Administrative Law

The applicant alleged that the respondent children's aid society failed to comply with a settlement agreement resolving a complaint under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The Board reviewed the 23 terms of the agreement in writing.

The Board found the respondent complied with 15 terms but failed to fully comply with 8 terms, particularly regarding explanations of how allegations of parental alienation and coaching impacted verification findings, and delays in disclosure.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide further explanations and complete disclosure.

The applicant mother filed an application with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent children's aid society refused to proceed with her complaints regarding her child in foster care.

The Board found that the applicant had submitted her complaints via email rather than using the prescribed formal complaint form as required by Ontario Regulation 156/18.

Consequently, the Board determined it lacked jurisdiction to review the application and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed the school board's decision to exclude her child from school under section 265(1)(m) of the Education Act due to safety concerns.

The school board disputed the Child and Family Services Review Board's jurisdiction, arguing that the Board only has authority to hear appeals of expulsions, not exclusions.

The Board agreed, finding that the exclusion was not a disciplinary measure or an effective expulsion, but rather a safety measure with clear conditions for return.

As there was no expulsion decision to review, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant, a grandparent, filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society failed to address her concerns regarding her grandchildren's safety and refused to proceed with her complaint.

The Board dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the applicant was not a parent or a person in receipt of services under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

Furthermore, the applicant had not submitted her complaint to the society using the required formal complaint form.

The appellant filed motions with the Child and Family Services Review Board appealing a school board's decision to expel a student.

The appellant argued the expulsion should be overturned because the decision was not made within the 20-day statutory timeline and notice was not provided promptly.

The Board dismissed the timeliness motion, finding the decision was made on the twentieth day and notice was provided promptly the following day.

The Board granted the appellant's motions to expedite the hearing on the merits and ordered the school board to disclose written and videotaped evidence to ensure procedural fairness.

This appeal concerns the applicable scale of costs when a municipality unsuccessfully appeals an expropriation matter to the courts.

The Ontario Municipal Board ordered compensation to the property owner.

The municipality appealed to the Divisional Court, which dismissed the appeal but awarded only partial indemnity costs of $7,500 rather than full indemnity costs of $23,586.84.

The Divisional Court declined to apply section 32(1) of the Expropriations Act, ruling that ordinary court costs rules applied.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and held that the principle reflected in section 32(1) should apply to court proceedings, entitling the successful respondent to full indemnity costs.

An NCR accused appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with discretionary community living privileges.

The appellant argued he posed no significant risk to public safety, citing 15 years without violent behaviour, and sought an absolute discharge or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board properly considered all relevant factors under section 672.54 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded the appellant continues to pose a significant threat to public safety based on his mental illness, lack of insight, substance abuse issues, and criminal history.

The court emphasized that absence of violent behaviour does not eliminate risk of serious psychological harm, and that Part XX.1 is designed to protect public safety before violence occurs.

The applicant sought to extend the time to appeal an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court that dismissed his application for judicial review on the grounds that it was frivolous and vexatious.

The application for judicial review had sought mandamus requiring the Pharmacy Examining Board of Canada to produce its decision limiting the number of qualifying exams each candidate is allowed.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on jurisdictional grounds, finding that the Court of Appeal for Ontario lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court on an interlocutory motion.

The proper route of appeal is to a panel of the Divisional Court under section 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The moving parties sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that lifted an earlier stay and dismissed their application for judicial review.

The moving parties had been selected in a lottery to apply for retail cannabis store licences but were disqualified by the Registrar for failing to provide an irrevocable letter of credit within five days of notification.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-part test for granting a stay: serious issue to be determined, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience.

While the court found a serious issue existed and acknowledged potential irreparable harm, it determined that the balance of convenience strongly favoured denying the stay due to interference with government policy, public interest in expanding cannabis retail access, and the fact that the moving parties' position had already been rejected by the Divisional Court.

The Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority (RHRA) brought an urgent application seeking an order for In Touch Retirement Living for Vegetarians/Vegans Inc. and Elaine Lindo (the Respondents) to cease operating as an unlicensed retirement home.

The Respondents filed a cross-application challenging the enforcement of the Retirement Homes Act, 2010 on Charter grounds and requesting consideration for a licence.

