Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The applicants, charged with municipal by-law infractions, sought a stay of proceedings or a mistrial under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of their section 7 right to make full answer and defence due to the prosecution's late disclosure.

The prosecution provided a crucial email chain regarding the property's zoning history after the trial had commenced and the prosecution had closed its case.

The court found that the late disclosure impaired the applicants' ability to plan their defence strategy and cross-examine the prosecution's witness effectively, thereby affecting the overall fairness of the trial.

Consequently, the court declared a mistrial as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant, Trevor Henry, pled guilty to careless driving causing death and bodily harm under the Highway Traffic Act.

The collision resulted in the death of Nancy Fleming and life-altering injuries to William Fleming.

The court considered sentencing principles of deterrence, proportionality, and restraint, along with aggravating factors (devastating impact on victims' family) and mitigating factors (guilty plea, remorse, no prior similar driving offences).

The court imposed a global sentence of 45 days intermittent imprisonment, a 2-year non-reporting probation order, and a 2-year driver's licence suspension, emphasizing that the sentence denounces the driving conduct and serves general and specific deterrence.

The defendant, charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act, brought a Charter motion arguing that proceeding by certificate evidence without the charging officer's attendance violated sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, seeking a stay or an order for the officer to attend.

The court dismissed the section 7 argument, noting that speeding is an absolute liability offence with no risk of incarceration.

For section 11(d), the court applied a contextual approach for regulatory offences, finding that the right to cross-examination is limited and requires a showing of material irregularity under section 49(4) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found the defendant's request for the officer's attendance was based on speculation and did not meet the threshold for a material irregularity, dismissing the Charter motion and the request to compel attendance.

The applicant, Ms. Drmic, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in her provincial offences matter for careless driving.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled trial date exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that delay was attributable to issues with service, lack of judicial resources, and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no evidence to support defence-attributable delay or to sufficiently explain how lack of judicial resources or the pandemic specifically caused the delay in this case, emphasizing the Crown's burden to prove reasonable steps were taken to avoid delay.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The defendant, 961557 Ontario Ltd. operating as "The Crooked Cue" brought a s.11(b) Charter motion for a stay of proceedings due to inordinate delay in a Provincial Offences Act charge.

The court calculated the total delay, subtracted periods attributable to defence conduct (including a largely unsuccessful disclosure motion, issues with setting trial dates, failure to perfect the s.11(b) motion, a directed verdict motion, and a motion to take a view), and accounted for COVID-19 as an exceptional circumstance.

The net delay, after deductions, fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The defendant failed to demonstrate the remaining delay was unreasonable or that they took meaningful steps to expedite the case.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant, 961557 Ontario Ltd., operating as "The Crooked Cue" was charged with failing to comply with an emergency order under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act for operating an indoor dining area during COVID-19 restrictions.

The prosecution alleged the establishment was not an "outdoor dining area" as required by O. Reg. 263/20.

The court found that the prosecution failed to prove the actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily because no clear, written regulatory order was established, and the interpretation of "outdoor dining area" by public health officials was subjective, inconsistent, and based on fluid guidelines rather than the regulation's plain wording.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendants brought a second set of pre-trial motions seeking a stay of proceedings for abuse of process, recusal of prosecutors, declarations of Charter violations, and various disclosure orders.

The motions alleged prosecutorial and investigative misconduct, including failure to disclose relevant case law, prejudicial filing of witness statements, and late disclosure of a police statement.

The court dismissed the motions for a stay, recusal, and prevention of new witnesses.

It also largely denied the disclosure requests, finding no merit in the misconduct allegations and that most requested items were matters for cross-examination.

The defendant was charged with a strict liability regulatory offence under the City of Toronto's noise by-law for excessive noise emanating from her unit.

The complainant, a neighbour, provided extensive logs, police reports, and emails detailing consistent loud music, banging, screaming, and running at late hours, disturbing her and her daughter's peace and sleep.

The defendant denied the noise, claiming it was impossible due to her work schedule, and argued she could not be responsible for the actions of adult nieces staying with her.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated, establishing that excessive noise originated from the defendant's unit.

The court also found the defendant failed to exercise due diligence in preventing the noise, despite being aware of the complaints and a co-op board order to remove her guests.

The defence's application for abuse of process, arguing forum shopping due to a parallel small claims court action, was dismissed as the regulatory charge was distinct from the civil claim.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Nina Nodwell, facing charges of careless driving causing death and bodily harm, brought two pretrial applications: one for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter, and another for a stay due to abuse of process by the Crown.

The court found the total delay was 19.6 months, but a significant portion was attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting the COVID-19 related delay, the net delay was well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

Regarding the abuse of process claim, the court found no firm resolution agreement was reached between the parties, and thus the Crown did not "resile" from a deal.

The court also found no prejudice to the defendant and no bad faith or improper motive by the Crown.

Both applications were dismissed, and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The defendant pleaded guilty to careless driving causing death after crossing a double solid yellow line and striking an oncoming vehicle head-on, killing the other driver.

At the time of the collision, the defendant's driver's licence had been suspended for 20 years, and he had an extensive record of driving offences.

The court emphasized deterrence and proportionality, sentencing the defendant to 75 days of intermittent custody, two years of probation, and a five-year driver's licence suspension.

