Human Rights

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

He challenged the trial judge's dismissal of his Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his person and vehicle.

The appellant argued that the police used a false pretext of a seatbelt violation under the Highway Traffic Act to arbitrarily detain him and search for drugs in violation of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that the initial stop was lawful based on an actual seatbelt violation, and that the subsequent search was authorized under the Cannabis Control Act based on reasonable grounds to believe cannabis was in the vehicle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, including a national not-for-profit HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C treatment information organization and its employees and board members, brought a defamation action against the defendant for an online libel campaign.

The defendant created profiles on his website labeling the plaintiffs as "groomers" and pedophiles, posted defamatory content on social media platforms, and left threatening voicemail messages at the plaintiffs' workplace.

The defendant's conduct was motivated by hatred stemming from the plaintiffs' association with the 2SLGBTQIA+ community.

The defendant failed to respond to the action and was noted in default.

The court granted default judgment, finding the statements were clearly defamatory, and awarded substantial general and aggravated damages.

A permanent injunction was issued requiring removal of all defamatory publications and prohibiting further defamatory statements.

The decision addresses a motion to amend the Statement of Claim in a civil action brought by Gurupdesh Pandher against the University of Windsor and several individuals.

The court considers whether the plaintiff may add Human Rights Code claims from prior HRTO applications, the addition of new defendants, the sufficiency of defamation pleadings, the scope of misfeasance in public office, the introduction of new human rights grounds, the effect of the collective agreement and labour arbitration, the use of documents subject to the deemed or implied undertaking rule, and the pleading of matters subject to settlement privilege.

The court grants some amendments, strikes others, and provides detailed directions for further pleadings.

This appeal concerns a partial stay of proceedings granted by a trial judge due to Charter violations arising from an unauthorized "no-knock" police entry into the accused's residence to effect an arrest.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in granting a partial stay based on a factual misapprehension and in rejecting alternative remedies.

The Court concluded that while the police misconduct was serious, a stay was not warranted given the lack of evidence of a systemic problem and the availability of alternative remedies like a strong judicial reprimand and potential sentence reduction.

The Crown's appeal was allowed, vacating the stay, and the accused's cross-appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion to compel the Crown to disclose details regarding police "pointer car" designations, arguing its relevance to a Charter Section 9 arbitrary detention issue.

The applicant was detained solely because he was driving a vehicle designated as a "pointer car," which may have been an outdated and incorrect designation.

The court found the evidence concerning the purpose, implementation, and removal procedures of the pointer car designation system to be "obviously relevant" to assessing the constitutional validity of the detention.

The motion was allowed, and the Crown was ordered to disclose all requested information.

A young person was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood and with having a blood alcohol concentration above zero as a novice and young driver.

The defendant challenged whether his right to counsel was breached, alleging he was funneled to duty counsel.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant was properly informed of his right to counsel through the standard caution, understood that right, and was appropriately offered duty counsel when he indicated he did not have a lawyer.

The court rejected arguments that non-compliance with section 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act regarding statements rendered the breath samples inadmissible, as breath samples are not statements and section 146 compliance is not a Charter requirement.

The defendant was convicted on all three counts, with one charge stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with impaired operation contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and operation while over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b).

The Crown withdrew the third count at trial and conceded that the Over 80 count should be dismissed due to Charter violations.

The sole remaining issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate his vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

The Crown's case rested on observations of an off-duty police officer and the arresting officer regarding the accused's driving pattern and physical observations.

The court found a reasonable doubt remained and dismissed the impaired driving charge.

The applicant brought a motion to stay proceedings based on an alleged breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant argued that the net delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that the net delay fell below the ceiling once defence delay and judicial deliberation time were subtracted, and alternatively that discrete events should be excluded.

The court found that after subtracting defence delay and judicial deliberation time, the remaining delay was approximately 20 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found that the trial continuation periods constituted discrete exceptional events that should be excluded, bringing the remaining delay below the ceiling.

The applicant failed to demonstrate defence initiative or that the delay was unreasonable.

The application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The appellants, Vice Media Canada Inc. and journalist Ben Makuch, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a production order requiring them to produce documents relating to their communications with Farah Shirdon, a Canadian resident who had joined ISIS and was charged with terrorism offences.

The appellants also sought to unseal the affidavit supporting the production order and challenged a non-publication order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the production order, finding that the Garofoli standard of review applied and that the issuing judge reasonably balanced the competing interests of law enforcement and freedom of the press.

The court allowed the appeal in part regarding the sealing order, directing that most material be unsealed with limited redactions.

