Wills, Estates, Trusts Law

The defendant, Fletcher’s Fields Limited, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, Robert Llewellyn Jenkins (as trustee for the Estate of Samuel Harrison Ball) and the Estate of Samuel Harrison Ball.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not have sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a costs award and had not demonstrated impecuniosity or a good chance of success on the merits.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to post $20,000 as security for costs and awarded $10,000 in costs to the defendant, with both amounts payable within 60 days.

This case involves an application concerning the administration of Joseph Holmes' estate, specifically addressing the approval of a settlement and the passing over of Gary Holmes as co-estate trustee.

The court found that ongoing conflict between the co-estate trustees, Gary and Jacqueline Holmes, Gary's past conduct as attorney for property, and the resulting delays and expenses prevented the proper administration of the estate.

The court approved the Minutes of Settlement, which resolved previous disputes regarding Gary's accounts as attorney for property, and ordered Gary to be passed over as estate trustee, appointing Jacqueline as the sole estate trustee.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a previous decision where the applicant's costs were directed to be payable from the Estate.

The applicant, the Estate Trustee, sought full indemnity costs under the Trustee Act, arguing the litigation was necessary for estate administration.

The respondent opposed, claiming the dispute was personal.

The court found the costs claimed by the applicant to be reasonable and ordered full indemnity costs of $10,814.50 to be paid out of the Estate, affirming the estate trustee's right to indemnification for reasonably incurred legal expenses.

The applicants sought to declare Capucine Loyer incapable and be appointed as her joint guardians for property and personal care.

They also sought prospective appointment of substitute guardians (Stéphane Loyer and Martine Lepage).

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) objected to the prospective appointment as a matter of law.

The court found Capucine Loyer incapable and appointed the applicants as joint guardians.

However, the court dismissed the request for prospective appointment of substitute guardians, holding that the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992, does not permit such appointments, emphasizing the need for ongoing judicial oversight and protection of the incapable person's rights under the Act and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The Trustee of the Alexander Morris Sharpe Trust sought the court's advice and directions on whether legal fees for David and Natasha Sharpe could be paid from the trust, which was established for the "sole and exclusive" benefit of their minor son, Alexander Morris Sharpe.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed, arguing the trust language was clear and restrictive.

The court ruled that the trust funds could not be used to pay the legal fees, as such payments would not be for the "sole and exclusive" benefit of the minor beneficiary, even if there was a collateral benefit.

Eric Linseman, the grandson of the deceased Raymond Edward Linseman, brought an application for dependant support from his grandfather's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

Eric, who had lived with his grandfather for many years due to his own challenges and his mother's inability to provide care, argued he was a dependant.

The estate trustees (Eric's mother and uncle) opposed, asserting Eric was not dependent and had received sufficient funds outside the will.

The court found a clear relationship of dependency, noting the grandfather's consistent support and the inadequacy of the existing trust fund for Eric's long-term needs.

The court also criticized the executors' conduct, including the wrongful transfer of estate property and destruction of documents.

The application for dependant support was granted, including the transfer of the deceased's property to Eric, but the claim for retroactive child support against Eric's mother was dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action concerning the interpretation of a centralized health and benefits trust deed.

The plaintiffs, a local union and three of its members, sought an order that the trust wrongly denied them an annual open enrollment window for benefits, which they argued was guaranteed by their prior local collective bargaining agreement and incorporated into the centralized trust.

The court found that the trust deed, read in its grammatical sense and as a whole, and consonant with the purpose of the collective bargaining regime, did not require the continuation of the annual open enrollment window.

The court emphasized the trustees' duty of prudence in adopting industry standards to minimize "anti-selection" risk.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiffs' claim.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment motion that found the appellants liable for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in a fraudulent scheme.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by drawing unwarranted inferences of liability based largely on the mere rejection of the appellants' evidence, rather than requiring positive proof.

The motion judge also made speculative and stereotypical findings regarding the appellants' credibility and financial arrangements.

The Court held that the rejection of a witness's evidence does not amount to positive proof of the opposite proposition.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment set aside, and the case remitted to the Superior Court for trial.

The Applicant sought dependant support from the Estates of his grandparents and uncle under the Succession Law Reform Act, and an order impressing assets with a trust.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Applicant was not a dependant of any of the deceaseds as he was not receiving regular support immediately before their deaths.

The court also found no evidence that his uncle had demonstrated a settled intention to treat him as a child of his family, nor was there a basis for a resulting trust, constructive trust, or proprietary estoppel claim.

The Estate of Joseph Zabukovec appealed a trial judge's decision granting Judith Tomek and Joseph Zabukovec Jr. joint beneficial ownership of 75% of a property based on unjust enrichment and proprietary estoppel.

The Estate argued the trial judge erred in valuing the land and failed to consider Joseph Sr.'s contributions to the house construction.