The court granted the RHRA's application, finding a continuous breach of the Act and dismissing the cross-application due to procedural deficiencies and lack of legal merit for the Charter claims.

Ancillary relief was also granted to ensure the safe transfer of residents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by the Attorney General of Canada to extend the suspension of a declaration of constitutional invalidity regarding sections 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The lower court had found that the "fifth working day review" for administrative segregation violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the lack of meaningful independent review.

The respondent sought an extension to allow Parliament to enact Bill C-83, which would replace administrative segregation with "structured intervention units." The court granted the extension to April 30, 2019, finding that immediate effect would pose unacceptable danger to correctional personnel and inmates, despite expressing concern about Canada's delay in addressing the constitutional infirmity and the absence of interim measures or adequate explanation of how the proposed legislation would remedy the breach.

Crown appeal of an acquittal in a provincial offences matter concerning the interpretation of the standard of "reasonable belief" under section 156(1)(c) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The respondent was charged with hindering or obstructing a provincial officer in the performance of his duties after preventing an inspection of his property where an open fire was burning.

The central issue was whether the provincial officer had the requisite authority to conduct a warrantless inspection based on information received from a bylaw officer regarding smoke and waste disposal on the property.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, establishing that "reasonable belief" in the regulatory inspection context is a lower threshold than "reasonable and probable grounds" and does not require the application of criminal law standards for assessing informant tips.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a detention order rather than granting a conditional discharge.

The appellant argued that the Board made a palpable and overriding factual error regarding his propensity to decompensate and that the Board failed to adequately consider alternative mechanisms for readmission to hospital.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding that the Board's findings were supported by evidence and that the detention order was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition available given the appellant's risk to public safety.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

An appeal from the Ontario Review Board's disposition continuing a conditional discharge for an individual found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The appellant argued that the Board's conclusion that he remained a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable, particularly given his 17-year history without violent behaviour while subject to Board jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it fell within the range of reasonable outcomes based on evidence including the appellant's serious index offences, lack of insight into his mental illness, resistance to treatment, high risk assessment scores, and the unanimous opinion of his treatment team that he remained a significant risk.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that maintained a conditional discharge while finding he remained a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible of aggravated assault and related offences involving a near lethal knife attack.

He argued the Board erred in failing to grant an absolute discharge, contending the evidence demonstrated he no longer posed a significant threat and that the Board reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion fell within a range of reasonable outcomes based on positive evidence, including the appellant's insufficient concern about his threat when psychotic, initial reluctance to accept case management, and refusal to switch to long-acting injectable antipsychotic medication.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash an appeal by Fay Brunning, a lawyer representing persons in proceedings under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The appeal challenged a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge requiring Brunning to appear before an Independent Assessment Process Adjudicator.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the direction was an interlocutory order rather than a final order, and that any appeal from it should go to the Divisional Court with leave.

The court also found the appeal moot since the scheduled proceedings had already taken place.

The court noted that while Brunning's concerns about the judge's comments regarding her conduct were understandable, those comments were part of the reasons for judgment, not the order itself, and could be challenged in other pending appeals.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer whose licence was revoked on December 10, 2014, appealed two orders that permanently enjoined him from advertising, holding himself out, and practising as a lawyer in Ontario.

The appellant challenged the fairness of the proceedings and claimed various bases for his right to practise law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the permanent injunctions, finding that the appellant had clearly breached section 26.1 of the Law Society Act by continuing to hold himself out as a lawyer and offer legal services after his disbarment.

The court rejected all of the appellant's arguments regarding procedural fairness and his claimed rights to practise law.

Stephen Doherty appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to psychiatric treatment, specifically antipsychotic medication.

The court addressed the mootness doctrine, determining the appeal was not moot due to the potential impact on future substitute decision-making.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board's factual findings, the court upheld the Board's determination that Doherty lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, despite some symptomatic improvement.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following dismissal of an appeal concerning a municipal dispute over property use, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondent municipality sought substantial indemnity costs based on allegations of misconduct made by the appellant and the procedural complexity caused by the self-represented litigant.

The court held that elevated costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and declined to award substantial indemnity.

However, the court accepted that the appellant’s conduct significantly prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

After reducing certain disbursements and adjusting fee amounts, the court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the appellant.