The court also addressed the non-publication order, finding it a valid alternative to sealing but noting that certain portions of the affidavit may not require the publication ban.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

Police officers observed a vehicle on Highway 105 near a R.I.D.E. checkpoint and followed it to a parking lot where they found the accused sleeping in a vehicle.

The officers detained the accused and administered an approved screening device and breathalyzer tests without proper Charter compliance.

The court found breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and excluded the evidence under section 24(2), resulting in an acquittal.

The applicant sought exclusion of breath sample evidence under sections 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing that police violated his section 8 rights by obtaining the samples without reasonable grounds to arrest.

The applicant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable grounds to arrest on an "over 80 mgs" charge and make an Intoxilyzer demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant raised three main issues: whether the officer should have delayed the approved screening device (ASD) test to eliminate mouth alcohol concerns, whether the officer should have verified device calibration, and whether the officer demonstrated sufficient competence in operating the device.

The court found no section 8 breach and dismissed the application.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter motion seeking a stay of proceedings for impaired operation and drive over 80mg charges.

The applicant alleged violations of Charter rights including section 7 and 8 rights regarding video recording in police cells.

The court found that the respondent caused the adjournment of the initial trial date through late filing of its Charter response notice and late disclosure of Police Cell Videotaping Pilot Project materials, particularly Phase 2 materials unknown to the applicant.

The court calculated 12 months and 4 days of combined institutional and crown delay, substantially exceeding Morin guidelines.

The court found both inferred prejudice based on delay duration and actual prejudice in the form of financial stress to the applicant.

The application was allowed and a stay of proceedings was ordered.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample.

The court found that the accused's section 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated due to special circumstances arising from his limited English proficiency and the police's failure to secure an interpreter.

The evidence of the refusal was excluded and that charge was dismissed.

However, the court found the accused guilty of impaired care or control based on evidence that he occupied the driver's seat, attempted to move the vehicle, and displayed signs of impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failure or refusal to comply with a breath demand.

The accused challenged the arrest and breath demand on Charter grounds, alleging lack of reasonable and probable grounds and breach of right to counsel.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and that the accused's right to counsel was adequately protected despite officers remaining visible outside a partially open hospital observation room door.

The court found the accused guilty of failure to comply with the breath demand based on his willful and voluntary failure to provide an adequate sample, and guilty of impaired driving based on the totality of the evidence and the adverse inference from his refusal to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with refusing a roadside screening demand after being pulled over for traffic violations.

The Crown alleged the accused unequivocally refused to provide a breath sample.

The court found that while the accused was legally obliged to comply with the demand, she was operating under a mistaken understanding of her legal rights and was confused rather than defiant.

The accused repeatedly requested access to counsel, which was not facilitated.

The court found a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the refusal was complete and unequivocal, particularly given the accused's confusion, her requests for legal advice, and the availability of counsel that could have clarified her obligations.

The charge was dismissed.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample into a roadside screening device and obstructing a peace officer by failing to provide identification.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b).

The court found that the roadside demand was made within the "forthwith" requirement despite a six-minute delay, as the delay was necessitated by articulated safety concerns and the accused's obstructive behaviour.

The arrest, though technically charged under the wrong provision, was supported by reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found no Charter violations and convicted the accused on both charges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle without a license and without a valid validation sticker on the license plate.

The appellant raised arguments based on religious freedom, freedom of movement and association, and various constitutional and international human rights instruments.

The trial Justice of the Peace found the appellant lacked sincere religious belief and convicted him.

On appeal, the court found the Justice of the Peace erred in law by applying an incorrect three-part test for assessing sincerity of religious belief and by failing to provide meaningful reasons addressing the appellant's Charter arguments.

However, the court upheld the conviction, finding that even if the appellant had sincere religious beliefs, regulation of highway driving is a justifiable limit on Charter rights under section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with care or control with excess blood alcohol and impaired care or control following a motor vehicle incident.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt based on evidence of erratic driving, manifest signs of impairment, and breath analysis results.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging police misconduct including improper handcuffing, an allegedly planted drug baggie, failure to preserve cell video evidence, and an improperly conducted strip search.

The court found that while some police conduct was disrespectful and the Crown breached its disclosure obligation regarding the video, these breaches did not warrant a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with three drug-related offences (possession of marijuana, possession for purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime) and three provincial offences (assaulting a peace officer and two counts of failing to comply with recognizance).

During a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation, a police officer observed the accused with his hand in his jacket pocket and smelled unburned marijuana.

The officer placed his hand on the accused and pushed him back into the vehicle, then subsequently pulled him out to effect an arrest.

A physical altercation ensued.

The trial judge found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to arrest, violated the accused's Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure, and used excessive force.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.