Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law

The accused was charged with Operation Impaired and Operation Over 80 following a single-vehicle collision with a guardrail on Highway 401.

The Crown alleged the defendant drove while having more than the legal limit of alcohol in his system.

The defence raised three issues: a breach of s. 10(b) Charter rights, that breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable, and that the Crown failed to prove impairment.

The court found no meaningful breach of Charter rights, that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable within the circumstances, and that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol.

The defendant was found guilty on both counts, with the Operation Impaired charge stayed.

The accused brought an application under s. 278.93 (formerly s. 276.1) for a hearing under s. 278.94 (formerly s. 276.2) to determine whether evidence of the complainant's sexual activity other than that forming the subject matter of the sexual assault charges would be admissible under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether the accused's application record must be provided to the complainant before the s. 278.94 hearing.

The court held that the complainant is entitled to receive the application record sufficiently in advance of the hearing to allow her to prepare and make meaningful submissions.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault arising from an attack on a vulnerable victim with Asperger Syndrome at a shopping mall.

The Crown applied for a publication ban on the victim's identity pursuant to section 486.5 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted the publication ban, finding that it was in the interest of the proper administration of justice to protect the victim's identity and privacy, balancing the victim's vulnerability and the risk of harm against the principles of open court and freedom of the press.

The accused was charged with impaired driving.

A Charter application was brought challenging the reasonable and probable grounds for the breathalyzer test based on the possibility of residual mouth alcohol affecting the accuracy of the roadside device.

The court distinguished the case from R. v. Becker on three grounds: the presence of a passenger who admitted to drinking, the beverages being at room temperature rather than cold, and the officer's administration of a residual mouth alcohol disclaimer to which the accused responded that consumption was an hour prior.

The court found no Charter breach and entered a finding of guilt.

The applicant challenged his detention in police cells following the completion of breath tests in an impaired driving investigation.

The court found a breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms regarding arbitrary detention, specifically during the period after 5:00 a.m. when the final officer-in-charge failed to promptly assess the prisoner in accordance with police directives and the Criminal Code.

However, the court determined that the breath sample evidence was not obtained in a manner that infringed Charter rights, as the breach occurred several hours after the evidence was lawfully obtained.

The connection between the evidence and the breach was found to be too remote and tenuous.

The breath sample results were admitted into evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of two controlled substances (cocaine and oxycodone) and failing to comply with the terms of his recognizance.

Following a high-speed pursuit and traffic stop, police observed a baggie of cocaine in the accused's waistband and arrested him.

A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed oxycodone pills.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable grounds, but determined there was a breach of the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) regarding the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The cocaine and health card were admitted as evidence, but the oxycodone was excluded pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine and failing to comply with recognizance, but acquitted of the second possession charge.

The defendant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 15-year-old passenger in his Uber vehicle.

The Crown sought 12 months jail; the defence sought the mandatory minimum of 90 days.

The court imposed 11.5 months jail structured as two consecutive sentences of 173 days each (plus 3 days presentence custody) to remain below the 6-month threshold that would trigger mandatory deportation consequences under immigration law.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for offences involving children, and noted the defendant's lack of remorse, empathy, and insight into his conduct as aggravating factors.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a RIDE program stop.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction on the Over 80 count only.

The defence argued that the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were violated and sought exclusion of the Intoxilyzer results under section 24(2).

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, having manufactured evidence of slurred speech and taken an impermissible shortcut by proceeding directly to arrest rather than first administering an approved screening device test.

The court excluded the breath test results and acquitted the accused.

The defendant pleaded guilty to driving with excess alcohol (160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood) and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from doing so, both offences occurring on March 7, 2017.

The defendant had an extensive criminal record including four previous drinking and driving convictions between 1995 and 2003, and seven previous driving while disqualified or prohibited offences between 1998 and 2013.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months imprisonment (concurrent on both charges), a lifetime driving prohibition, and 36 months probation with conditions including mandatory alcohol treatment and counselling.

The applicant sought to vary his probation order to remove the non-contact condition with his girlfriend, J.R., and his children, citing rehabilitation and J.R.'s support.

The Crown opposed, highlighting the applicant's history of domestic violence, breaches of the order, and ambivalence towards alcohol counselling.

The court acknowledged the applicant's efforts but noted ongoing concerns and the lack of complete information due to concurrent family court proceedings where the children had been removed from J.R.'s custody and the applicant was denied supervised access.

The court emphasized the need for a holistic approach to domestic violence cases across criminal and family justice systems.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum five-year sentence for procuring a person under 18 to provide sexual services under s. 286.3(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court considered reasonable hypothetical scenarios, particularly one involving a youthful sex trade worker who was herself exploited and manipulated, recruiting a 17-year-old friend without financial gain.