The Court of Appeal found an error in the land valuation but declined to interfere with the remedy, citing the broad discretion in crafting equitable remedies for proprietary estoppel.

The court affirmed the trial judge's order as consistent with the parties' original intention for the house and house lot to be conveyed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Litigation Administrator, Edward Waters, was personally ordered to pay costs due to acting in his own interest.

The plaintiff, Catalyst Capital Group Inc., appealed a motion judge's decision to strike out several of its claims against Dundee Kilmer Developments Limited Partnership (DKD), Infrastructure Ontario (IO), and the Crown.

The claims arose from Catalyst's exclusion from financing the 2015 Pan/ParaPan American Games Athletes' Village project.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating Catalyst's claims against DKD for breach of a funding term sheet, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment/quantum meruit.

However, the court upheld the striking of unjust enrichment/quantum meruit claims against IO and the Crown, the public law duty claim against IO and the Crown, and the misrepresentation claim against the Crown, finding them either statute-barred, lacking direct benefit, or precluded by statutory immunity.

The applicant, Nazha Boulos as estate trustee, sought a declaration that her late husband's estate was the beneficiary of three Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF) accounts held by Duca Financial Services Credit Union for the late Yura Nicola Khagek.

Mr. Khagek had previously designated Mr. Boulos as the beneficiary of his Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) accounts, which were later automatically converted to RRIFs by Duca Financial without a new beneficiary designation.

The court, applying principles from the Succession Law Reform Act and relevant case law, found that the original RRSP beneficiary designation traced to the converted RRIF accounts, reflecting Mr. Khagek's clear intention to gift the funds to Mr. Boulos.

The application was granted, declaring Mr. Boulos's estate as the beneficiary of the RRIF accounts.

The defendant lawyer, John McGarrity, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a solicitor's negligence claim brought by the plaintiffs, Donald Jesse James and Elsie Maria James.

The plaintiffs alleged that McGarrity failed to properly advise them regarding an agreement to add their daughter, Janice James, to the title of their farm property, which included a non-alienation clause preventing them from selling the property.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that the solicitor's negligence claim was inextricably tied to the main action to set aside the agreement and that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial, particularly concerning the plaintiffs' understanding of the agreement and potential undue influence from their daughter.

This decision addresses two consolidated proceedings.

The plaintiff, Julie Craven, sought substantial damages from the Estate of Andrew Peter Osidacz for a series of violent acts, including assault, the wrongful death of their son Jared, and attempted murder.

Additionally, Ms. Craven claimed that Michael Osidacz, as the estate trustee, breached his fiduciary duties by unreasonably defending the estate, leading to the dissipation of assets.

The court assessed damages for Ms. Craven, awarding her $565,000.00, and found the estate trustee personally liable to reimburse the estate for $71,277.98 in legal costs due to his imprudent and hostile litigation strategy.

An appeal concerning whether a daughter exerted undue influence over her elderly parents, resulting in an inter vivos gift of substantially all their capital assets.

The parents transferred their equity in a property to the respondent daughter, who had lived with them and provided care.

The trial judge found no presumption of undue influence arose and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial decision, finding that while the relationship had the capacity to create undue influence, the trial judge properly concluded the presumption did not arise based on the dominant personality and financial acumen of the father, and that any presumption would have been rebutted.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, arguing it failed to disclose a cause of action for ownership or vesting of cottage land.

The court found the statement of claim did not sufficiently plead the requirements for a gift, nor did it allege trust, proprietary estoppel, unjust enrichment, or detrimental reliance.

Given the pleadings, particularly the deceased's stated intention not to convey due to tax liability, the court concluded it was plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the plaintiffs' claims could not succeed as pleaded.

The defendants' motion was granted.

The applicant, Pamella Poitras, brought an application against her stepchildren challenging the 2013 will of her deceased husband, Gilles Poitras, on grounds of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.

She also sought dependant's relief under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that while suspicious circumstances existed regarding undue influence, the evidence did not establish coercion sufficient to set aside the will.

The court also found Gilles had testamentary capacity.

However, the court determined that Gilles had not made adequate provision for Pamella's proper support and awarded her a lump sum of $85,000 under the SLRA, in addition to her life estate in the matrimonial home and its contents.

The applicants, two of the estate trustees, brought a motion for directions under Rule 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to wind up the estate of Maria Christina Sampogna.

The motion addressed various disputes between the siblings, who were all beneficiaries and executors, regarding estate expenses, household contents, jewellery, and outstanding costs awards from previous litigation.

The court provided detailed directions for the distribution of assets, allocation of expenses, and payment of costs, ultimately aiming to finalize the estate administration and allow the applicants to be removed as trustees.

The court rejected allegations of theft against the applicants and ordered the respondents to bear personal responsibility for certain costs due to their unreasonable conduct.