Environmental Law

This decision concerns the continuation of refusals motions in complex insurance litigation involving environmental claims at 26 mining sites operated by Vale Canada Limited.

The court addresses the proportionality and sufficiency of discovery efforts, the organization and resolution of thousands of discovery refusals, and sets out directions for further production and inquiry.

The ruling emphasizes the need for balance and proportionality in discovery, especially in large-scale litigation, and provides a framework for resolving outstanding discovery disputes ahead of trial.

The court considered the allocation and quantum of costs following summary judgment in favour of Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CPR), where the third party, Canada Colors and Chemicals Limited (CCCL), sought costs from the plaintiff, 863880 Ontario Limited.

The court found that exceptional circumstances justified ordering the plaintiff to pay CCCL’s costs, but not the full amount claimed.

The court directed a revised calculation, holding the plaintiff responsible for half of CCCL’s reasonable costs up to the discontinuance of a related third party claim, and all reasonable costs thereafter, subject to a 20% reduction and further specific deductions.

The Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami sought a permanent injunction and other orders to enforce its zoning bylaws against Temagami Barge Limited (TBL) and Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel, alleging unlawful commercial uses on Crown land zoned for "Special Management Area (SMA) Zone (Crown Land)".

TBL argued its uses were lawful non-conforming or permissible expansions under the Planning Act.

The court found most of TBL's commercial uses (marina, retail fuel, commercial docking, barge rental, retail aggregate sales, sewage waste disposal) unlawful, not qualifying as lawful non-conforming uses or reasonable expansions of prior industrial uses.

The court granted a permanent injunction against these unlawful uses but denied the request for partial closure of the property and removal of sea-can containers and an office trailer, finding insufficient evidence of public nuisance or contravention for the latter.

The plaintiff, Erwin Banfi, brought a motion for approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees against multiple municipal and provincial defendants concerning alleged increased flood risk and reduced property values due to overdevelopment in Oakville.

The action, initially premised on property diminution, shifted focus due to difficulties in proving causation and quantifying individual damages.

The proposed settlement involved a $500,000 payment by defendants to the Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation for a flood education and protection program for class members, and class counsel fees of $495,000.

The court approved the cy-près settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the litigation's challenges and the material benefit provided to class members.

Class counsel fees and a $5,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff were also approved.

The appellants, a group of First Nations, appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed their application for judicial review.

They argued that Ontario's revocation of a forest management regulation (MNR-75) and amendments to the Environmental Assessment Act (Bill 197) breached the Crown's duty to consult and the honour of the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the duty to consult does not apply to the law-making process (Bill 197) and that the revocation of MNR-75 did not give rise to a duty to consult as the alleged adverse effects were speculative and equivalent protections remained in force through other legally binding instruments.

The proposed interveners, Environmental Defence Canada Inc. and Federation of Ontario Naturalists, sought leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the statutory interpretation of s. 10(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 2007, which prohibits damage to habitats of endangered species.

The Town of South Bruce Peninsula opposed the intervention, arguing it would not offer a useful contribution.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding the matter to be of public interest with broad implications, and that the interveners, as reputable environmental organizations, could offer a unique and useful perspective on the interpretation of "damage" and the application of principles like de minimis and the precautionary principle, without causing injustice to the appellant.

The Town of Lincoln sought a declaration that AIG Insurance Company of Canada had a duty to defend it under a public entity general insurance policy.

The Town was a defendant in a negligence action alleging sewage overflow due to a ruptured pipe, disrepair of a storm sewer, and improper land grading.

AIG denied coverage based on a pollution exclusion clause.

The court found that the claim against the Town had two branches: one related to the pumping station and sewage flood (potentially subject to exclusion), and another related to the storm sewers and land grading (not subject to the exclusion).

As the second branch was not derivative and concerned a different wrongdoing, the pollution exclusion did not apply to it.

Therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The defendants, Alex G. Krek and Francka Krek, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs', William and Dianne Klein, action for delay, pursuant to Rule 24.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, stemming from an oil spill 29 years prior, was commenced in 2011 and had seen significant delays and missed timetables.

The Kreks argued the delay was inordinate, inexcusable, and caused prejudice, citing the death of a witness and Mr. Krek's frail health.

The Kleins contended their delay was reasonable, particularly given a prior ruling by Wood J. in October 2017 that found their delay reasonable until recently, and subsequent consent timetables.

The court, while expressing "grave concerns" about the slow progress and finding the overall delay inordinate, ultimately denied the motion to dismiss.

This was based on the principle from Stokker v. Storoschuk that where delay has been addressed in a prior court order, only subsequent delay requires explanation.

The court found the delay since Wood J.'s order (17 months) was not inordinate or unexcused, but imposed a peremptory "last chance" timetable for the Kleins to advance the action.

The appellants, two cottagers' associations, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that individual cottage sewage systems were subject to the Building Code Act rather than the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The central issue was whether the relevant "lot or parcel of land" for determining regulatory jurisdiction was the five registered parcels owned by the Grand River Conservation Authority or the individual cottage lots described in leases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that "lot or parcel of land" means land that is legally recognized for municipal and planning law purposes and for which title can be conveyed.