The court found that in this hypothetical, an appropriate sentence would be two to 2.5 years, making the five-year mandatory minimum grossly disproportionate and thus a violation of s. 12.

The violation was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter due to a failure of minimal impairment.

The mandatory minimum sentence was declared of no force or effect.

B.L.P. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine aggravating facts for sentencing, specifically whether a knife was used during the assault on the complainant, A.W. The court assessed conflicting testimonies from the complainant and the accused, along with physical evidence.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and the accused's inconsistent, concluding that the aggravating facts, including the use of a knife, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

This criminal trial concerned multiple charges, including aggravated assault and firearm offences, stemming from a shooting incident where a child was injured.

The court, sitting without a jury, evaluated circumstantial evidence primarily focused on identity.

One defendant was found guilty of numerous charges based on a confession, corroborating video evidence, and flight from police, while the other defendant was acquitted on all counts due to insufficient evidence and unreliable expert testimony regarding fingerprints.

This criminal trial involved two Ontario Provincial Police officers, Jason Redmond and David Vogelzang, facing charges related to obstruction of justice, breach of trust, and trafficking cannabis, stemming from an undercover operation.

The court acquitted both officers on charges of attempted obstruction of justice and breach of trust concerning a meeting where they discussed a rumour about the undercover officer's identity, finding reasonable doubt regarding their intent to obstruct.

Redmond was found guilty of trafficking cannabis (Count 4, admitted) and knowingly dealing with a forged document (Count 5).

He was acquitted of a second trafficking charge (Count 3, withdrawn) and a breach of trust charge related to the forged document (Count 6), as his actions in creating the document were not connected to his official duties.

Saad Fouad was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The court found him guilty of robbery, determining that an implied threat of violence existed based on the totality of circumstances, including leading the victim to a dark, secluded area where a second individual brandished an object perceived as a gun.

However, he was found not guilty of using an imitation firearm because the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the individual who brandished the object, as witness testimony indicated it was the second male, not Fouad.

The applicant, Nivethan Alakeswaran, sought a stay of proceedings after being convicted of aggravated assault, alleging a Charter breach (ss. 7 and 12) due to an assault by a Peel Regional Police constable during his post-arrest interview.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's evidence unreliable and incredible, and that the alleged assault was not established on a balance of probabilities.

The defendant, charged with child luring via Facebook Messenger, sought to exclude Facebook communications as evidence, alleging a Section 8 Charter violation.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine if the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized Facebook records, which included public profile information, private messages with the victim, and communications within a child exploitation group.

Applying the Marakah framework, the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy, citing the public nature of Facebook, the defendant's lack of control over the data, the victim's age, and the illegal nature of the communications.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court statements made by a four-year-old child alleging child abuse.

The statements were hearsay and presumptively inadmissible.

The defence challenged whether threshold reliability had been established, arguing the statements were inconsistent, lacked a promise to tell the truth, and had never been subject to cross-examination.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and found the statements substantively reliable based on the circumstances in which they were made, the open-ended questioning, the identity of the recipients as trusted individuals, the temporal proximity to the alleged assault, and corroborating physical evidence.

The court admitted all of the child's utterances, including inconsistent statements, for trial.

The applicant, Anthony Edward Ringel, brought two pretrial applications: one challenging the constitutionality of section 579(2) of the Criminal Code, which deals with stays of proceedings, and another seeking to exclude inculpatory statements made to undercover officers in 2013 on the basis of "tainting" by previously excluded 2004 confessions.

The court dismissed both applications.

It found section 579(2) of the Criminal Code to be constitutional, reaffirming that a stay of proceedings does not equate to an acquittal and does not inherently violate Charter rights under sections 7, 11(b), or 11(h).

Regarding the tainting application, the court found no sufficient temporal, contextual, or strong causal connection between the 2004 excluded confessions and the 2013 admissions to undercover officers, thus ruling the 2013 statements admissible.

A youth was charged with invitation to sexual touching contrary to s. 152 of the Criminal Code and committing an indecent act by exposing his genital organs to a person under the age of 16 years contrary to s. 173(2) of the Criminal Code.

The allegations arose from incidents that occurred when the complainant was between two and five years old while attending an unlicensed daycare operated by the accused's mother.

The complainant did not disclose the incidents until Grade 5, when prompted by a classroom discussion about inappropriate sexual touching.

The trial judge found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, and rejected the accused's denials as marked by inconsistencies and implausibilities.

The accused was convicted on both counts.