Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The appellant appealed her guilty pleas to multiple Provincial Offences Act charges, including operating a motor vehicle without insurance and failing to comply with probation.

She argued that her guilty plea was not informed, that she acted under duress, and sought to have the entire proceeding quashed and sent back for trial.

The trial court had imposed a sentence of 7 days in jail and a $5,000 fine.

The appeal court examined the validity of the guilty plea under the five conditions set out in the Provincial Offences Act and found that the appellant failed to meet her onus of demonstrating that the plea was involuntary, uninformed, or equivocal.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed both his conviction for stunt driving and his sentence following a retrial.

The appellant was originally charged in September 2011 with driving 218 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, allegedly racing with another vehicle.

After a lengthy procedural history, the retrial commenced in March 2017.

The appellant raised multiple grounds of appeal regarding jurisdiction, alleged non-disclosure of dispatch recordings, and Charter violations related to a second officer's attendance at the scene.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal against conviction, finding no evidentiary foundation for the appellant's assertions and noting the appellant's own failure to diligently pursue available remedies.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the trial judge made an error in principle by failing to consider that the appellant had already served 12 days incarceration and three months of a driving prohibition for the same offence.

The conviction was upheld but the sentence was varied.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of unlawfully depositing material on public lands contrary to section 27(1)(a) of the Public Lands Act.

The respondent, a miner who owned mining rights to a parcel of land, had deposited debris on a Crown land trail (CL 16773) that crossed his property.

The trial justice acquitted the respondent, finding that the Crown had not proven the trail was Crown land and that the Mining Act provided a legal exception to the Public Lands Act.

The appellate court found palpable and overriding errors in the trial justice's factual findings and rejected the legal argument that mining rights exempted the respondent from the Public Lands Act.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal was quashed, and a conviction was substituted with a $500 fine imposed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal under section 131 of the Provincial Offences Act from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed her appeal from a conviction for operating a rental unit without a valid licence.

The applicant contended that she had entered an uninformed guilty plea at trial, arguing this raised a question of law essential to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's complaint was fact-based rather than a question of law, and that she had failed to meet the very high threshold for granting leave to appeal under section 131 of the POA.

An appeal from a conviction under section 159(3) of the Highway Traffic Act for failing to move into another lane for an emergency vehicle if safe to do so.

The appellant argued that the offence could only be committed upon passing a stopped emergency vehicle, not upon approaching it.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on the interpretation that the obligation to move lanes is triggered "upon approaching" a stopped emergency vehicle.

The appeal court upheld the conviction, finding the statutory language clear and unambiguous.

The appellant appealed her conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While backing out of a parking spot at a Costco store, the appellant's vehicle accelerated in reverse and crashed into the store's front entrance, killing two individuals and injuring two others.

The appellant claimed her foot became stuck under the brake pedal, preventing her from stopping the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as implausible and found the appellant created a dangerous situation by reversing at high speed and taking no corrective action for at least five seconds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for dangerous driving and that the verdict was reasonable.

The Crown appealed a not guilty verdict in a Highway Traffic Act charge of driving while handling a handheld device.

The trial Justice of the Peace acquitted the defendant on the basis that the Crown failed to prove that the vehicle was a "motor vehicle" and the road was a "highway" as defined by the Highway Traffic Act, because the Crown's witness did not use the specific phrase "as defined by the Highway Traffic Act." The appellate court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the Crown's evidence was sufficient and that witnesses need not recite statutory definitions verbatim.

The court applied principles of judicial notice and the ordinary meaning of terms.

The defendant was charged with driving while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

An investigating officer observed the defendant operating a tractor-trailer and believed he saw the defendant holding a cell phone.

Upon stopping the vehicle, the officer photographed a Motorola device in the cab.

The defendant testified he was holding a water bottle and that the device in question was a scanner used to record delivery details for his employer, not a communication device capable of making phone calls.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was holding a hand-held communications device or another object, and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with Impaired and Over 80 Care or Control of a motor vehicle on January 30, 2015.

The Crown admitted the accused's blood alcohol content was 150 mg per 100 ml of blood and that she was impaired in law.

The sole issue was whether the accused was in care or control of the vehicle.

The accused testified she occupied the driver's seat to change her boots while waiting for a restaurant party to begin, not to drive.

The court found the accused rebutted the statutory presumption of care or control under section 258(1)(a) on a balance of probabilities.

However, applying the de facto care or control test, the court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused created a realistic risk of danger through her poor judgment in consuming alcohol while seated alone in the driver's seat with her keys and the vehicle in a parking lot approximately 45 minutes before her planned departure.

The offender was sentenced for Criminal Negligence Causing Death after pleading guilty to driving a truck at high speeds through residential streets while fleeing police, striking and killing a 69-year-old pedestrian.