Since the individual cottage lots were not formally severed or registered, the five registered parcels constituted the relevant "lot or parcel of land," bringing the collective sewage systems (exceeding 10,000 litres per day) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment.

The court issued a costs endorsement following successful motions by the Attorney General of Ontario, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, and the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) to strike two constitutional challenge applications.

The applications, brought by National Steel Car Limited, challenged aspects of Ontario's Global Adjustment electricity regime.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Attorney General and Her Majesty in the amount of $50,000, and to the IESO in the amount of $75,000.

The decision considered the general principles of costs under Rule 57.01, the principle of indemnity, and the reasonable expectations of the parties.

It addressed the applicant's argument of being a public interest litigant and confirmed that a party fully participating in and supporting a successful motion, even without formally bringing it, can be awarded costs, subject to adjustment.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority sought to amend charges against a corporate defendant relating to alleged interference with a wetland and watercourse.

The prosecution moved to expand the time frame of 30 charges from August 28, 2012 to September 26, 2012, to May 1, 2011 to September 26, 2012, and to add particulars regarding destruction of vegetation to three counts.

The court granted the motion, finding that the evidence of the defendant's farming activities supported the amendments, the circumstances were serious environmental protection matters, the defendant was not prejudiced, and the limitation period had not expired.

The appellants were convicted of two counts of breaching a regulation under the Conservation Authorities Act.

At trial, they were sentenced to fines of $5,000 each and a two-year probation order requiring reconstruction of a seawall.

The Conservation Authority appealed to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court, seeking removal of a home addition as a sentencing term.

The POAC judge allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, remitted the fines, and ordered removal of the addition.

The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, arguing the POAC judge exceeded the scope of appellate review by reversing factual findings without identifying palpable and overriding error.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the POAC judge impermissibly substituted his own findings regarding whether the conduct constituted a flagrant and deliberate breach of the regulations.

The defendants were charged with discharging or causing the discharge of a pesticide (Headline) into the environment contrary to the Pesticides Act.

The Crown alleged that on July 23, 2013, a helicopter operated by the defendants sprayed pesticide near Highway 40 and St. Andrews Line in Chatham-Kent, causing material discomfort to two witnesses.

The trial hinged on identity and whether the pesticide was improperly used.

The court found that while the pesticide was detected and material discomfort was established, the Crown failed to prove identity and improper use beyond a reasonable doubt.

The critical evidence linking the defendants to the incident (Exhibit 13) was found to be unreliable due to authentication and reliability problems.

The defendants were acquitted.

The plaintiff sought certification of a class action against Mercedes-Benz entities, alleging that BlueTEC diesel vehicles contained "defeat devices" that turned off emission controls below 10 degrees Celsius, leading to excessive nitrogen oxide emissions.

The action primarily claimed economic loss due to negligent misrepresentation, alongside statutory claims under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act and Competition Act, and common law claims for negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of warranties, and waiver of tort.

The court granted certification for 14 of the 17 proposed common issues, revising three and declining to certify three (negligence, breach of express/implied warranties, and aggregate damages).

The decision clarified the "some basis in fact" test for common issues, emphasizing a one-step approach focused on class-wide commonality, and reiterated that aggregate damages are for the quantum of loss, not proof of liability, requiring liability to be established first.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order to compel the defendant municipality to issue adult entertainment establishment licenses, asserting a binding settlement agreement.

The municipality argued the settlement was not enforceable without a council resolution and that the plaintiff had lost its legal non-conforming use rights due to a 5.5-year cessation of operations.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the settlement agreement was not binding on the Town without formal adoption by a by-law or resolution of council, and that any legal non-conforming use rights under the zoning by-law had been extinguished due to the prolonged discontinuance of operations.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from a watershed enforcement officer regarding the freshness of topsoil observed at a property.

The officer opined that topsoil was "very fresh material" based on observations of construction equipment, lack of vegetation, and crisp bulldozer tracks.

The court applied the four-element test from Regina v. Graat to determine whether the lay opinion evidence was admissible.

The court found that all four elements were satisfied: the officer was in a better position than the trier of fact to form the conclusion; the conclusion was one that persons of ordinary experience could make when combined with the officer's experiential capacity; the officer had the necessary experiential capacity despite not being an expert; and the opinion was a compendious mode of stating complex facts.

The opinion was admitted into evidence.

Appeals from convictions and sentences imposed on a corporation and individual for offences related to unauthorized access to Crown land and trespass for fishing purposes.

The appellants organized a public protest and removed trees that had been felled by the Ministry of Natural Resources to restrict access to Oswald Lake.

The court upheld the convictions, finding that the Ministry lawfully restricted access under the Public Lands Act and that the appellants were parties to the offences committed by others.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding no error in principle regarding the failure to inquire into financial ability to pay and determining the fine was not demonstrably unfit given the circumstances of organized civil disobedience.