Ashley Brooke Audet

The Crown sought a ruling that an accused’s inculpatory statement made to a police officer while awaiting medical treatment was voluntary and admissible.

The statement was made after the accused had earlier invoked the right to silence during a recorded interview and after consulting counsel.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter, emphasizing gaps in the officer’s notes and inconsistencies in recollection.

The court applied the contextual voluntariness analysis and concluded that uncertainties about the unrecorded portions of the conversation and the officer’s unreliable recollection raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The statement was ruled inadmissible and the Charter exclusion argument became moot.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, possession of a firearm knowing its possession was unauthorized, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the 'jump principle' given his prior global sentence of six and one-half months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge explicitly considered the jump principle and the sentence was within the appropriate range.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing it was an unreasonable verdict because the complainant's identification evidence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant was sufficiently well-acquainted with the appellant, having seen him daily at school and having an unobstructed view of him for 40 to 45 minutes during the offence.

The court held that the in-dock identification, supplemented by a photo line-up, was sufficient to support the conviction.