The appellant, Joseph Scott Hill, appealed his conviction and sentence for destroying or harvesting prescribed trees contrary to a Haldimand County by-law.

The appeal challenged the trial Justice of the Peace's interpretation of the "own use" exception and alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The appellant also sought a reduced fine and restitution.

The court dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the "own use" interpretation and no factual basis for the ineffective assistance claim.

The court also dismissed the respondent's request for costs, deeming the appeal not to meet the high threshold for a cost award.

The defendants, charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace fatality, brought motions for disclosure of Ministry inspectors' disciplinary files and a "Director's Memo" and for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process and unreasonable pre- and post-charge delay.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the requested disciplinary files were not relevant first-party disclosure and that the Director's Memo was protected by solicitor-client privilege, with no "innocence at stake" exception met.

The court also determined that the pre- and post-charge delays were not unreasonable under the Charter's fair trial and delay provisions, and that the alleged investigative and prosecutorial misconduct did not meet the high threshold for an abuse of process stay.

The defendant was charged with failing to yield to a pedestrian and driving while under suspension after a black pickup truck struck an elderly woman on a mobility scooter in a crosswalk.

The central issue was the identity of the driver, as no witness saw the defendant actually driving or sitting in the driver's seat.

Relying on circumstantial evidence, including witness descriptions of a shirtless, nervous man who exited the driver's side and called 9-1-1, and police identification of the defendant at the scene, the court found the only reasonable inference was that the defendant was the driver.

The court also held that the defendant was deemed to have received notice of his licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act.

The defendant was found guilty of both offences.

Melissa Miller pleaded guilty to careless driving causing death under the Highway Traffic Act after texting while driving, resulting in the death of a cyclist.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including her remorse, lack of criminal record, community involvement, and immediate assistance at the scene, alongside aggravating factors such as a prior HTA offence, texting in a construction zone, and the vulnerability of the cyclist.

The Crown sought the maximum sentence (2 years jail, 5 years license suspension, 2 years probation), while the Defence urged a non-custodial sentence.

The court emphasized proportionality, denunciation, and general deterrence, distinguishing between regulatory and criminal offence sentencing principles.

The final sentence imposed was 45 days jail and a 2-year driver's license suspension, with no probation.

The defendant, Brett Hicks, was charged with alcohol-impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The breath demand was deemed unlawful because the officer failed to observe the required 15-minute waiting period for mouth alcohol dissipation, rendering the ASD result unreliable.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's s.10(b) Charter right to counsel, as police made only token efforts to contact his counsel of choice and failed to inform him of his right to wait, which rendered his refusal provisional.

Furthermore, the police's degrading treatment of the defendant in the holding cell, specifically denying him toilet paper and observing him use his mask, constituted an unreasonable search and seizure under s.8 of the Charter.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on both criminal charges, and related provincial offences were proven but stayed due to the s.8 Charter infringement.

Scott Watson was convicted of careless driving causing death (s. 130(3) HTA) and careless driving simpliciter (s. 130(1) HTA) after a trial.

The court considered sentencing principles, legislative intent behind the new careless driving provisions, and the proportionality of the sentence.

Despite the defendant's health issues and belated expression of remorse, the court found his driving behaviour severely lacking and imposed a custodial sentence and a lengthy driving suspension, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

This case concerns an application by the accused, Taiga Building Products Ltd., for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial, related to an Occupational Health and Safety Act charge following a workplace fatality, spanned 11 days over nearly two years.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating a total delay of 23 months and 29 days.

After deducting 80 days for defence delay and 39 days for a discrete COVID-19 related event, the net delay was 610 days (20.05 months), exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and that the delay was unreasonable, partly due to the Crown's unsuccessful expert qualification application and late disclosure.

A stay of proceedings was entered.

The respondent tow truck driver was acquitted of municipal by-law offences for offering services and positioning his truck within 200 metres of an accident scene.

The lower courts found the municipal by-law inconsistent with s. 177(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, which exempts towing services from a general prohibition on commercial solicitation on roadways in an emergency.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 177(3) merely creates an exception to a prohibition and does not grant paramount permission to attend accident scenes.

The by-law was not inconsistent with the HTA.

Convictions were entered and fines imposed.

The applicants, charged with violating the Quarantine Act, brought numerous pre-trial motions challenging the validity of the charging documents, the legislation itself, the authority of the screening officer, alleged breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (including sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11(a), 11(e), 11(i), and 15), and unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed all motions, finding the charging documents valid, the Quarantine Act enforceable, the screening officer's authority established, no Charter breaches proven due to lack of evidence or prior judicial precedent, and no unreasonable delay after accounting for defence-caused delay and the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

The matter was remitted for trial.

The appellant, a novice driver, appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while holding a cellular phone, arguing his guilty plea (made by paying the fine) was uninformed because he was unaware of the automatic 30-day licence suspension that followed.

The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the licence suspension as a direct consequence of the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) regulatory scheme, rather than a collateral consequence that would invalidate the plea.

The court emphasized that drivers are expected to be aware of the consequences within the highly regulated driving regime and that the simplified plea process under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) is intended for efficiency, making it rare to set aside a plea on "fundamental fairness" grounds for readily discernable penalties.