluntary and admissible at trial, subject to editing out references to Barreira's criminal record.

In a prosecution for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application seeking admission of several out-of-court statements made by the deceased to friends and associates describing a deteriorating relationship with the accused and expressing fear that the accused and his family intended to kill him.

The court conducted a voir dire on the admissibility of the statements under the hearsay rule.

The court held that the statement expressing fear that the accused would kill the deceased with his own guns was admissible under the traditional state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.

The remaining statements describing prior disputes, business dealings, and a recent altercation between the deceased and the accused were admitted under the principled exception because necessity was established and sufficient indicia of reliability existed through corroborating evidence and contextual circumstances.

The probative value of the evidence relating to animus and motive outweighed any prejudicial effect, including concerns about prior discreditable conduct.

The accused, a Black man charged with the murder of an Asian man, brought a motion to allow multiple-choice questions to be put to prospective jurors during the challenge for cause process, arguing the standard Parks question is insufficient to uncover subconscious racial bias.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the standard question.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence that the proposed multiple-choice format would be an improvement over the standard Parks question, but directed that jurors be instructed they may provide detailed answers rather than just 'yes' or 'no'.