The offender had a prior criminal record including drug offences, dangerous driving, and multiple driving-while-prohibited convictions.

The Crown sought eight years; the defence sought five years.

The court imposed eight years less pretrial custody, finding the offence was aggravated by the deliberate nature of the criminally negligent driving undertaken to evade police apprehension, the calculated manner in which the pursuit was initiated, continued reckless driving after police backed off, and the offender's conduct after striking the victim.

The court also imposed consecutive sentences for related driving-while-prohibited and obstruct police charges, resulting in a total sentence of six years and two months, plus a 15-year driving prohibition.

The defendant was charged with permitting a motor vehicle to be operated without insurance contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

A police officer observed the defendant's vehicle being driven by another person, checked the vehicle's registration, and later called an insurance company.

The Crown argued that once ownership and lack of insurance were established, the defendant's permission to drive could be inferred.

The court dismissed the charge, finding that the Crown failed to prove all essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly the element that the defendant permitted the driver to operate the vehicle.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and having care or control of a motor vehicle on December 31, 2013.

The vehicle had mounted a snowbank after the accused swerved to avoid a collision.

When police arrived, the accused was found in the driver's seat with keys in the ignition.

The court examined whether the accused had care or control of the vehicle despite it being immobilized on the snowbank, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable as required by law.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's licence was suspended, contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant had 21 prior convictions for the same offence and had accumulated $27,000 in unpaid fines.

The Crown and defence proposed a joint submission for 12 months probation with no fine or incarceration.

The court rejected the joint submission, finding it contrary to the public interest and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

The court imposed 60 days custody, a $2,000 fine (the statutory minimum for a subsequent offence), plus costs and surcharge, and 12 months probation with specific conditions including a prohibition on being in the driver's seat of any vehicle.

A seventeen-year-old defendant pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with an improper means of attachment and operating an unsafe motor vehicle under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant's improperly attached homemade trailer became detached and struck a cyclist, resulting in the cyclist's death.

The court imposed fines and probation, balancing the defendant's youth, remorse, and lack of prior record against the severe and tragic consequences of the offences and the need for general deterrence.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown conceded that the defendant was impaired and over the legal limit.

The sole issue was whether the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The defendant testified he had no intention to drive and was waiting for his partner to pick him up.

The court found that the defendant occupied the driver's seat with a contemporaneous intention to drive, or alternatively, that there was a realistic risk he would change his mind and drive home given the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted.

The defendant was charged with impaired care or control and over 80 care or control after being found asleep in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot.

The defendant claimed he had no intention to drive because he had called a friend to pick him up and fell asleep while waiting.

The Crown relied on the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the defendant's evidence regarding his plan was not credible and that he failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

Even if the presumption had been rebutted, the court found the Crown proved actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk the defendant could change his mind and drive while impaired.

The accused was charged with stunt racing contrary to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for driving at 161 km/h in a 100 km/h zone on Highway 401, exceeding the speed limit by 61 km/h.

The Crown relied on Lidar speed detection evidence from a trained officer.

The defence challenged the accuracy of the Lidar reading and suggested the officer's vehicle was moving when the reading was taken.

The court found stunt racing to be a strict liability offence with a due diligence defence available.

The Crown proved the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities.

The accused was convicted.

The defendant was charged with two counts of being a party to unregistered real estate trading under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

Following the prosecution case, the defence raised the issue of the defendant's capacity to conduct his defence due to alleged mental disorder.

The court was required to determine whether the defendant was, on a balance of probabilities, unable to conduct his defence due to mental disorder.

The court found that the defendant was capable of conducting his defence and ordered the suspended proceeding to continue.

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act, challenging whether the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt all elements necessary for the admission of radar evidence.

The trial justice of the peace convicted the appellant based on evidence from a police officer who used a Decatur Genesis handheld radar device to measure the vehicle's speed at 117 km/h in an 80 km/h zone.

The appellant argued the officer was insufficiently qualified and had not properly followed manufacturer's testing procedures.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the officer had received adequate training, tested the device before and after use in accordance with manufacturer's instructions, and provided sufficient evidence of the device's reliability.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving without a contract of automobile insurance contrary to the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act.

The prosecution sought the minimum penalty of $5,000 for a first offence.

The court considered whether to apply section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act to provide relief from the minimum penalty.

The defendant had recently been released from hospital treatment for severe anxiety and depression, was receiving ODSP, and the fine would be crushingly oppressive relative to his circumstances.

The court imposed a reduced fine of $3,000 with a one-year payment period, finding exceptional circumstances existed and that imposing the minimum fine would be unduly harsh and not in the interests of justice.